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This dissertation examines an encounter with the Muslim world within the context 
of U.S. overseas expansion from 1898 to 1906 and the transformation of white 
masculinity in the United States from the 1870s to the 1920s. In 1906, in the 
southernmost portion of the Philippines, the U.S. military encountered grassroots militant 
resistance. Over one thousand indigenous Muslim Moros on the island of Jolo, in the 
Sulu archipelago, occupied a dormant volcanic crater and decided to oppose American 
occupation. This meant defying their political leaders, who accommodated the 
Americans. These men and women, fighting in the defense of Islamic cultural and 
political autonomy, produced the spiritual, intellectual, and ideological justification for 
anti-imperial resistance. In this dissertation, I examine how underlying cultural 
assumptions and categories simplified definitions of race and gender so that American 
military officials could justify the implementation of U.S. policy as they saw fit in the 
Southern Philippines. I argue that U.S. military officials had wide latitude in designing 
the military campaigns and conduct they believed were justified in order to implement 
and enact imperialistic policy. Occupying military forces set the template through their 
campaigns and strategies, whether effective or not, that became the historical experience 
that shaped U.S. foreign policy. For these reasons, I focus on how social constructions of 
race, gender, a U.S. ideology of imperialism and expansion, and lived experience with 
 2 
Native Americans, all shaped how U.S. military officials formed ideas about who the 
“Moros” were, how to deal with them, and how to construct them as a savage “other” as 
extra-continental expansion continued throughout the twentieth century.  
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Introduction 
On March 5, 1906, the United States Army attacked a band of Filipino Muslims 
who had taken refuge on Bud Dajo, a volcanic summit on Sulu Island in the Sulu 
archipelago of the southern Philippines. The operation culminated in the massacre of 
approximately seven hundred to one thousand men, women, and children. It fed outrage 
among anti-imperialists in the United States appalled at the carnage of empire building.1 
The angry reaction surprised Leonard Wood, Governor General of the Southern 
Philippines. Prior to the assault on Bud Dajo, Wood and his staff appear to have 
concluded that the gathering on the summit was an opportunity to demonstrate U.S. 
military dominance and political authority in the region. In its aftermath Wood and his 
staff viewed the event as an extremely effective counterinsurgent operation, which had 
met all its stated objectives. It also exonerated an approach to dealing with the indigenous 
Muslim population that Wood had advocated since his arrival as Governor General of the 
southern Philippines, which was renamed the Moro Provinces by the Philippines 
Commission. Wood and his staff hoped that with the eradication of this symbol of anti-
colonial defiance they could launch a civilizing mission. U.S. policy-makers decided that 
the Moros were a savage people for whom “warfare was their religion and like a national 
sport” and who were incapable of self-rule. Vice-Presidential Candidate Theodore 
Roosevelt declared that allowing self-rule for Filipinos would be like “granting self-
government to an Apache reservation under some local chief.”2  
                                                 
1
 Charles Byler, “Pacifying the Moros: American Military Government in the Southern Philippines, 1899-
1913,” Military Review 85 (2005): 41-45. 
2
 Hermann Hagedorn, Leonard Wood, A Biography, Volume I (New York: Harper Brothers Publishers, 
1931), 406; Herman Hagedorn, ed.,Works of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1925), 60; Peter Gowing, Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-
1920 (Manila: University of the Philippines, 1977), 156; Robert A. Fulton, Moroland: The History of Uncle 
Sam and the Moros, 1899-1920 (Bend, Oregon: Tumalo Creek Press, 2009), 163, 166. 
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This colonial policy rested on the premise that Muslim Filipinos remained outside 
the orbit of civilization and in need of racial uplift by the United States. The process of 
racial uplift often required the destruction of so-called barbarians. Leonard Wood 
particularly believed that such “savages” understood only the language of violence. As 
one army marching song phrased it: “Civilize them with a Krag.” Colonial administrators 
needed to quash political and military opposition and enlist ruling Muslim elites in 
support of U.S. goals in order to establish order in the region. Once order was established 
policy-makers could begin the civilizing project in earnest.3  
This dissertation examines this encounter with the Muslim world within the 
context of U.S. overseas expansion from 1898 to 1906 and the transformation of white 
masculinity, which occurred in the United States from the 1870’s to the 1920’s.4 In 1906, 
in the southernmost portion of the Philippines, the U.S. military encountered grass-roots 
militant resistance. Over one thousand indigenous Muslims on the island of Jolo, in the 
Sulu archipelago, occupied a dormant volcanic crater and decided to oppose this 
imperialist project, which meant defying their political leaders, who accommodated the 
Americans. These mujahiduun, and mujahidatt, fighting in the defense of Islamic cultural 
and political autonomy, produced the spiritual, intellectual, and ideological justification 
                                                 
3
 Brian McAlister Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine-American War, 1899-
1902 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 27. The U.S. Army adopted the Krag-
Jorgenson rifle in 1893. It was a smokeless, bolt-action, repeating, .30 caliber rifle. John Morgan Gates, 
Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1973), 67-70; W. K. Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the 
Malays of Southern Thailand (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 49; Hagedorn, Leonard Wood, 
Volume II, 43. 
4
 Gail Bederman Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 
1880-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 15,17.  
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for anti-imperial resistance.5 The massacre at Bud Dajo has not been examined by 
historians within the context of shifting ideas about race and gender in the United States.  
This dissertation seeks to rectify this omission by examining the pacification of 
the Muslims in the southern Philippines as a distinctly different phase from the 
counterinsurgency fought in the north from 1898 to 1902 against westernized 
Illustrados.6  My study of this event also concentrates on the process of race- making in 
American history and its linkage with shifting gender formation. Theodore Roosevelt and 
Leonard Wood were not only principal actors in this process of destruction of Tausug 
Moros’ polity but also very close friends and proponents of a new brand of white 
masculinity for a new century and a vigorous overseas American empire. They saw this 
expansionist project a new frontier for white men to test his mettle against savage and 
barbarous races. Men like them conflated Islam with savagery and pigeonholed Muslim 
Filipinos as a particularly uncivilized race of people. Once armed with this certainty of 
“Moro character,” U.S. Army officials embarked on a campaign to eradicate Muslims’ 
political and cultural authority.  
The U.S. imperialist response to the Moros exhibited the contradiction at the heart 
of modernity. During the nineteenth century the nation-state emerged as the primary 
mode of political society in the Western world. Classical liberalism and free-market 
capitalism spread as the primary modes of political and economic life. The official 
ideology of classical liberalism, especially regarding individual rights, was problematic in 
                                                 
5
 Mujahiduun means “the ones who struggle in the cause of Allah” and denotes the male gender. 
Mujahidatt means the same for female gender. 
6
 Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States & the Philippines (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 61-62. The Illustrados were the elite class of Filipinos who 
grew up in households where Spanish was a second language. They were educated, primarily male, and 
produced the intellectual basis for a Filipino nationalism. Jose Rizal was foremost amongst them as a potent 
nationalist symbol of a Philippines nation. 
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a system predicated upon racial hierarchies and the de facto marginalization of specific 
groups as “out groups.” As historian Chandan Reddy points out, “The nation-state’s 
claim to provide freedom from violence depends on its systematic deployment of 
violence against peoples perceived as non-normative and irrational.”7 In order to provide 
an environment that broadened access to economic mobility for whites, classes of non-
white others had to be established, policed, and reified in public discourse. American 
historical actors constructed racial and gendered categories and used them to “other” 
entire populations. This placed them outside of the hegemonic community of white 
American citizens, denied them the basics rights of citizenship, which contradicted the 
ideological basis of the liberal nation state.8    
Violence carried out against non-whites was a central feature of 19th century 
American political life. The liberal nation-state, which emerged via continental westward 
expansion, was erected upon the bodies of enslaved African-Americans and communities 
of indigenous people. The late 19th century transition to global empire as a result of the 
Spanish-American War was not ideologically seamless, but it occurred within an 
ideological continuity of violent territorial expansion.   
The Philippine Islands fell into possession by the United States through the 1899 
Treaty of Paris, which ended the Spanish-American War. The United States acquired the 
islands, along with Cuba, Guam, and Puerto Rico, for the paltry sum of twenty million 
dollars. The United States fought a bloody insurgency against a Filipino nationalist 
movement in the north from 1898 to 1902. United States policymakers used claims of 
                                                 
7
 Chandan Reddy, Freedom with Violence: Race, Sexuality, and the U.S. State (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2011), 18-20.  
8
 Audrey Smedley, Race in North America: Origin and Evolution of a Worldview 3rd Edition (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2007), 201-03.   
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economic benefits for all Americans as rationale for expansion into the Pacific. The myth 
of “free land” and yeoman farmer, firmly established within the cultural psyche of 
America, suggested the presence of infinite frontiers upon which white men could tame 
the wilderness into civilization while preserving individual liberty, both economic and 
political. They connected national security to continued economic growth, which they 
argued preserved the unique American character and society.9   
The United States occupied the southern islands, which did not participate in the 
insurgency, with the hope that the Moros of that region would cooperate in the 
acquisition of this newest addition to the American empire. Islam had been the dominant 
religion in the south, where Muslims controlled thirty percent of the landmass of the 
islands, despite numbering about ten percent of the population of the Philippines. The 
largest of the Muslim ethnic groups in the south was the Maguindanaons, who made up 
about seventy-five percent of the population of the island of Mindanao, the second largest 
Philippine island. The second largest of the Muslim ethnic groups, and noted as the 
fiercest and most effective of fighters by the Spanish and the Americans, was the Tausug. 
The Tausug lived in the Sulu archipelago and were the dominant ethnic group of that 
region.10 The Tausug and Maguindanaons had a solid tradition of resistance to foreign 
dominance and vigorously opposed U.S. hegemony from the moment Americans landed 
on their shores. 
Malay missionaries brought Islamic religion and civilization to the Philippines 
from nearby Islamic societies in Southeast Asia in the twelfth century C.E. These 
                                                 
9
 Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1963), 189-94; Richard Slotkin, Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the 
American Frontier, 1600-1860 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973), 320, 347; Walter 
Nugent, Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), 222-23. 
10
 Caesar Majul, Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: Diliman, 1999), 5, 23, 69.  
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missionaries were orientated toward Sufism, the mystical tradition within Islam. They 
tolerated the indigenous cultural, and often spiritual, institutions and practices in the 
communities they encountered. They lived within these indigenous communities. They 
intermarried with the local population and adapted much of the political structures of the 
people to whom they were proselytizing.11 Although U.S. officials claimed that the 
Moros possessed only a basic understanding of Islam, they had a solid intellectual 
tradition of Islamic scholarship, which produced versions of the sharia filtered through 
their cultures and histories.  
When the Americans landed in the southern Philippines and began their colonial 
relationship with the Muslims of the Philippines they readily adapted the moniker the 
Spanish had given the Muslims, Moros. Also, much as Americans had done with Native 
Americans, they unconsciously conflated all Muslim ethnicities into an abstract “Moro 
race,” especially when it suited military and colonial expediency.  
 
Methodology 
In this dissertation, I examine how “underlying cultural assumptions and 
categories” simplified definitions of race and gender so that American military officials 
                                                 
11
 Majul, Muslims in the Philippines, 46-55. The Shafi school of Islamic jurisprudence is found in use in 
East Africa, Yemen, Palestine, and Southeast Asia. It is the third of the four schools of law founded in the 
Islamic legal tradition. Sufi’s mystics, in the Islamic tradition, exported Islam to the region. Once in 
Southeast Asia, it adapted to many of the existing indigenous religious traditions, making it rather unique 
and specific to each region. By destroying the indigenous political structures, United States policymakers 
weakened the efficacy of this localized Islamic tradition as a discourse within which to articulate a basis for 
opposition. In the late twentieth century and contemporary times, the Islamic groups that have risen to the 
forefront of the “Moro” struggle for autonomy and independence have generally been articulating 
internationalist Pan-Islamic based revivalist movements. The most recent and lethal example of this would 
be the Abu Sayyaf movement founded by a veteran of the Afghan wars who trained in Islamic 
jurisprudence and Islamic political theory in Saudi Arabia.   
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could justify the implementation of U.S. policy as they saw fit.12 This study further 
argues that U.S. military officials had wide latitude in designing the military campaigns 
and conduct they believed were justified in order to implement the more general U.S. 
policy of imperialism. In doing so, occupying military forces set the template through 
their campaigns and strategies, whether effective or not, that became the historical 
experience that shaped U.S. foreign policy. For these reasons I will especially focus on 
how social constructions of race, gender, a U.S. ideology of imperialism and expansion, 
and lived experience with Native Americans all shaped how U.S. military officials 
formed ideas about who the “Moros” were, how to deal with them as a group, and, more 
specifically, how the United States should operate in dealings with them as the savage 
“other” as extra-continental expansion would continue throughout the twentieth century.  
I also note the complexities of constructions of race among builders of U.S. 
empire and its close relationship to gender and, in the case of the Muslims in the 
Philippines, religion. Prior discussions of race have centralized phenotypical construction 
and given short shrift to the roles that culture and religion have played in racializing 
subordinated communities. In other words, how did policymakers demarcate the 
boundaries of the other besides the recognition and emphasis of phenotypical 
characteristics like skin color, hair texture? It is my contention that other factors were 
employed in these constructions, and in my study I highlight the role that religion and 
culture, as well as gender, played in the construct of the racial other in the southern 
Philippines.13  
                                                 
12
 Frank Costigliola and Thomas G. Paterson, “Defining and Doing the History of United States Foreign 
Relations: A Primer,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 12. 
13
 Mathew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and 
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U. S. officials shaped attitudes toward Muslim Filipinos within the context of 
white supremacist ideology commonly accepted in this era. Notions of race, which were 
part of this ideology, conflated images of savagery with racial inferiority and regarded the 
Moros as irrevocably primitive. I argue that race, as a concept and category, varies across 
time and space, and that marginalized groups themselves catalyze reconstructions of 
hierarchical racial categories. Race also shifts according to a variety of factors attributed 
to the people generally defined as an inferior “Other.” In the Philippines from 1898 to 
1906, officials categorized Moros on the basis of their religious and cultural differences, 
as well as the lack of clear binaries of gender.14  
The first goal of this dissertation is to suggest that ideas of race represented 
attitudes and beliefs about the differences between Moros and American military officials 
based on religion in an effort to demonize and subordinate them. In this way Islam, 
wrongly understood in a racial context rather than as an ideology and faith practice, 
shaped how U.S. officials defined the intrinsic elements of a “Moro character.” U.S. 
officials adapted the ethnic identifier of Moro from the Spanish who had assigned it to 
Muslims based on generalizations of all Muslims as “Moors,” like their earlier 
adversaries whom they had ejected from Spain not long before they occupied the 
Philippines. It did not become a generally accepted self- identifier by Muslims in the 
Philippines until the mid-twentieth century.15 
                                                                                                                                                 
Abroad, 1876-1917 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000); 154-5. : Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1978), 206-07; Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in 
American War and Diplomacy (New York: Anchor Books, 2012), 6, 205, 227.   
14
 Siobhan B. Somerville, Race and the Invention of Homosexuality in American Culture (Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 2000), 23-24; Bederman, Manliness & Civilization, 25, 140; Edward 
Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 20-21. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefanic, Critical 
race Theory: An Introduction (New York University Press, 2001), 7-9, 22; Audrey Smedley, Race in North 
America: Origin and Evolution of a Worldview (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2007), 17, 35.  
15
 Edward M. Kuder, “The Moros in the Philippines,” The Far Eastern Quarterly 4.2 (1945): 119-26. 
 16 
Islam provided the intellectual and spiritual context for Moros’ resistance to U.S. 
rule. A strong tradition of militant jihad emerged from several centuries of struggle 
between the Spanish and the Tausug.16 This knowledge and understanding of Islam 
motivated many of them to declare jihad, or “fisabil” as Moros called it, against 
American soldiers. Jihad became common when Americans attempted to usurp Islamic 
political and cultural institutions. By grounding resistance to U.S. occupation in Moro 
Islamic ideology, they resisted attempts by Americans to define and control them. 
Individual Moros, even those with only a rudimentary understanding of Islam, 
understood the primacy of Islamic governance in the sharia and the proscriptions against 
living under the rule of non-believers. Hundreds of years of resistance to Spanish 
imperialism had created a culture of jihad.17 To Moros the spectacle of armed U.S. 
soldiers criss-crossing Mindanao with no regard for the sovereignty of the locals 
provoked violent reactions. It was not misinterpreted or misunderstood. Having engaged 
the Spanish in armed struggle to maintain autonomy, and armed with an ideological 
context of Islam, Moros once again responded with force in an attempt to stop this 
invasion of their lands. 
Moros came together on Bud Dajo because of changing political circumstances 
that resulted from the American occupation and a shifting social environment. While 
many Tausug datus made accommodations with American authorities, many ordinary 
Tausug refused to abide by them.18 Wood’s offensives made them landless and the ebb 
and flow of marriage, death, and births, had been interrupted by the relentless 
                                                 
16
 Majul, Muslims in the Philippines, 73-74, 121-40.  
17
 Renato Oliveros, “Islam in the Moro-American War, 1899-1913: Implications on Muslim Mindanao, the 
Philippines” (PhD diss., Temple University, 2005), 120-21; Majul, Muslims in the Philippines, 380-82.  
18
 Datus are semi-autonomous rulers of bands of Tausug. They recognized the authority of the Sultan based 
upon his purported lineal connection the Prophet Muhammad.  
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counterinsurgency activities of the U.S. Army. Out of this cauldron of violence and 
destruction the tradition of militant jihad revived. Landless Tausug families and their 
sympathizers, created a community on the summit where they formulated grass roots 
resistance. Traditional political leadership within the Tausug community did not direct 
this resistance. It emerged from the experience of displacement and to fill a power 
vacuum left by datus who had accommodated with the Americans.19  
I characterize this event as a massacre, borrowing my definition of massacre from  
Leeanna Keith’s The Colfax Massacre. Keith argues that given the number of fatalities 
and the one-sided nature of the confrontation between blacks and whites in Colfax, 
Louisiana in 1873, the term massacre is appropriate. In addition Keith points out the 
historical tendency to label such events as “riots” in an attempt to characterize 
Reconstruction-era blacks as prone to rioting. Similar characterizations of one-sided 
confrontations with Native Americans, such as the Wounded Knee massacre, are 
repackaged in the white supremacist press of the day as “battles” in order to characterize 
the victims as aggressive savages. Massacres in the American West, and the Philippines, 
functioned as a justification for the civilizing mission as well as a method of imperial 
conquest. I concur with Keith and cite the same imbalance of power between U.S. Army 
and Bud Dajo protagonists in 1906 as justification for defining this event as a massacre.20   
The historical record of U. S. involvement in the southern Philippines illustrates 
the American civilizing mission in the country at large. This imperial project rested upon 
the desire to drag barbarians and savages into the light of progress and forcefully bestow 
                                                 
19
 Fulton, Moroland, 255-57; Barbara Ransby, Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement: A Radical 
Democratic Vision (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 171.  
20
 Leeanna Keith, The Colfax Massacre: The Untold Story of Black Power, White Terror, and the Death of 
Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), xii-xv; Heather Cox Richardson, Wounded Knee: 
Party Politics and the Road to an American Massacre (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 288, 293-95.  
 18 
upon them the twin gifts of free-market capitalism and liberal democracy. The “empire of 
liberty” promised by Thomas Jefferson began with the dubious and contentious mission 
to deal with the “Indian problem,” and came to include the “Negro problem,” the 
“Philippine problem,” the “Moro problem,” and, in contemporary times, the “problem of 
Islamic extremism.” The common denominator of all these problems has been their self-
inflicted nature as one of many consequences of aggressive United States economic and 
territorial expansion. It is no coincidence that these missionary impulses and drives to 
remake the savage Other coincided with regions that held some resource desired by 
Americans, or were deemed strategic for the preservation and expansion of American 
hegemony. By the end of the nineteenth century, economic expansion and anxiety over 
the loss of  mythic free land provided the condition for a metamorphosis in the nature of 
this discourse and the nature of U.S. empire.21   
Late nineteenth-century expansion was built upon the intellectual foundation of 
several men who wrote extensively and provided the spiritual, economic, and strategic 
rationale for the “new empire” built during the twilight of continental expansion. Josiah 
Strong, Brooke Adams, Alfred Mahan, and Frederick Jackson Turner were men who 
provided this intellectual rationale. Josiah Strong articulated a spiritual and racial 
foundation for the manner in which officials would administer non-whites outside of the 
continental U.S. Like Turner, Strong believed that the closing of the frontier presented a 
spiritual and cultural crisis for the white male in the United States, but argued that Anglo-
                                                 
21
 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: H. Holt and Co., 1920); 
LaFeber, The New Empire, 61, 63-65. 
 19 
Saxon expansion characterized by Protestant missionary activity was the solution to the 
crisis.22   
This transition and reconfiguration in the cultural and political discourse of the 
United States did not signify a radical shift. It was simply a metamorphosis of nineteenth-
century continental expansion into an overseas, extra-continental project. From its 
colonial origins the nature of U.S. expansion had been racial warfare, expelling or 
exterminating one “race” of people to make room for another. The language of imperial 
expansion was nestled within an ideology of political egalitarianism for white men and 
moral, spiritual, and economic uplift for indigenous peoples. The twinning of these 
discourses created a moral imperative for whites and a language of essentialism to 
describe indigenous people. The logic was that if God had ordained the “overspreading of 
the continent with the Anglo-Saxon race” and the bringing of Christian civilization to 
lesser peoples, then Anglo-Saxons had an implied duty to remake peoples being 
disenfranchised or removed. Consequently, American imperialist whites articulated an 
all-encompassing methodology of imperialism that justified acts that resulted in cultural 
genocide.23 It was never enough to appropriate resources and land because the language 
and ideology of U.S. empire also called for the remaking of subordinate populations into 
pale replicas of white Americans. U.S. imperial ideology demanded cultural, spiritual, 
economic, and intellectual hegemony over its victims.24   
                                                 
22
 LaFeber, The New Empire, 62, 72-79; Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in 
American War and Diplomacy (New York: Anchor Books, 2012), 207-11.  
23
 Steven Leonard Jacobs, Lemkin on Genocide (Plymouth, United Kingdom: Lexington Books, 2012), 40-
42. Raphael Lemkin defined genocide as crime against humanity after World War II. He included cultural 
genocide as one of the eight dimensions of the crime. Cultural genocide as defined by Lemkin is to 
“obliterate every reminder of former cultural patterns.” Examples he gave were the compulsory use of the 
occupiers’ language, the banning or marginalizing of religious practices, and the banning of cultural 
practices integral to the effacy of cultural identity.   
24
 LaFeber, The New Empire, 72-74; Gregory Nobles, American Frontiers: Cultural Encounters and 
 20 
Despite this evolving discourse of a new empire outside of the continental United 
States, army officers and policymakers returned to familiar frames of reference for 
dealing with new populations. They used the experience of dispossessing the Native 
Americans to form strategies to pacify the Moros, and the racial constructions of Indians 
and African Americans to craft them both distinct and Other. Officials characterized 
Filipino Muslims in a manner that defined them as a savage people much like the Native 
Americans. The U.S. had dispossessed Native Americans within the context of this 
prevalent discourse while they implemented a combination of armed force and legal 
machinations in order to abrogate and break treaties when it suited the political, cultural, 
and social agenda of the hegemonic community of whites. As already noted, when 
Theodore Roosevelt accepted the vice-presidential nomination, he declared that allowing 
self-rule for Filipinos would be like “granting self-government to an Apache reservation 
under some local chief.” In likening the Filipinos to the Native Americans, Roosevelt 
deployed a powerful parallel that constructed an entire community as savages in order to 
justify the treatment of these people as “wards” of the federal government.25 Officers not 
only established a precedent of irregular combat against the Moros; they introduced 
similar patterns of paternalistic control from the U.S. western plains into the southern 
Philippines. The same racial attitudes that provided ideological justification for the 
eradication of Native Americans influenced the rationalization for the massacre at Bud 
Dajo in 1906.26  
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This is not to argue that American officials merely transferred racial constructions 
of Native Americans to Muslim Filipinos. The process of race-making was a complex, 
contingent exercise, especially dependent upon the circumstances and necessities of the 
mission faced by the U.S. military in that moment.27 While the experience in the 
American West gave officials the language, and sometimes the inspiration, for 
description of the Moros and justification of policies, they made clear distinctions 
between the two. In fact, American officials were often thoughtfully selective regarding 
the tactics they used in the pacification of the Moros. Leonard Wood, however, 
conducted his counterinsurgency actions against the Moros based upon a flawed, and 
somewhat invented, narrative of his success against the Apache in the Arizona territories. 
Wood’s behavior in this period was something of a departure from what had been a fairly 
nuanced, albeit racist, construction of Moro racial character by most American officials. 
It is not a matter of whether or not U.S. policymakers conceived of Moros like 
Native American populations or rather constructed a new and novel racial identity for 
them.28 Rather, policymakers equipped with a toolbox of ready-made racial 
characteristics borrowed from them in order to categorize Moros, and indeed all 
Filipinos. By the late nineteenth century scientific racism had expanded beyond the 
binary of white and non-white and created a plethora of categories of race in order to 
explain phenotypical variations in humanity, and rank them upon a subjective scale 
predicated upon white Anglo-Saxon racial supremacy.29 
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Scientific classification, scientific management, and technological innovation 
seemed to offer solutions for late nineteenth-century societal problems. Society was 
driven by innovations in science and technology and medicine. The growth of scientific 
management spread the dubious idea that through technology, social, political, and racial 
problems could be solved. This widely embraced notion combined with teleological ideas 
about human development provided an ideological and functional context for an 
American imperialism that denied the basic rights of humanity to these “wards” even as 
they insisted on their importance for white citizens.30 
In addition, this study will illuminate the nature of occupation, colonialism, and 
cultural conscription of colonial subjects as inherently destructive and potentially 
murderous. The period this study covers is a preliminary phase to a mission of 
civilization in which people like Theodore Roosevelt, David Prescott Barrows, Najeeb 
Saleeby, and Leonard Wood felt compelled to engage. These men were not homicidal 
monsters; in fact, they saw themselves as acting in a benevolent fashion. Furthermore, 
despite their admiration of the efficiency of the British system, they believed Americans 
had more altruistic motivations. The mechanics of conquest, however, contradicted the 
benevolent language of American exceptionalism and empire. Civilization required 
destruction for its targeted population. Stripped of the rhetorics of benevolence and 
paternalism, faced with resistance, conquest assumed its naked character of extreme 
measures and violent coercion to achieve its goals. Men like David Prescott Barrows, 
Wood, Reverend Charles Brent, and Robert Bullard supported acts of extreme violence, 
which culminated in the massacre at Bud Dajo.  
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Even those individuals who constructed Philippine policy with an orientation 
toward service and beneficence exhibited a degree of cold-blooded paternalism marked 
by a casual disregard for the destruction of Moro societies and peoples. Barrows, one the 
most vivid examples, was enthusiastically supportive of harsh measures taken against 
Moros and Christian Filipinos who resisted. His reaction to the massacre at Samar was 
indignation that military tactics were being questioned at all. In his zeal for the 
transformation of lesser peoples he was willing to tolerate genocidal policies. His 
opinions regarding the Moros were much more severe because he saw them as ranking 
lower in the hierarchy of civilized peoples than the Christian insurrectos.31 As much as 
Barrows verbalized a commitment to the improvement of Filipino society and has been 
portrayed as such within the historiography, he was an eager participant and urged others 
on in the exploitation of lands. Furthermore, his ambition to establish schools was part of 
a larger imperial project that in the south amounted to cultural imperialism and the utter 
destruction of Moro culture and religiosity. His insistence that Filipinos be taught English 
and learn American history, rather than that of the Philippines, was part of his grander 
vision of eradicating an autonomous Filipino cultural identity. 32   
David Prescott Barrows had extensive experience studying American indigenous 
peoples for the purpose of imperial domination and cultural genocide and saw the 
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mission of civilization for the Moros as similar to what had been done with Native 
Americans. Letters written by him demonstrate a consistent point of view on this matter 
up until 1902. Although he would eventually conclude that a reservation system would 
not work for Filipinos in light of its ineffectiveness with Native American communities. 
Barrows maintained a certain consistency in his outlook on dealing with “dependent 
peoples.” His use of the phrase marked his alliance with paternalistic liberal elements 
within the U.S. who understood Native Americans in this way and enfolded the “new 
wards” that came from the Spanish-American War.33   
Army officials decided that autonomy would not be an option for Moros until 
their indigenous culture and religion could be eliminated and replaced with “American” 
institutions so as to remake them into brown-skinned, racially inferior versions of white 
Americans. Army officials accordingly justified extreme measures that resulted in a 
campaign of cultural genocide.34 The U.S. engaged in the destruction of entire 
communities accompanied by large losses of life, both civilian and combatant. Wood 
exemplified the United States’ approach toward Filipino Muslims and patterns of 
interaction with them that persisted throughout the U.S. imperial era. The same racial 
attitudes that provided ideological justification for attempted eradication of Native 
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American communities influenced the rationalization of the massacre at Bud Dajo in 
1906.  
Existing side-by-side and often intermingled with this racist ideology was the 
newer intellectual and social ideology of Progressivism. Officers such as Wood, Pershing 
and Bullard perceived their role and their duties in the southern Philippines within this 
ideological context, which included a duty to design an improved, forward-thinking 
society. These “progressives in uniform” within the ranks of the officer corps and 
political administrators did not hold to a monolithic political and social discourse. These 
individuals determined to engage and improve perceived lower races from inferior 
civilizations for their own betterment. This ideal worked out along varying degrees of the 
ideological spectrum, but was nonetheless consistent in the actions, if not always the 
rhetoric, of these men. Wood and his fellow officers, while conscious of the changing 
role of the United States in the global community of empires, embraced a particular 
vision of empire, which differed from that of their European counterparts. U.S. empire 
was predicated upon an eventual goal of self-governance and a conviction that  
“Americanness” was a universal goal all people could reach given the right tutelage.35  
U.S. Army officers in the Philippines viewed Christian Filipinos superior to 
supposedly wild tribes and Moros, because they believed Christians exhibited some 
trappings of Western civilization due to direct Spanish rule. On the other hand, colonial 
officials constructed Moros as incapable of even rudimentary participation in running 
their political affairs due to the absence of the influence of Western Christendom. These 
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characterizations of Moros presented the illustration of a community unable to govern 
itself properly, responsive only to brutal force, and in need of the direct tutelage by the 
United States. Wood favored policy that adapted a civilizing mission to remedy this 
dilemma, beginning with reducing opposition to colonial rule. At no time did Wood 
consider the possibility of indigenous autonomy among Moros.36  
The band of Moros that would gather atop Bud Dajo in an order to establish their 
autonomy acted within their understanding of the Islamic faith.37 They avoided living 
under the dominion of non-believers, which they understood to be prohibited under 
Islam, and attempted to recapture political control of the community through jihad. The 
destruction of slavery, demanding of the cedula, and general contempt displayed by army 
officials toward Moros seemed part of a concerted effort to subjugate Muslim people who 
for centuries had successfully kept such domination at bay.38 Given this growing 
perception among the Moros of Sulu, the appearance of the sultan to acquiesce to 
demands of the United States destroyed his legitimacy among many Moros. Furthermore, 
the behavior of those political elites who collaborated and conspired with U.S. forces to 
kill and subjugate other Moros, especially the common ones, further inflamed the masses 
and destroyed the credibility of the traditional Moro political leadership.39 Abandoned by 
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their political elite, unprotected from the violence and depredations of U.S. Army, they 
banded together in this grass-roots effort to resist the destruction of their society and way 
of life. They dressed in their finest apparel and, with less than three hundred rifles among 
them, prepared to face death with the hope of paradise, rather than acknowledge any 
measure of cultural supremacy to their enemies.40  
The Tausug Moro women who fought the U.S. Army on Dajo battled to defend 
their homes and their families. Despite the American press portrayal of Tausug women as 
victims, Tausug society interpreted women’s roles as more fluid and malleable than their 
American counterparts. The negotiations between the United Sates and the Sultan were 
heavily influenced by the constant presence and guidance of the Sultan’s mother, Sultana 
Pangyan Inchi Jamela. Such obvious exercise of power was not limited to the elite in 
Tausug society. In fact the many years of jihad against the Spanish established an active 
role of militant struggle for Moro women.41    
In his capacity as military commander of the southern Philippines, Wood helped 
to craft policy in the region in an effort to civilize the Moros. Wood’s aggressive 
campaign toward Moros sprang from his desire to establish Western cultural values and 
institutions and to prove himself worthy of the posting he had received as a close friend 
of the president. Wood and his officers were convinced that the only way to stabilize the 
region and civilize the people was to make them into dependents of the U.S. so they 
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could culturally remake Moros into brown-skinned imitations of white Americans. In the 
imagination of U.S. policymakers this was a benevolent act for which  Moros should be 
thankful. Their “ungrateful,” rebellious response symbolized the Moros’ supposed 
inability to appreciate the gift of civilization that was being bestowed upon them. Martial 
opposition characterized as “savagery” fed the assertion that they were not ready for self-
governance. The racial construction of Moros as savages normalized this authoritarian 
approach to colonial rule and justified a policy of cultural genocide. Bud Dajo, as brutal 
as it was, represented an obstacle to forward progress that Wood felt obligated to remove 
so that U.S. authorities could embark upon a civilizing mission of their new “wards.” 
Wood, like most officers in the southern Philippines, filtered his perceptions of Moros 
through previous views and judgments formulated from experiences with Native 
Americans. Yet as historian Paul Kramer points out, Wood and others still managed to 
construct a particular and unique Moro racial identity, one that differed from that of the 
Christian Filipino rebels in the northern islands. Ironically, U.S. military and political 
officials often judged each violent encounter as necessary lessons meant to teach 
“savage” races the fine art of civilization. However, despite their “rational” assessments, 
Bud Dajo would be the first of several instances of mass killings of Moros justified by 
missionary impulses and the imperatives of the civilizing mission.42  
 This work addresses several fields of inquiry. It adds to the historiography of the 
Philippine insurrection, including the American “Moro Wars,” and Islam in Southeast 
Asia and the Philippines. In addition, this work contributes to the historiography of race 
and gender in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century United States. Lastly, it 
supplements discussion of the transition from the “Old Army” to the twentieth-century 
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army that would see action in the First World War. The dissertation also speaks to the 
historiographical treatment of Leonard Wood, John Pershing, Dean Worcester, and 
Theodore Roosevelt, as well as less-researched figures, such as Robert Bullard, Hugh L. 
Scott and David Prescott Barrows. 
The historiography of the Philippine insurrection, the conflict that extended from 
1898 to approximately 1902 when President Theodore Roosevelt declared victory, is 
robust. This body of scholarship set within a rich historiography a relationship of 
dependency and neo-imperial arrangement, which has been invaluable to any discussion 
of U.S. empire. However, in historians’ examinations of the relationship between the 
Philippines and the United States, especially during the “imperial era,” the Muslims of 
the south are generally footnotes to the larger narrative. Because the signing of the Bates 
agreement in 1899 was geared toward avoiding a Muslim-Christian alliance in the 
insurgency against the United States Army, historians and policymakers have pinpointed 
the nationalist insurgency in the north as the main theater of resistance to U.S. imperial 
rule and colonial administration. The historical record, however, reveals the South as the 
locus of primary resistance to U.S. political and cultural hegemony, a battle that 
continues to this day.  
Cesar Majul was the first, and to date the only, Filipino Muslim to document the 
history of the Moros of the Philippines with the intention of providing a voice to a people 
he felt had been marginalized from Philippine national society. In 1973, Majul wrote 
Muslims in the Philippines, which focuses primarily on the history of Islam in the 
Mindanao and Sulu regions with sufficient coverage of the colonial period of U.S. 
administration. In addition, he produced scholarship related to the Islamic practices of the 
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Moros. His work enlarges the base of knowledge on the history of Islam in the 
Philippines and the individual histories of various ethnicities in Sulu and Mindanao. 
While Majul’s writings do not directly and consistently address the history of the 
American occupation, they provide an important contextualization of the martial struggle 
undertaken by bands of Moros determined to resist the imperial domination of the United 
States. Majul’s work has been germane to my research in that it provided a rare 
examination of Moro political and religious institutions, including a unique version of 
sharia.43  
Though there is a rich body of work by military historians, Paul Kramer’s The 
Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines, 1898-1920, 
written in 2006, provided the theoretical basis for my own work and vastly broadened the 
historiographical scope on this topic.  Kramer argues that a novel racial construction of 
Filipinos resulted through interactions between American whites and Filipinos during 
occupation. Unlike previous historians, he minimizes the role the legacy of North 
American racism toward African-Americans and Native Americans played in the racial 
constructions of Filipinos. Kramer argues that Filipinos shaped U.S. empire as much as 
the U.S. shaped Filipino society. Because of his primary focus on the Tagalogs and the 
formation of pre-1898 intellectual elites, his work does not contain a great deal of 
information on the South. Nonetheless, Kramer discusses the post-insurgency role of 
Christians who took up “the white man’s burden” to impose Western cultural norms upon 
the non-Christian population. This legacy of U.S. occupation was characteristic of the 
influence of the Illustrados’ intellectual production.44  
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Kramer’s work contributes a great deal to the historiography because he 
emphasizes the agency of Filipinos in the formation of U.S.-Filipino relations. The most 
exciting portions of his text discuss the Illustrados and their role in creating a Filipino 
national identity. This carefully negotiated constructed identity led to a rapid embrace of 
U.S. rule accompanied by the taking up of the “white man’s burden” in its administrative 
role with the Moros and “wild tribes” after independence. My project will go beyond 
Kramer’s by extending this analysis to the southern Philippines and bringing the Bud 
Dajo massacre from the margins to the center of the historiographical discussion. 45  
Prior to Kramer’s seminal text Michael Salman’s The Embarrassment of Slavery: 
Controversies over Bondage and Nationalism in the American Colonial Philippines, 
discussed the role that the institution of slavery played, especially the rhetoric of anti-
slavery, in the formation of a Filipino national identity. Written in 2001 Salman argues 
that the debate helped to cement the hegemony of U.S. colonial rule by placing Filipino 
nationalists on the defensive about slavery. This also put the Moros and other non-
Christians at the center of the debate over which group had the “right to rule.” Christian 
Filipino nationalists claimed they were best suited to embark upon the civilizing mission 
of non-Christian minorities within the Philippine Islands. Despite actively challenging the 
precepts of white supremacist imperial logic, they implicitly reinforced it by arguing 
privilege based on Western acculturation. Salman’s argument gibes with Paul Kramer’s 
later assertions that Filipino nationalists took on the “white man’s burden” as the 
transition from direct rule to neo-colonialism evolved from the early twentieth century to 
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the post-World War II period. But, like other works in the historiography, it relegates the 
Moros to the margins of the historiography.46  
In 2008, Julian Go wrote American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite 
Political Cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico During U.S. Colonialism. This text 
is a comparative examination of the Philippines and Puerto Rico’s political elites with a 
specific focus on the “cultural dimensions of American colonialism.” Go argues that the 
general thrust of the American colonial project in these regions focused on the 
“transformation” of political elites into the cultural equivalent of their imperial masters, 
the Americans. This makeover fostered and nurtured a particular political culture and 
elite class within the respective societies.47 Go’s work has been useful to this study in that 
he identifies, along with Salman and Kramer, the central role that U.S. cultural 
imperialism held in the American/Philippines relationship.  
Moroland: The History of Uncle Sam and the Moros, 1899-1920, written in 2009 
by Robert Fulton, is to date the most comprehensive narrative history of the United States 
campaign to eradicate Moro political and cultural autonomy in the early years of U.S. 
involvement. Fulton painstakingly traces the relationship between the Moros and the 
United States from the Bates agreement to 1920. Unlike most previous historians, he 
alludes to the grass-roots resistance that led to the establishment of the settlement on Bud 
Dajo. My project expands upon this by emphasizing the extent to which ordinary Moros 
stepped outside of the guidance of traditional Islamic leadership to oppose the Americans 
at Bud Dajo. In addition, I highlight the role that religion played in the opposition to 
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American occupation, and I examine the gendered and racial constructions of the Moros 
by U.S. officials.48 
The historiography of the intersections of gender, sexuality, and race in the United 
States has provided a historical context for United States expansion in the period I am 
examining, and it has also provided ideological context for the massacres in settler 
colonies. Although I use arguments from Anthony Rotundo’s 1993 American Manhood: 
Transformations in Masculinity from the American Revolution to the Modern Era, my 
primary theoretical foundation is Gail Bederman’s Manliness and Civilization: A 
Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917. This text, written 
in 1996, identifies the years from 1880 to 1917 as extremely active for the renegotiation 
of white masculinity in the United States. Like Rotundo, Bederman defines gender as a 
“historical and ideological process,” not as an inherent essence. Yet unlike Rotundo and 
other historians of gender, Bederman argues against a “crisis of masculinity” in this 
period. Rather, she maintains that masculinity was in flux, as it always is.49  
 Kristin Hoganson’s Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics 
Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars, written in 1998, claims 
that a renegotiation of male and female gender roles in the late nineteenth century helped 
to push the nation into war by fostering a desire for martial challenges, especially among 
upper-class and middle-class white men. Again differing from Bederman’s argument, she 
describes this as a “crisis of masculinity.” Hoganson’s work was helpful in providing me 
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with a vivid illustrative record of male angst and masculine assertiveness in the lead-up to 
the Spanish-American War.50 Sarah Watts, in Rough Rider in the White House: Theodore 
Roosevelt and the Politics of Desire, from 2003, uses Theodore Roosevelt as a lens 
through which to analyze a “new vision of manhood,” which encompassed “rational” and 
“primitive” behavior. Roosevelt, according to Watts, embodied through his own personal 
struggle with masculinity a national transformation of the concept. His racial fantasies 
rested upon an eternal struggle between the races in which Anglo-Saxon whites needed to 
be vigilant against softness and “over-civilization” lest they be engulfed by the lower 
races. Both Hoganson and Watts provided a historical context for the transformation of 
masculinity that Bederman argues for. Although their vision of this transformation is 
darker and more of “crisis” than Bederman suggests, taken together they all suggest that 
the masculinity project was central to the expansionist policies of the period.  
Several other texts within the historiography of gender in this period highlight the 
shifting definitions of femininity as well, which helped me to place the killings of 
“women and children” within an ideological context and provide a comparison to the 
shifting ideal of white masculinity. Shawn Michelle Smith’s American Archives: Gender, 
Race, and Class in Visual Culture, published in 1999, studies the “convergence of 
scientific and commercial photography in the transformation of middle-class identities in 
the nineteenth century.”51 Smith argues that photography tried to pinpoint “interiority” of 
human subjects and that this process was integral to the production of a “racialized 
middle-class identity” during the nineteenth century. These photographic archives, 
according to Smith, “generated and maintained essentialized discourse of interior 
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character” and established social hierarchies by reading facial types.52 Louise Michelle 
Newman’s White Women’s Rights: The Racial Origins of Feminism in the United States, 
from 1999, argues that feminism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was 
not an egalitarian movement. During this period, white women activists had a 
“heightened racial consciousness as civilized women, contributing to and reinforcing 
dominant religious, scientific, and cultural ideologies that attributed to them unique moral 
and political roles.” She chronicles and analyzes the creation of feminist ideology within 
the context of the racial debates of the time as well as in relation to the “nation’s 
civilizing mission”53 Laura Ann Wexler’s 2000 Tender Violence: Domestic Visions in an 
Age of U.S. Imperialism (2000) deals with “the cult of domesticity” in late nineteenth-
century and twentieth-century America and its role as a “crucial framework for American 
imperialism” in that time period. In particular, Wexler examines the use of images of 
domesticity and how the “male gaze” was used to place peoples into specific categories. 
My research has identified the role of the male gaze as central to the construction of non-
white women as a foil against a particular version of femininity attributed to civilized 
white women.54 
My study also contributes to the larger historiography of the U.S. military’s 
transition from the “Old Army” to the modern twentieth-century army. The ideology of 
officers in power significantly shaped the conduct of the military in this period. 
Therefore, my study will examine to what degree the cultural beliefs of military officials 
and their experiences in the Philippines influenced the development of this transition to a 
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professional army. Throughout his life, Wood remained consistent in his efforts to reform 
the army and radically alter American Defense Policy. The biographies of General 
Leonard Wood, Colonel Robert Bullard, and Lieutenant Frank Ross McCoy reveal how 
these men belonged to a group of officers whose imperialist ideology contributed to a 
military makeover in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. These men presided 
over the destructive transformation of Muslim cultural and political life in the southern 
Philippines from 1898 to 1907.55 This example illustrates the birth of an ideological army 
instrumental in the implementation of new U.S. imperialist policies. 
With some exceptions, the historiography of U.S. relations with the Philippines 
and the insurrection has gaps in relation to a serious analytical examination of the 
occupation and pacification of the south. Most scholarly examinations of U.S. policy in 
the Philippines relegate the South to the margins of the narrative. Those who have dealt 
with the South generally have not placed enough focus upon the people outside of the 
elite ruling class, nor have they examined the role that gender, race, and religion played 
in the formation of policy. This dissertation helps rectify this by examining archival 
material related to those individuals’ responsible administration and pacification of the 
southern Philippines. Furthermore, my project considers the construction of race among 
the builders of U.S. empire. Some scholars have generally accepted definitions of race 
based on phenotypical construction and have given short shrift to the role that culture and 
religion played in defining subordinated communities as a racial other.  
This work is composed of four chapters, which are arranged both chronologically 
and thematically. Chapter one provides the historical context for U.S. expansion into the 
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Pacific and the eventual acquisition of the Philippines. An analysis of the relationship 
between Theodore Roosevelt and Leonard Wood provides a framework for understanding 
how transformations of gender and increasing racial tensions in the United States 
influenced foreign policy in the Philippines. Chapter two discusses the initial contact 
between Filipino Muslims and the United States military as soldiers attempted to occupy 
the region and design a program of administration. This chapter analyzes the changes in 
American ideas about the region as the civilizing mission is imported from the Americas 
into the Southern Philippines. I argue that U.S. policy-makers use the lived experience of 
Native American interactions, and the political imperatives of the moment, to craft their 
policy. Chapter three discusses the beginning of the tenure of Leonard Wood as 
Governor-General of the region and his decision to aggressively erode Muslim polity 
with the goal of military pacification and cultural transformation of Moro society. 
Chapter four focuses on the Bud Dajo massacre and places the Moros at the center of the 
narrative. The role of Moro women on the battlefield provides a crucial moment when 
gender, race, culture, and ideology intersect to reveal the hard lessons of a U.S. foreign 
policy of occupation – one that the Moros refused to accept.  
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Chapter One: Re-inventing American Masculinity: Leonard Wood, Theodore 
Roosevelt, and the Transformation of American Empire 
 
After meeting Leonard Wood in June 1897, Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
Theodore Roosevelt enthused to a friend: “I have developed at Washington a playmate 
who fairly walked me off my legs.”56 Wood and Roosevelt became a frequent pair in the 
years surrounding the Spanish-American War. They established a routine of 
companionship that centered on robust physical activity and long intimate discussions 
concerning the nation’s destiny. They spent many hours together hiking, fencing, and 
even kicking a football with Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the junior Republican senator 
from Massachusetts. Their fencing matches could be quite violent. They used sticks in 
place of blades and sometimes caused one another injuries. Roosevelt literally gushed 
over Wood’s physical prowess. He described him as “a man of extraordinary physical 
strength and endurance.” The journalist Jacob Riis, a mutual admirer of both men, said, “I 
liked to see them together because they were men of the same strong type.”57 Leonard 
Wood descended from an old Yankee family that traced its genealogy back to the first 
English settlements in North America. Theodore Roosevelt had a similar pedigree and 
quite an impressive genealogy of wealth and power accrued by a family that descended 
from Dutch settlers of New York around the same period that Wood’s forbears settled 
New England. These two men formed a homo-social bond that in many ways 
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encompassed and shaped the social and political transformations of the early twentieth 
century.58 
Roosevelt and Wood’s comradeship personified the hopes of a generation of 
upper-class white men who felt threatened by change. Their anxiety centered on a 
perceived change in their status as strong patriarchs throughout economic depressions, 
Indian wars, and heightened violence against African Americans and other non-whites. A 
massive railroad strike in 1877 punctuated by the use of state, local, and federal troops to 
put it down characterized the violence and instability of late nineteenth-century America. 
Although events of the 1870’s brought to the fore an ideological shift in white 
masculinity, the process of transformation sprang from earlier constructions of white 
male identity in the United States. In the early part of the nineteenth century, upper-class 
white male identity was linked to a sense of responsibility to the community. By the end 
of the nineteenth century, male competition had come to be emphasized over cooperative 
relationships between men. Wood and Roosevelt exhibited a mix of these ideas. They 
maintained healthy competition in their own relationship, but cooperation among men of 
their class remained crucial for the success of the nation. Together they helped usher into 
the national consciousness a transformed white supremacist masculinity, which suited the 
physical expansion of United States military and economic power both within and outside 
of the North American continent. 59   
                                                 
58
 Watts, Rough Rider, 162; Frank Costigliola, “‘Unceasing Pressure for Penetration’: Gender, Pathology, 
and Emotion in George Kennan’s Formation of the Cold War,” in The Journal of American History 83.4 
(1997): 1316-18.  
59
 David Omar Stowell, Streets, Railroads, and the Great Strike of 1877 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), 75-6, 142; E. Anthony Rotundo, American Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from 
the Revolution to the Modern Era (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 3-5, 224-26; Bederman, Manliness and 
Civilization, 183-85, 215.  
 40 
The Wood family’s Puritan roots put them on the side of the Union during the 
Civil War, which interrupted the ambition of Leonard’s father, Charles Wood, to become 
a doctor. Setting out to earn a medical degree as a young man, Wood failed to complete 
medical school and opted for homeopathic instruction in Pennsylvania. Despite this 
failure , when the Civil War began, he was drafted into the Union Army and served as a 
medical officer in Louisiana. Shortly thereafter he contracted malaria and returned home 
severely ill. For the remainder of his life he struggled with the aftereffects of this 
affliction. The Wood family had to seek out climates that did not exacerbate his 
condition. They eventually settled on Cape Cod, Massachusetts. Although he was able to 
earn a living and support his family, Charles Wood became a “taciturn” and angry man 
because of his health problems, perceived inadequacies and shortcomings, and inability 
to significantly advance his medical career.60 He placed high hopes in young Leonard that 
he would complete medical school and pursue a career in medicine.  
Leonard’s father chose an academic regimen for his son typical of the white upper 
middle class of the late nineteenth century. When Leonard was a boy, Charles Wood 
hired young schoolteacher Jessie Haskell away from the local school to tutor him. Ms. 
Haskell felt overwhelmed by the rigors of being a schoolteacher teacher in an unfamiliar 
environment and welcomed the opportunity to work for the Woods. Her employment 
allowed her to escape the pressures of teaching full-time in a new environment, so unlike 
her home in Boston. Jesse Haskell instructed Leonard in Latin, French, mathematics, 
religion, and philosophy. When he reached his teens, he enrolled at the Pierce Academy 
in Middleborough, Massachusetts, and excelled academically. While at Pierce Academy 
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an intense Wood remained fairly aloof from his classmates. He exhibited signs of 
aggressiveness and competition and excelled in sports. He completed his studies and 
aspired to a military career, despite his father’s ambitions for him in medicine.61  
Leonard’s military aspirations were temporarily thwarted when his father passed 
away in 1880. Rather than seek a place at West Point or Annapolis, Leonard felt duty 
bound to obey his father’s wishes and entered medical school at Harvard College, as his 
father had wanted. He graduated from Harvard Medical School in 1883 and began an 
internship at Boston City Hospital. During his time there he earned a reputation for being 
rebellious and stretching the rules. He showed signs of the arrogance and extreme self-
confidence that later became hallmarks of his personality, colonial administration, and 
quest for public office. Wood committed many acts of disobedience and exhibited 
defiance of hospital regulations. He often ignored direct requests to follow the rules. He 
openly and repeatedly fraternized with nurses, and ultimately the program no longer 
tolerated him. Boston City Hospital summarily dismissed Wood in September 1884 for 
performing surgeries without permission. He harvested skin from one child for another 
child’s open wound without permission from the medical staff. As a result of his 
dismissal, Wood’s prospects of a medical career looked quite dismal. His negative 
reputation dogged him, making it impossible for him to get another appointment at any 
other hospital. It was at this low point that Wood decided to join the army.62 
This proved a turnaround.  Wood’s enlistment in the United States Army led to a 
successful military career and enduring political legacy. Wood reinvigorated his medical 
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career via the process of extra-continental expansion about to take place. He would 
embody a new zeitgeist of white male supremacy. In particular, his participation in the 
mythologized “capture” of the infamous Chiricahua Apache warrior Geronimo provided 
the foundation of his heroic identity as a reinvigorated white man for the twentieth 
century. Wood rode a wave of national reinvention of white supremacy almost all the 
way to the White House. Along the way he made contact and found favor with the most 
powerful men in American empire-building. Through these contacts Wood rapidly 
ascended the ranks of the United States Army and eventually perpetrated the massacre on 
Bud Dajo in 1906.63 
Leonard Wood’s army career began in the American Southwest, where one of the 
last free bands of Native Americans, the Chiricahua Apache, desperately struggled to 
maintain their autonomy in the face of rapidly expanding white settlement. The 
Chiricahua were a branch of the Apache who traditionally lived in the Southeastern 
Arizona highlands, Northern Sonora, and Chihuahua, Mexico. Geronimo was not a 
political leader of the Chiricahua, but rather a shaman and respected warrior. Decades of 
war and indiscriminate violence from the Spanish, Mexicans, and finally the United 
States took a terrible toll upon the Chiricahua. By the time they encountered the 4th 
cavalry and Leonard Wood, they were a beleaguered and exhausted community.64  
In 1885 Leonard Wood received his appointment as acting assistant surgeon, a 
civilian position, in the 4th Cavalry with a salary of one hundred dollars per month. 
Wood boarded a train from New York City to his first posting at Fort Huachuca in 
Arizona Territory. He arrived at Fort Huachuca on July 4, 1885, very anxious to get out 
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into the field. On his second day in Arizona he volunteered to go out on a combat 
mission. Wood relished the field duty and quickly rose through the ranks to become chief 
aide to Captain Henry Lawton. The lines between medical officer, civilian worker, and 
soldier were inevitably blurred on the battlefield in the Arizona Territory. In Wood’s 
case, because he always wanted to be in the thick of the action, he went on patrols against 
the Apaches on a regular basis. He gained a well-earned reputation for dependability and 
enthusiasm in the field and in his duties as assistant surgeon. He also persevered to 
become the best rider in the outfit and was willing to spend eighteen hours a day in the 
saddle.65 
General George R. Crook commanded troops at Fort Huachuca when Wood 
arrived. Crook had fought Geronimo before, earned his mutual respect, and persuaded 
Geronimo and the Chiricahua to enter the nearby San Carlos reservation in May 1885. 
One year later, however, Geronimo and a band of Chiricahua fled the San Carlos 
reservation and began raiding throughout the Arizona Territory. Geronimo and his 
followers left the reservation and took up arms after several grievances went unanswered 
by Crook and the reservation authorities. The government reservation was extremely 
overcrowded. The farming equipment they were given was completely inadequate, and 
corrupt Indian Agents conspired to profit off their presence and keep them impoverished. 
These grievances made reservation conditions unlivable. Once Geronimo escaped the 
reservation, he and his warriors embarked upon a violent campaign throughout the 
territory, as they robbed, killed, and captured white settlers. Despite his best efforts, 
including the use of Apache scouts, Crook failed to capture Geronimo. President Grover 
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Cleveland then dispatched General Nelson Miles to the territory to put an end to 
Geronimo’s resistance and get the Chiricahua Apache back under U.S. government 
control.66  
By the time General Miles arrived and took command of the 4th Calvary, Wood 
had been posted to Fort Huachuca for over one year. Miles came to Fort Huachuca with 
the attitude that Crook had been too lenient with the Apache. He judged reliance upon 
indigenous scouts a faulty strategy, believing they could not be trusted. He also decided 
that the Apache understood only the language of force and urged the expulsion of the 
entire community from the Arizona Territory. Miles used regular Army troops, instead of 
the combination of indigenous scouts and regular troops that Crook had deployed. Miles 
liked Wood from the moment they met and immediately picked him for Captain Henry 
Lawton’s unit, which was selected by Miles to capture Geronimo. In his interview with 
Miles, Wood claimed, “the right sort of white men could eventually break these Indians 
and compel then to surrender.”67 Wood was obviously referring to himself. What he 
meant was that a white man who possessed the endurance, stamina, and persistence of an 
Apache could outmatch him in the field. Wood believed these traits to be intrinsic to the 
Apache as a race, yet white men could develop and surpass them, if they dedicated 
themselves to perfecting their physical endurance. Such thinking reflected the ideology of 
white supremacy, which became the dominant worldview in the latter portion of the 
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nineteenth century. It also impressed Miles, who immediately included Wood in the unit 
assigned to capture Geronimo.68  
Wood sympathized with Miles’ sentiments that Indians responded only to force 
and believed that the Chiricahua Apache needed to be expelled in total from the Arizona 
Territory. Like Wood, Miles had not gone to West Point, yet he had risen up through the 
ranks through his performance in the Civil War and the post-Civil War and subsequent 
Indian Wars. Just as Wood’s later critics attributed his rise through the ranks to 
favoritism, Miles endured whispered innuendoes because of familial connections, having 
married the niece of General William T. Sherman and his brother, Senator John Sherman, 
which significantly helped his military and political career.69 General Miles soon became 
a mentor and patron to Wood. Miles admired Wood’s physical strength and rugged 
masculinity and described Wood as a “splendid type of American manhood, a fair haired 
blue eyed young man of great intelligence, sterling manly qualities, and resolute spirit 
and as fine a specimen of physical strength and endurance as could easily be found.”70 
They took up a regular practice of holding boxing sessions. These brutal matches often 
ended with both parties injured. Mile’s friendship with Wood provided him introductions 
into elite political circles, which further enhanced Wood’s career.71  
                                                 
68
 Joseph Hamblen Sears, The Career of Leonard Wood (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1920), 32; 
Rotundo, American Manhood, 36, 228-29.   
69
 Heather Cox Richardson, Wounded Knee: Party Politics and the Road to an American Massacre (New 
York: Basic Books, 2010), 48-49. Despite the innuendo, Miles actually provided the Shermans with a 
valuable ally in their ambitions to project their political power into late nineteenth-century national politics. 
70
 Diary of Leonard Wood, 4 May 1886, 27 August 1886, Papers of Leonard Wood; Hagedorn, Leonard 
Wood, Volume I, 106-07; Sears, Career of Leonard Wood, 32. 
71
 Elliott J. Gorn, The Manly Art: Bare-Knuckle Prize Fighting in America (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1986), 185-97. Preston, Sword of the Spirit, 206. In the post-Civil War United States, the increase of 
leisure and recreation time generated a “sporting boom.” Middle- and upper-class white men became 
conscious of physical fitness, and much attention was paid to sporting activities and physical strength. 
Pugilism made a big comeback in this time period, despite the fact that it cut across class lines; it was 
particularly important to elite whites that they develop physical muscularity. “Muscular Christianity” was a 
term that arose to describe the new Anglo-Saxon man for the twentieth century. Pugilism and sports such as 
 46 
Lawton’s unit began tracking Geronimo in what turned out to be fruitless 
frustrating treks throughout the territory and into Mexico without ever making contact 
with or sighting Geronimo and his band. Geronimo perfected “hit and run” guerilla 
tactics and frustrated U.S. Army attempts to capture and contain the Chiricahua Apache. 
In the many months he had spent pursuing Geronimo, Wood endured a severe spider bite, 
which nearly killed him, and engaged in deadly skirmishes with various other bands of 
Chiricahua. While Wood’s unit trekked throughout the Southwest in search of Geronimo, 
Geronimo eventually surrendered to Lt. Charles Gatewood in late August of 1886.72  
On September 7, 1886, Assistant Surgeon Leonard Wood approached the end of 
his harrowing journey through the Arizona Territory and Old Mexico in search of 
Geronimo. After Geronimo’s surrender, Wood and Troop B escorted the Chiricahua back 
to Fort Huachuca for eventual expulsion into a malaria-infested detention camp in 
Florida. In the final days of their journey back to Fort Huachuca, a young Chiricahua 
woman gave birth. Doctor Leonard Wood observed and recorded the event with detached 
indifference and never even mentioned the sex of the newborn child in his detailed diary. 
He recorded: “Yesterday, while on the march a young Indian girl gave birth to a child. 
The command halted perhaps for an hour for this purpose and then took up the march, the 
girl carrying her young baby. She looked pretty pale, but otherwise seemed to pay little 
attention to the incident.” Wood observed her stoic delivery with no apparent emotion of 
his own. He gazed upon the event with a kind of cold admiration that was utterly 
dehumanizing. His detached observation and literal record of the event placed the woman 
into the socially constructed category of savage, outside of the civilized parameters of 
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white female gender. For Wood she unnaturally contradicted the binaries of male and 
female, and thus provided evidence of the barbarity of her “race.” The very next day, the 
U.S. exiled this anonymous Chiricahua woman to Fort Marion, Florida. Perhaps neither 
she nor her child survived the ordeal.73  
Wood’s observations of Apache women also included remarks about how they 
breast-fed their “young” in plain view of men. Wood showed no discomfort as he 
watched these women in the midst of acts that were considered private, intimate moments 
if carried out by white women. Wood replicated an American pattern of denying the 
Native American women authentic sexuality and reifying her as “a depersonalized 
object” without the power to define her personal boundaries. Her health, even her 
mortality, was of as little consequence to her as was her modesty. His written 
observations of the Chiricahua were a mix of admiration for their abilities to survive in a 
harsh environment and blatant disgust.74 Wood’s cursory treatment of the young Apache 
woman giving birth, and his willingness to admit he had witnessed such an act, reflected 
contemporary ideas about Native American women. They were presented as 
simultaneously savage and unnaturally superior to white women in their endurance. For 
men like Wood, this difference proved the barbarism of their race. His friend Roosevelt 
agreed and held a deep contempt for the Native Americans as a “race” but admired their 
“bravery, cunning, and ferocity.”75  
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Wood’s description of the event resembled similar descriptions of enslaved 
African American women giving birth in the cotton fields, as well as Wood’s later 
description of the woman warriors he faced on the Bud Dajo summit. These acts, which 
generally had been in the private realm of women, were recounted in a detached manner 
in order to typecast non-white women as “other” and subject to very different rules of 
etiquette for white men. While white men emphasized their duty to protect white women, 
they violated the private spaces of non-white women as they invaded and occupied the 
spaces these women inhabited. White men placed them outside of the protection of white 
patriarchy. Throughout the American experience of continental expansion, Native 
American women were always seen in relation to white men. Such white men 
dehumanized all non-white women, especially Native American women, and portrayed 
them as potentially dangerous if they were not supporting white men’s imperial 
projects.76 
In the last years of the nineteenth century, characterizations of Native Americans 
as repositories of lost masculine attributes proliferated, even as various Native American 
nations engaged in armed struggle to preserve their autonomy. In addition to the hyper-
masculinization of Native Americans, whites assigned them primal, bestial qualities 
deemed necessary for the survival and advancement of the white Anglo-Saxon race. 
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Native Americans were harassed, killed, and concentrated into reservations, yet 
simultaneously nostalgically commodified as one component of the passing of an era. 
Americans acknowledged a necessity to tame wild spaces, yet still felt a loss as the 
central government brought the West under political control. The Nez Perce were 
defeated in 1877, and Chief Joseph assumed iconoclastic status with his photos 
commodified as the legacy of a lost era of American civilization. The Lakota were 
defeated in the 1880’s, and Sitting Bull became an attraction at the Buffalo Bill Wild 
West Show.77 Arizona Territory newspapers described Geronimo and the Chiricahua as 
able to “run like a deer, drop down on all fours, and live on snakes, ants or any creeping 
thing.” Comparisons were made between white soldiers and Native American warriors: 
“Our soldiers must have ham and eggs. . . . [The Native American warrior] can lope off in 
a dog trot for one hundred miles without sleeping.” Even as Native Americans were 
removed from territory whites inhabited they were held up as mirrors to the inadequacies 
of white soldiers.78  
Characteristics that had been grafted onto Native Americans—such as warlike, 
physically hardy, and eager for carnage—were touted by men like Theodore Roosevelt as 
virtues the white man also had to possess in order to maintain racial dominance. As white 
masculinity underwent this transformation, these “savage characteristics” were 
reinvigorated in public discourse as necessary attributes for white men; the designated 
progenitors of the continuation of American empire. Americans feared these attributes 
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were vanishing from the character of white men. Roosevelt and others spoke of these 
“barbarian virtues” as being necessary for the civilized white man to be successful in the 
perpetual struggle for racial dominance. The passing of the frontier created a sense of 
unease that its loss had removed from society a proving ground for white men. Theodore 
Roosevelt’s attempt to recapture that spirit by remaking himself into a frontiersman 
universalized the mythology of the white man’s struggle against savagery in the 
American West.79  
American continental expansion had been contextualized within the political and 
cultural production of the “frontier.” American expansion, being a gendered process, had 
been an indicator of white Anglo-Saxon racial progress. Roosevelt argued that the unique 
racial character of white English-speaking peoples made them particularly suited for the 
conquest of North America and called the American West “predestined to be the 
inheritance” of the American white race for generations. Wood, as a soldier and doctor 
with the 4th cavalry, embraced Indian removal as a teleological necessity for the settling 
of the continent. Wood looked forward to “a good deal of active service” and an 
“immense time” prior to his participation in the removal of the Chiricahua. Like many 
whites, he embraced the idea of the frontier as testing ground for white men. As for 
Native Americans, he observed Apache life and culture and concluded, “nothing could be 
more primitive.” The idea of the frontier permeated notions of national identity, as well 
as academic and cultural production. The frontier occupied a central ideological presence 
in American life. It had been alternately presented as a location for the testing of 
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individual mettle, a theater of a racial struggle for survival and dominance, a safety valve 
for the survival of democratic society, and a place of potential threat to civilized mores.80  
Despite their personal failure to capture Geronimo, Miles and Wood rewrote 
history and removed Gatewood’s central role from the narrative. Miles, Wood, and 
Lawton credited the surrender and United States custody of Geronimo to their “take no 
prisoners” style of campaigning against the Chiricahua. Captain Lawton specifically 
singled out Wood for praise when he cited the unit for the “capture” of Geronimo. 
Lawton cited Wood’s “courage, energy, and loyal support” as key reasons for the 
successful capture of Geronimo, despite the fact that Geronimo had surrendered to 
Gatewood hundreds of miles from where Wood was that day. Thus began the creation of 
a myth around Wood, Miles, and Lawton that rested upon the problematic belief that 
“savages” respond only to violent, coercive control. For men like Roosevelt, Wood, and 
other imperialists, this myth discredited the use of negotiation, nuance, and tactically 
applied cultural sensitivity in counterinsurgency.81  
Wood received the Congressional Medal of Honor for his part in the capture of 
Geronimo. Later characterizations of the event, particularly when he sought public office, 
placed him at the center of the campaign. Biographer John Holme described Wood as 
“one of the best Indian fighters the country ever produced.” In 1920 Holme tied the 
success of the campaign to Wood’s formula of “following the Indians night and day, no 
matter how rough the country, and to never give them any rest until they were killed or 
captured,” as if Wood were solely responsible for the capture of Geronimo. This event 
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opened many doors for Wood, which he fully exploited. Leonard Wood became a central 
character in the saga of Geronimo’s surrender and the final defeat of the Chiricahua 
Apache in the Arizona Territory.82  
Wood’s army career grew out of the eradication of a marginalized people, who 
had been placed within a teleological narrative of progress and judged unworthy of rights 
or recognition as full-fledged members of the human race. Wood cultivated the dogmatic 
point of view that stern control and violent retribution were necessary to earn the respect 
of the Native Americans and effectively manage them. Wood placed himself, as did 
others, within an ideological tradition of enabling the transition of Native Americans 
from backward savages to a semi-civilized state under the tutelage of paternalistic whites. 
This ideology dictated that natives occupied a lower rung on the ladder of evolutionary 
civilizational development. Furthermore, this ideology encompassed the notions that 
Indians, being a “warlike people,” invariably interpreted “kindness or patience as 
weakness” or, worse, cowardice. These notions were held by many in tandem with a 
desire to usher the Native Americans through this “transformation to civilization” or else 
force them to face extermination and exploitation by rapacious white settlers and an 
uncaring political structure. This axiom of using force against a savage people, who 
might mistake using a similar standard of behavior with them as one might with a white 
army for weakness, eventually resurfaced during Wood’s tenure as Governor General of 
the southern Philippines. The nineteenth-century mythology of the frontier was steeped in 
this kind of rhetoric: e.g., “The only good Indian is a dead Indian.” As whites expanded 
westward and faced pushback from indigenous peoples, they often took matters into hand 
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and committed massacres such as the “Sand Creek Massacre” of 1864. The 
indiscriminate slaughter of entire communities was likewise predicated upon the notion 
that “savages” understood only the language of force. It was no coincidence that this 
slaughter often came after wholesale land grabs by whites, and was followed by the 
concentration of the survivors on reservations.83  
Wood’s life and career as an army officer illustrated how dangerous the 
consequences of the creation of the new white male supremacy were for thousands of 
people. Through the career of this one army officer, who enjoyed the privileges of 
whiteness and access to the proper political connections, thousands of people would lose 
their lives, homes, and freedom. Wood did not do this alone. Indeed, an entrenched 
political establishment and national community supported him. These two constituencies 
sought out a national identity, which reinvigorated existing beliefs about racial, gendered, 
and civilizational supremacy.84 
From the end of the American Civil War until the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the United States Army engaged in a continual campaign of military operations 
against Native Americans as white Americans consolidated their acquisition of an intra-
continental empire. Territorial expansion had been the fulcrum upon which United States 
foreign and domestic policy pivoted since well before the establishment of the American 
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republic. The lands of the indigenous people were settled by whites whom Theodore 
Roosevelt said were entitled to it “by right of conquest and of armed possession.” In the 
second half of the nineteenth century the process became especially intense. The end of 
the Civil War precipitated a period of increased migration of whites westward. As this 
movement accelerated, so did the completion of the transcontinental railroad and the 
demise of Native American autonomy. Wood actively imbibed the Jacksonian democratic 
vision of a continent settled by whites, which, as it materialized, witnessed the defeat of 
the last of the indigenous peoples. Wood’s participation helped create a new myth of 
white supremacist racial triumphalism, which incorporated old tropes of gender and race, 
a mythical vision he shared with many whites of the elite and middle classes. He and 
Roosevelt marched through history side by side and reinvigorated patriarchal white 
supremacy during a significant ideological reification. As the myth proliferated, a 
transformed ideology of white male supremacy coalesced in the minds of many 
Americans.85  
Wood’s relationship with Theodore Roosevelt, like his previous one with Miles, 
catapulted his military career forward. Roosevelt was directly responsible for Wood’s 
two most important career advances: his appointment as colonel of the Rough Riders and 
his promotion to brigadier general over several hundred other qualified candidates. 
Roosevelt expressed gushing admiration for Wood’s physical appearance and his 
experiences “Indian-fighting.” He said Wood was “one of the two or three white men 
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who could stand fatigue and hardship as well as an Apache.” He praised Wood as “by 
nature a soldier, a man of extraordinary physical strength and endurance,” who could 
withstand “intolerable fatigue, intolerable thirst, and never satisfied hunger.” 86  
In Roosevelt Wood acquired a valuable political patron, and Wood always 
claimed they never exchanged a cross word, nor ever had a quarrel. Despite this claim, 
Wood admitted he envied the social status and opportunities that Roosevelt enjoyed 
because of his family’s great wealth. He envied Roosevelt’s opportunities to travel and 
his purely academic pursuits.87 Besides sharing an affinity for American empire they also 
shared a preoccupation with physical activity and the pursuit of a “strenuous life.” Wood 
prided himself on his physical prowess as well as his physical discipline, much like 
Roosevelt, while Roosevelt admired Wood’s austere personality and way of life. The two 
engaged in “violent exercise” such as swordfights with staffs and brutal boxing matches. 
They often drew blood and caused serious injuries like concussions, much as Wood had 
with Miles. They also hiked together, trying with all their might to run one another into 
the ground on backbreaking jaunts in the hills. They partook in this aggressive, 
competitive behavior as a way of defining a new masculinity for a new American 
empire.88  
Wood and Roosevelt belonged to the generation the Civil War veterans left 
behind. As the Civil War generation grew old, it was up to a new generation of men like 
Wood and Roosevelt to prove their worth and sustain the progress, health, and wealth of 
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the American empire. Wood, Roosevelt, and Henry Cabot Lodge all came of age 
listening to the war stories of that generation. They idealized the martyrs of that conflict 
as well as the living veterans and figures like the widow of Robert Gould Shaw, whose 
husband had died leading African American soldiers in battle. Roosevelt especially felt 
internalized pressure to live up to the status of these mythologized men. He felt a deep 
shame due to the fact that his father had paid a replacement to fight in the Civil War and 
was not tested in the fire of combat as Roosevelt so vociferously preached in his political 
and personal life.89 Both Wood and Roosevelt remained constantly aware that they had 
not “proven” themselves on the field of combat, despite Wood’s bogus Medal of Honor. 
These two men grew up in the shadow of men who had fought to the death to preserve 
the union. They were part of a cohort of white upper middle class men whose desire to 
prove themselves grew exponentially as the recessions of the latter portion of the 
nineteenth century shook the ideological foundations of their identity as patriarchs.  
At the end of the Civil War the Army of the Republic shrank from over one 
million men to thirty thousand in a very short period. After Reconstruction this number 
decreased even further. In 1885, the United States Army comprised less than twenty-five 
thousand men. Most of the officers had been in the same rank for over a decade and a 
half. Many staff officers, as well as enlisted men and newly minted lieutenants, 
complained that the staff officers were poorly trained, out of shape, and lacking in 
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professionalism. The army’s primary duties were on the frontier, acting as a “frontier 
constabulary,” quelling indigenous insurgencies and concentrating them into 
reservations.90  
During this process of de-mobilization and the transition to a primarily 
industrialized society, competition for jobs increased as immigrants from Southern and 
Eastern Europe came in great numbers to meet the increasing demand for labor. The 
arrival of these disparate non-Anglo-Saxon Europeans challenged the myth of a 
homogenous white race and highlighted the multi-ethnic character of the republic itself. 
Despite legal status as “whites” entitled to the rights of citizenry as other white 
Americans, many white Americans, like Roosevelt’s friend Frederic Remington, 
questioned their racial robustness and ability to assimilate into the American white 
community. Roosevelt attributed the unique racial characteristics of the “American race” 
to the fact that they had “in their veins less aboriginal American blood” than the other 
European-descended communities in the Americas. The influx of so many people whose 
“whiteness” was questionable caused a frantic struggle on the part of Anglo-Americans to 
defend the boundaries of privilege for “authentic” whites. Anti-immigrant sentiment and 
a stringent policing of the boundaries of whiteness characterized this struggle. Despite 
this ambiguity of whiteness, ethnic whites eventually assimilated into a homogenous 
conglomerate of “Americans” that claimed privilege based on phenotype. White 
Americans drew the boundary, however, between and white and non-white through acts 
of extreme racial violence and the policing of sexuality.91  
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Mass lynchings, murder, and other atrocities openly committed against African 
Americans, Chinese, and other non-whites drew and hardened these boundaries. As 
Northern Republican whites, like the Woods and the Roosevelts, abandoned 
Reconstruction efforts in the South, African Americans challenged the narrative of white 
supremacy by carving out a small middle class and semblance of economic 
independence. White Americans responded violently with legal and extralegal methods to 
preserve white privilege. African Americans were violently expelled from power in states 
all over the South and lost the right to vote for almost a century. White terrorism, which 
produced the greatest number of lynchings and mass killings of blacks in the nation’s 
history, drew a stark line between white and non-white. While the majority of the victims 
of lynchings were men, black women were also lynched. Mobs lynched black women 
under the cover of rhetoric, which placed them in the category of non-human and 
removed the protection of their gender from the extreme ritualistic violence of the lynch 
mob. As Wood’s career went from army doctor to colonial administrator and architect of 
United States foreign policy, he upheld this ideology of race and civilization, which 
justified such carnage.92  
While Wood’s family were anti-slavery Yankees, and Leonard himself abhorred 
mob violence against African Americans, his public persona played an important role in 
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the redefining of white masculinity.93 New laws to control the lives and movements of 
African Americans, Chinese, and immigrants reinforced a racialized hierarchy. This 
hierarchy determined who deserved privileges associated with full American citizenship. 
The Chinese Exclusion Act severely restricted entry of Chinese into the United States, 
barred them from citizenship and stripped Chinese-Americans of recognition as members 
of the national community. Other legal means, which were best expressed by the 1896 
Plessy v. Ferguson ruling, put non-whites outside of the protection of law and into 
permanent status as non-citizens.94  
In the late nineteenth century, the intelligentsia, academia, and popular culture 
widely accepted and articulated the idea that each racial community occupied a place on a 
racial and evolutionary hierarchy. Middle and upper-class education of white men 
included academic and scientific works that validated this race ideology. Men like 
Leonard Wood and Theodore Roosevelt learned this material in primary, secondary, and 
university education. The intellectual treatment of race classified humanity within fixed 
boundaries and categories. Brutal mob violence, which accomplished de facto 
segregation in the American South, enforced and reinforced those boundaries. Economic 
relationships and complex systems of oppression throughout European societies and their 
imperial territories accomplished the same task. In 1853, Arthur Comte de Gobineau 
published The Inequality of the Races, which claimed that all races outside of the white 
race had failed to achieve the pinnacle of human evolution as whites had done. American 
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anthropologist Lewis Henry Morgan’s text Ancient Civilizations, published in 1877 and 
widely read, also argued for hardened boundaries and categories of race, placing whites 
firmly at the top of a racial hierarchy. By the late nineteenth century, this had emerged as 
a consensus across the social and political spectrum of the United States and the Western 
world. White supremacy was legitimized through science, political theory, and 
philosophy during the nineteenth century. Anthropologists, like Morgan, provided 
scientific arguments for Anglo-Saxon intellectual and cultural superiority. Scientific 
racism took for granted that the white race(s) reigned over all others. In its mildest 
application, adherents of this race ideology articulated a “white man’s burden” to civilize 
the lower races. In its most extreme interpretation, it called for the extermination of lower 
races, especially if they proved problematic and difficult to subdue or civilize.95 
The Europeans spent the latter nineteenth century putting into practice these 
principles of racial classification as they built vast empires in the lands of non-whites, 
often devouring the remains of former Asian, African, and Islamic empires. Prior to U.S. 
troops destroying Moro communities, Europeans killed entire communities of Africans 
and Asians who stood in the way of their imperial aims. In Southwest Africa, Germany 
employed the principles of scientific racism to justify the first planned genocide of the 
modern era as they nearly wiped out the Nama and Herero peoples in Namibia. As they 
committed this act of genocide, they catalogued and classified Africans to bolster their 
arguments for white supremacy. In Southeast Asia the French occupied modern-day 
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Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, also citing the inferiority of the peoples and a plan to 
uplift and civilize the inhabitants of the region. In India the British appropriated an 
existing caste system as a tool of colonial and imperial control, while simultaneously 
using it to bolster the existing racial order throughout their empire in Africa, the 
Caribbean, and even Ireland. The acceptance and application of scientific racism was 
widespread in Western civilization and crossed political, economic, and often ethnic 
lines.96  
As this race ideology reached its pinnacle, the process of white racial conquest of 
North America entered its final stage, and historian Frederick Jackson Turner elaborated 
on the “closing of the frontier.” Social commentators lamented the dangerous passing of a 
significant milestone in a teleological vision of American history. Turner identified this 
passing of the frontier as a seminal event in United States history at the Colombian 
Exposition in 1892. He argued that the very basis of American democracy had been 
access to “free land” and that the existence of the frontier had defined American 
democracy. He positioned the frontier as central to any understanding of American 
cultural, political, and social development. Furthermore, Turner placed the frontier at the 
very heart of the formation of a uniquely American character. Turner argued that with no 
more land to take, the American character of the republic faced peril since it depended 
upon land ownership, preferably by Anglo-Saxon men who worked the soil. Roosevelt’s 
The Winning of the West, written in 1896, placed the Anglo-Saxon race of “rough 
settlers” at the center of a “great epic of wilderness conquest.” Turner and Roosevelt’s 
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frontier was isolated in place and time and served as a demarcation between the savage 
and the civilized. Turner gave his presentation against the backdrop of thirty years of 
economic uncertainty, increased automation leading to a prevalence of white collar jobs 
for men, and women becoming more politically active. It was a call to arms for American 
policymakers to redefine the nature of American democracy and white masculine 
identity. 97  
During this period the American republic underwent strategic and political 
transformations that shaped a new worldview for a generation of men and women who 
supported new extra-continental expansion. This aggressive expansion began with the 
overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893 and eventually culminated with the United 
States becoming a global power eclipsing all the European empires in influence and 
projection of power, if not territory. The renegotiations of gender within American 
society coincided with this period of expansion and general application of race ideology.  
Nineteenth-century white upper middle class males understood and enacted their 
roles as men within a vision of white masculinity based on gentility, but industrialization 
and the increase of white-collar jobs for white middle-class men created a sense of 
anxiety among this cohort. The demand for positions as clerks and middle management 
increased, thereby bolstering the ranks of white middle-class men. Leisure time and 
consumption became a part of the life of this emerging middle class. The anxiety among 
men in this class sprang from a narrative that stated that the growth of sedentary work 
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feminized white men. In addition, women, particularly middle-class white women, made 
increasing demands for political participation and social authority.98  
The reinvigoration of white masculinity that occurred in the 1890’s and the early 
twentieth century borrowed myths about nineteenth-century expansion to critique the 
perceived softening of white men. White masculinity underwent a change whereby traits 
associated with a cooperative, communal, gentile white male were replaced by traits 
associated with a more competitive, aggressive male. The white male body, as in 
muscular physicality and aesthetic, was punctuated in print and popular culture as the 
human ideal. Leonard Wood, a man who paid a great deal of attention to his physical 
fitness, embodied an ideal of white masculinity that appealed to many people, but luckily 
for him captured the attention of very powerful men. The years from 1880 to 1917 were 
very active for the formation of white middle-class masculine identity. In this period 
gender roles were defined within the context of a civilizational construct, which linked 
race and gender.99   
It was also during this period that the presentation of specific characteristics 
pigeonholed white women into a gender-specific racial category. The formation of gender 
identity for white men depended upon the reification of specific feminine characteristics. 
This feminine identity deemed women important to the preservation and advancement of 
civilization, yet deliberately placed them outside of existing power structures. Men 
likened politics to war and claimed that women, as the repositories of goodness and 
humanizers of children, lacked the character to wage it effectively. Theodore Roosevelt 
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expressed the sentiments of white men of this class when he described his wife as “so 
pure and holy that it seems almost profanation to touch her.”100 Women were expected to 
exclude themselves from the centers of power in order to protect themselves from its 
degrading effects. They were also cast as de-sexualized beings who engaged in the act of 
intercourse to bear children for the race rather than to satisfy human sexual urges, which 
only men were allowed to possess. Men, however, also held women up as a threat to the 
strength of male children. Contemporary figures complained women raised “over 
civilized flat-chested cigarette smokers with shaky nerves and doubtful vitality.”101 White 
women received the blame for the “feminization” of males in the United States, and their 
conduct dictated the honor of the white men deemed their caretakers. White people linked 
white manhood directly to civilization and linked the protection of white women to white 
manhood. As white masculinity transformed, it defined white femininity and 
universalized gender behaviors for women as well.102  
American race ideology formed in tandem with gender ideology via the violent 
demarcation of racial boundaries. As Leonard Wood participated in the removal of the 
Chiricahua Apache from the Southwest, American soldiers massacred the last “free band” 
of Lakota at Wounded Knee, and the 1890’s produced a peak in the number of lynchings 
of African Americans. Over one thousand African-American men were lynched in this 
ten-year period, with 1892 being the peak year at 230.103 The practice of lynching 
reasserted the political and social supremacy of the white male, at a time when white men 
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felt intense unease about the feminization of white men and the loss of white privilege. 
As white men reasserted their dominance, they excluded African Americans from the 
history of the struggle between the states. Instead, they recast them as characters in an 
“Old South” where African Americans had been better off in bondage: “Civilization 
positioned African American men as the anti-thesis of both the white man and 
civilization itself.” White Americans reinvented African Americans in the persona of 
“coon” and “mammy.” This reinvention of the African American accomplished several 
goals for white Americans. It created a present where African Americans were not angry 
about having been brutalized via chattel slavery, and white people were not guilty of their 
exploitation. It also created gender-specific prototypes for African Americans that did not 
threaten white male privilege. The “mammy” figure in particular illustrated for whites a 
“public representation of white benevolence” that would reform and uplift African 
Americans, while simultaneously casting whites in the role of supremacy. African 
Americans who attempted to step outside these gender norms faced violent consequences. 
Brutalization of African American women by mobs of white men starkly drew the line 
between white women and non-white women, who were placed outside of the gender 
norm.104  
The intimate friendship of Roosevelt and Wood was a coupling of the “same 
strong type” of men during the United States’ rapid expansion into global empire 
accompanied by a simultaneous transformation of white masculinity. While white 
supremacy had always bookended the expansion across the continent, a new variation of 
the narrative of race and gender was needed to explain American hegemony imposed 
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outside of the continent. The manifestation of Wood’s identity as an “Indian fighter” 
suited the narrative being created about the west, which explained United States 
aggressive expansion into the Pacific and Caribbean as it was remade as a global empire. 
Roosevelt’s public persona provided the American public with a living illustration of the 
new white man, and Wood provided Roosevelt with the prototype for the same. Both of 
these men also reinforced rapidly spreading ideas about white feminine identity as the 
foil against the non-white woman who was placed outside of the protection of the white 
patriarchy. Non-white women in the United States were de-personalized through the 
violence of the racist mob and the male gaze of the foot soldiers of empire like Leonard 
Wood. During the Spanish-American War’s insurgencies in the Philippines, Filipino 
women were subjected to such de-personalization.105  
After Wood completed his assignment at Fort Huachuca in 1890, General Miles 
ordered him to report for duty at the Presidio in San Francisco. At the Presidio, Wood 
maintained his relationship with Miles as subordinate and protégé. Because the post 
surgeon was an alcoholic who avoided dealing with patients, Wood kept to a very busy 
schedule as the post surgeon. He earned a reputation as a capable and dedicated doctor 
and competent soldier. Wood also continued to dedicate himself to physical fitness. 
Though he lacked social charm, he made the acquaintance of his future wife, Louise 
Condit-Smith.106  
Wood met Louise, the daughter of a deceased army colonel, while she was on 
vacation in the Bay Area with her uncle, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field. Wood 
admired Louise and found he “enjoyed life at the hotel very much” once he had met her. 
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They lunched, rode, and took walks together “virtually every day” after they met. 
Eventually, Judge Field sent for Wood and grilled him regarding his intentions toward his 
“favorite niece,” and Wood passed muster. They married in Washington, D.C., on 
November 18, 1890. The Woods then returned to the Presidio, where they resided for the 
next five years.107  
Wood returned to Washington in 1895 at the start of the expansionist enthusiasm 
that spread among much of the capital’s political elite. Wood enthusiastically entered the 
ranks of the “imperialists” headed by Roosevelt, Lodge, John Hay, Brook and Henry 
Adams, and Alfred Mahan, among others. The new President McKinley’s chronically ill 
wife often required the attention of the young Doctor Wood. Wood functioned in the 
capacity of counselor and comforter to Mrs. McKinley as well as doctor. This provided 
him with direct access to the First Family and earned the affection of the new president. 
Once again, General Miles acted as patron to Wood and introduced him to everyone he 
needed to know to enhance his political portfolio. One of the men was a young officer 
named Frank McCoy, who became a dedicated aide and mentee. It was during this period 
that he also met young Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt.108  
Theodore Roosevelt, and Leonard Wood couched their argument for American 
extra-continental expansion within the intellectual production of men like Josiah Strong 
who were popularly read during the latter portion of the nineteenth century. Josiah Strong 
expanded upon a racial argument and justification for global imperial activity. Strong 
urged the transformation of societies of inferior races through the exportation of 
American civilization. If these inferior races would not cooperate with this civilizing 
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project, Strong advocated an “Anglo-Saxon conquest” of the uncivilized spaces. In 1885 
Strong published Our Country, which articulated his vision for a Christianized world 
with white Americans cast in the role of the “chosen people” destined to go forth on a 
mission of mercy to civilize lower races and bring them Christian civilization. Strong 
linked this mission of spiritual fulfillment with commercial expansion with classic 
Protestant notion of commerce to follow the word of Christ. Strong advocated this 
expansion as peaceful alternative to violent race war. The two dominant ideologies of the 
day, scientific racism and social Darwinism, rested on the assumption of an inevitable 
struggle for racial supremacy. Strong believed commercial and missionary expansion 
would soften the subjugation of lower races by transforming their savage natures. The 
embrace of commerce would bring them under the cultural and intellectual hegemony of 
the white race. Policymakers believed this would engender within them admiration 
combined with recognition of their place below the white race.109  
Alfred Mahan provided the strategic rationale, and blueprint, for the expansion of 
naval power, especially into the Pacific. Mahan argued that sea power determined the 
global pre-eminence of any nation.110 Mahan also believed that “the Church is a greater 
fact than any state and that Christianity is more than any political creed.” For Mahan 
religion, specifically Anglo-American Protestantism, held a central role in the greatness 
of the American nation. He believed in the exportation of those spiritual ideals as part of 
the imperial mission for the twentieth century United States and rejected arguments from 
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anti-imperialists that the United States was unprepared “for the duty of governing 
dependencies.”111  
Roosevelt was a strong proponent of the views of Turner and Mahan and he 
inculcated Wood with his enthusiasm for extra-continental empire building. In the time 
they spent together on long walks, Wood and Roosevelt would discuss the troubles 
brewing in Cuba, and they actively campaigned for United States intervention. Roosevelt 
later stated that they “both felt very strongly that such a war would be righteous as it 
would be advantageous to the honor and interests of the nation.” On deployment to Cuba, 
Wood wrote, “Hard it is to believe that this is the commencement of a new policy and 
that this is the first great expedition our country has sent overseas and marks the 
commencement of a new era in our relations with the world.”112 Wood looked forward to 
war with Spain as a means of liberating Cuban from Spanish imperial tyranny. Later he 
carried out U.S. imperial policy in Cuba with the intention of racial uplift of a people he 
felt lacked the sophistication for genuine independence. Roosevelt and Lodge both 
burned to get the United States into war against Spain. These three men fed off one 
another in a deadly triumvirate, each urging the other and the country along the path to 
war. President McKinley was reluctant to send Americans to war off the continent, 
having experienced the carnage of war at Antietam, one of the deadliest battles of the 
Civil War. Despite his reluctance, however, he committed to war to advance the 
economic interests of the nation, as he perceived them, and simultaneously bring the 
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benefits of American civilization to “backward” peoples.113 When the United States 
eventually declared war on April 10, 1898, Roosevelt resigned from his post as assistant 
secretary of Navy so he could actively lobby for an assignment in the Army, which would 
guarantee him action. Wood was still assigned as assistant surgeon and medical officer to 
Mrs. McKinley, who depended upon his ministrations. Despite this, he also lobbied to get 
sent into combat. Wood burned with an ambition to achieve political power and felt 
combat in this period of expansion guaranteed that. Their combined ceaseless efforts to 
fight led to the creation of the “Rough Riders.”114  
The Rough Riders were a unit of cavalry made up from varied types of white men 
from different regions, classes, and vocations. Roosevelt had intended them to be just 
that: a sampling of the best the white American race had to offer. They were formed as 
the governor of Arizona pleaded for the opportunity to host cavalry regiments composed 
of “frontiersmen possessing special qualifications as horsemen and marksmen.” Wood 
and Roosevelt were happy to oblige the governor, and with the support and patronage of 
other western politicians, they were able to gain the appropriations of funds enough for 
three regiments of volunteer mounted cavalry. 115 Although President McKinley offered 
Roosevelt command of the regiment, Roosevelt prudently recognized that a seasoned 
officer should lead the unit. He agreed to come on with the rank of lieutenant colonel and 
insisted that the command go to Leonard Wood as commanding officer with the rank of 
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colonel. Wood later described Roosevelt as “one of the most subordinate subordinates I 
ever had.” Roosevelt attested to Wood’s character when he declared that Wood possessed 
“the qualities of entire manliness with entire uprightness and cleanliness of character.” 
Roosevelt felt Wood was endowed with the essential traits of manhood required for 
command of such an elite, prestigious unit. Wood insisted that recruiters should not 
accept any man “whose stomach was larger than his chest.” Roosevelt wanted to put on 
public display what he believed to be the best of white American masculinity. He 
selected cowboys from the west, bluebloods, from the east and Southern gentlemen.116  
Once in Cuba, the Rough Riders were assigned to take San Juan Hill and a series 
of fortified summits manned by well dug-in Spanish infantry. The taking of San Juan Hill 
entered the mythology of the war in a way that profoundly affected the political fortunes 
of both men. The Rough Riders may likely have faced disaster had it not been for the 
African American 9th and 10th Infantries that provided them with covering fire, as well 
as the African American cavalry that charged the hill with them. Although he described 
the 10th as having “followed their leaders with splendid courage” and without a “single 
straggler among them,” Roosevelt’s version of events also suggested that African 
American soldiers hesitated and had to be threatened with violence in order to get them to 
perform as white soldiers. Roosevelt asserted such claims despite the fact the 9th and 
10th Cavalries had fought Native American insurgencies all over the American West 
prior to their deployment to Cuba. In keeping with the overall theme of exalting the 
biological and physical supremacy of the white American race, they were not included in 
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the narrative, nor were they allowed to participate in the celebratory reenactments of the 
battle for the press.117  
  The Colored 9th and 10th Cavalries reached the summit of Kettle Hill alongside 
the 1st Volunteer Regiment of the Rough Riders. John J. (“Black Jack”) Pershing, who 
had earned a Silver Star for his efforts in capturing San Juan, led the 10th. According to 
witnesses, the black units performed their duties quite well. Despite his immediate reports 
of their admirable performance and skills as soldiers, Roosevelt later characterized their 
performance as not being on par with that of the white soldiers. In a series of articles 
published in Scribner’s magazine, Roosevelt praised the physical and martial abilities of 
African American soldiers, yet insisted they could perform only if properly guided by 
white officers. Roosevelt believed that the forced migration of Africans into the Americas 
was “a racial and national catastrophe,” since he thought they could never truly be 
assimilated into American society. For Roosevelt, African American soldiers’ battlefield 
successes threatened white supremacist reclamation of male authority, unless it was 
placed within the context of a master-slave subordinated relationship.118  
After hostilities in Cuba ceased, President McKinley appointed Wood governor of 
Santiago. Wood approached his task with his usual humorless and unyielding approach. 
His autocratic management style became a well-known characteristic of his colonial 
administration. He correctly believed “his rule was the rule of a Pasha” whose authority 
was “absolute to life and death” if he chose to wield it. Never one for self-doubt or 
compromise, and completely convinced of his righteousness, Wood aggressively 
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enforced his particular method of rule in the areas under his control. He launched a 
program of massive garbage collection enforced by surveys and inspections of homes and 
neighborhoods to ensure compliance. Wood then turned to food distribution and mass 
conscription to feed the population and clean up the city. He also successfully turned 
many former insurgents into a “rural guard,” which he used to stamp out any further 
resistance and police the local community. Wood would later replicate this practice in the 
southern Philippines with the Moro Constabulary. He was extremely autocratic, yet an 
effective administrator. Despite his rigidity, he succeeded in cleaning up Santiago, Cuba, 
wiping out “banditry,” and became a model for colonial administration of the new 
imperial possessions of the United States. He left Cuba with a reputation later celebrated 
as an administrator who “taught Cuba how to rule itself.”119  
The occupation of Cuba by the U.S. Army faced sporadic violent resistance from 
Cuban revolutionaries. U.S. officials, however, treated any opposition as banditry and 
stamped it out violently. U.S. authorities successfully exploited phenotypical and class 
distinctions in Cuba, grafting the American binary of “Negro” and white onto Cuban 
politics. This effectively squelched any real unified resistance to United States 
occupation. During Wood’s tenure as governor he granted authority to Cubans who 
opposed independence and had not participated in the insurrection against the Spanish. 
These men supported Wood’s program of Americanization of the new territories and 
were completely “obsequious and cooperative” with U.S. authority.120 The United States 
facilitated the creation of an elite class of white Cubans who grew enriched in an 
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economic relationship predicated upon the underdevelopment of the island and the 
subordination of the masses into a serf-like status within an agrarian society. Cuba 
became a client state of the United States for the next fifty-plus years. Among other 
tactics, United States officials recast the Maceo brothers as racially ambivalent 
characters, more white than black, in order to explain their apparent military genius. 
Similar to how Roosevelt excluded black soldiers from the myth of San Juan Hill, they 
removed Afro-Cubans from the narrative of success of a “multi-colored” revolutionary 
coalition. Unlike the Philippines, Cuba’s transition to U.S. imperial possession did not 
require the United States to crush counterinsurgency.121  
At the conclusion of the Spanish American War on December 10, 1898, the 
United States and Spain signed the Treaty of Paris. The Spanish ceded the territories of 
Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines to the United States in exchange for a lump sum 
of twenty million dollars. Reflecting the racial assumptions of the era, indigenous 
populations were not consulted despite, in the cases of Cuba and the Philippines, having 
spent many years fighting bloody insurgencies against Spanish occupation. These newly 
acquired territories created a problem for nativists and others who feared the inclusion of 
those whom they considered racial inferiors.122  
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After the war, Wood continued to expand his résumé as an expansionist and 
became further ensconced within the inner circle of imperialists in Washington, D.C. His 
relationship with Assistant Secretary Roosevelt paid off when he returned to the capital 
with Roosevelt as president. President McKinley had succumbed to wounds from an 
assassin in the spring of 1901, and Roosevelt, who had been made vice president in 1900, 
became the president of the United States. Wood and Roosevelt continued their close 
relationship after he became president. Roosevelt carried his vigor for expansion into the 
White House, determined to realize his dreams of American empire and re-invigoration 
of white male supremacy.123 
Wood’s friendship with Roosevelt was the meeting of like muscular minds and 
bodies, which became the genesis of racial and gendered myths that invigorated 
American imperial white supremacy and expanded beyond the geographical boundaries 
of the continent. The patronage of Nelson Miles and Theodore Roosevelt provided Wood 
access and opportunities to carry out the imperatives of American empire, thus causing 
the death and destruction of thousands of Moros in the southern Philippines. Their 
participation in the violent process of overseas expansion in Cuba and then in the 
Philippines provided a template for white masculinity in the age of extra-continental 
American empire.124 Robust competition between men, embrace of “barbarian” virtues, 
and control of the definition of gender identities of women were the characteristics 
exhibited by these men and touted from the bully pulpit of Roosevelt’s presidency. The 
myth of Leonard Wood as Indian fighter descended from Puritan stock provided capital 
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for the greater narrative of race and gender accompanying and propelling the United 
States into the community of global empires. The two of sought to rescue white men from 
a crisis of identity and hardened both gender and color lines in the United States for 
several generations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 77 
Chapter Two: To “Uplift, Civilize, and Christianize”: The Paradox of the 
American Civilizing Mission in the Southern Philippines 
 
A popular account of McKinley’s Philippines policy states that in 1899, while 
addressing a delegation of Methodist Christian ministers, the President presented his 
evangelical vision of civilizational uplift of the people of the Philippines. Embedded 
within his rhetoric was his public rationale for the continued possession and occupation 
of the islands. McKinley claimed he sought bipartisan guidance from the House and 
Senate and received no good advice from anyone there. It was not until he sank to his 
knees in Christian prayer for many nights in succession that inspiration came to him. God 
afforded him the certitude that it was the duty of Americans to “educate the Filipinos, and 
uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the very best we could 
by them, as our fellow men for whom Christ also died.” McKinley, like many 
imperialists, couched his occupation and usurpation of Filipino self-determination within 
a discourse of paternalistic racism. McKinley’s divinely inspired foreign policy decision 
was also pragmatic and politically astute. In a time of heightened patriotic fervor and 
popular support for America’s expansion into the Pacific and the Caribbean, he 
calculated the political costs of granting the Philippines independence and decided to 
hold onto the islands.125 
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The acquisition of these new territories represented a new frontier for many 
Americans who craved opportunities to carry out their civilizing mission. Many 
expansionists sincerely believed that “civilizing” the savage would mutually benefit both 
missionaries and the millions of souls they meant to save. The U.S. expansionist project 
of the late nineteenth century infused moral certainty with a renewed sense of national 
purpose. Expansionists fiercely asserted the moral dimensions of American empire, 
especially as anti-expansionists attempted to monopolize the moral high ground in the 
debate of empire. Imperialist architects and soldiers were determined to introduce the 
nation’s “new wards” to American civilization. Proponents of American empire defined 
civilization as white Anglo-Saxon Christian Protestantism, free-market capitalism, and 
the inculcation of distinctly American cultural notions of race, gender, and teleological 
historicism. This moral certitude also provided cover for what anti-imperialists claimed 
were baser motives for occupation. The Philippines provided the coveted naval bases that 
would help secure access to the Asian markets. Imperialists vociferously insisted these 
self-interested motives provided as much benefit to the Filipinos as they did for 
Americans. The moral certitude of President McKinley, and these proponents of the new 
U.S. empire, would have severe consequences for all the inhabitants of the Philippines.126  
At the end the of the nineteenth century, the United States was like most Western 
societies in that it guaranteed a certain degree of freedom from violence for white 
citizens, contingent upon continued violence against non-normative peoples portrayed as 
irrational. Despite the often asserted values of individual freedoms, self-determination, 
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and the opportunity to transcend one’s humble beginnings, the U.S. historical experience 
for the “other” was often brutal and exploitative and resulted in the extermination of large 
indigenous communities that stood in the path of U.S. economic and territorial 
expansion.127  Interwoven into the economic imperatives of the nation was the ideology 
of race, which placed groups outside of the protection of the law and traditions of the 
nation. Free white male American citizens benefited materially and psychologically from 
state violence carried out against Native Americans, as the latter were removed from their 
lands. The same was true of violence against African Americans, Chinese Americans, 
immigrants, and other groups placed outside of the paradigm of whiteness. Close to two 
hundred years of aggressive marginalization of Native Americans, African Americans, 
and others had created a solid tradition of bifurcated notions of citizenship. White 
citizenship differed from that of non-whites, who were often the target of state, and non-
state, sanctioned violence. This was woven into a narrative of freedom, democracy, and 
free-market capitalism, which were part of a teleological discourse of progress.  
The United States took possession of the former territories of the Spanish Empire 
with the historical and cultural baggage of this white supremacist ideology fused with a 
free-market system predicated upon the marginalization of certain populations. Once in 
possession of the islands, the U.S. adopted a policy of political stewardship of the 
Filipinos by placing them under direct United States rule. Anthropologists, professional 
educators, and other members of academic and intellectual communities studied the 
people of the islands in an effort to categorize them. They then designed a colonial policy 
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suitable for the “natives”’ supposed stage of civilization and their racial temperament. 
During this same period, the military also made assessments of Moro character and 
society with the goals of pacification and control of the populace. Both military and 
academic communities came to similar conclusions about “Moro character.” As white 
American men classified the Moros into a specific category, their commitment to Islam 
came to be the distinguishing factor that set them as a race apart.128 
Soon after Americans arrived in the Philippines, they embarked on a campaign of 
military pacification. From the beginning of armed conflict, the violent imposition of 
imperial rule was justified in terms of a civilizing mission—the bringing of republican,  
Protestant-Christian, American values to those who lacked them. Nineteenth-century U.S. 
identity was grounded in a racial, spiritual, and cultural amalgam of white Protestantism. 
Many white Americans also possessed profound beliefs in the superiority of United 
States political and social institutions and a conviction that they held a divine mandate to 
help other countries to follow the American example. These beliefs somewhat 
contradicted the predominant race ideology, which deemed the targets of U.S. missionary 
zeal beyond the reach of the apex of white racial superiority. The term “mission” implied 
that assimilation was possible, but at the same time, the colonial project was legitimized 
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by racist depictions of Filipinos, which called into question the likelihood of a successful 
outcome. 129 
Americans eventually insisted on less autonomy for the Moros than the Spanish 
had allowed, and considered the Moros less capable of assimilating American values than 
the Christian Filipinos. Unlike the Spanish, U.S. authorities were also unwilling to accept 
a mere token acknowledgement of U.S. sovereignty from the Moros. While military 
officials used fairly arbitrary and prejudiced assessments of Moros as the basis for their 
decisions, academics produced the intellectual rationale for their violent pacification. As 
the historian Joan Scott has noted: “The paradox of the civilizing mission . . . was that the 
stated goal was to civilize those who finally could not be civilized.” Despite stated goals 
of uplift for marginalized people, Americans faced a paradox. The ethos of white 
supremacy and scientific racism seemed to place the racial “other” biologically beyond 
the reach of uplift.130 
Prior to large-scale resistance of Moros against American rule, Christian Filipinos 
violently opposed U.S. attempts to invalidate their struggle for independence from the 
Spanish. Commodore Dewey’s stunning naval success against the Spanish Navy on May 
1, 1898 enabled him to demand the immediate surrender of Manila by Spanish forces. At 
the time, over two thousand soldiers of the insurgent army surrounded the city. Prior to 
Dewey’s victory, U.S. policymakers, including President McKinley, expressed 
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ambivalence about occupying the islands. President McKinley kept his options open, 
however, and occupied the islands, when the opportunity presented itself through 
Dewey’s victory. Dewey subsequently decided to direct expedition commander Major 
General Merritt to reduce the power of the Spanish and give “order and security to the 
islands while in U.S. possession.” By the end of June, over 10,000 U.S. soldiers 
surrounded Manila and were poised to take possession of the islands.131  
Filipino insurrectos resisted McKinley’s decision to incorporate the Philippines 
into the new U.S. empire. When Americans attempted to implement the terms of the 
Treaty of Paris and physically occupy the country, Christian Filipinos launched organized 
violent opposition. Emil Aguinaldo emerged as the commander of the Filipino Army as 
well as the president of the Republic. Aguinaldo was a member of the Filipino upper 
class who had joined the resistance and took advantage of his class and authority to raise 
a faction loyal to him. He was a nationalist and illustrado who used personal charisma to 
create loyalty and violence to remove challengers and usurpers of his authority.132  
American soldiers called Filipinos “niggers and goo-goos” and treated them with 
contempt almost from the moment they arrived on the islands.133 Racial attitudes 
cultivated in the states, and the official position that U.S. military forces would thwart 
Filipino independence, turned a tenuous situation volatile with constant violent 
encounters between Filipinos and U.S. soldiers. Americans soon became embroiled in a 
bloody asymmetrical war with Filipino guerillas determined to legitimize their 
declaration of independence by military force. Shooting broke out between Filipinos and 
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American soldiers on February 4, 1899. On February 5, Americans soldiers advanced 
aggressively and effectively across a sixteen-mile front, sweeping the Filipino forces 
before them. It was the bloodiest single day of the war, with two hundred thirty-eight 
American casualties and over one thousand Filipinos killed. The resulting insurgency, 
which lasted until 1902, was brutally bloody, marked by U.S. atrocities, and gave an 
entirely new meaning to the popular “water cure” health regimen.134 
Aguinaldo and his men disbanded and fought a fierce guerilla war against U. S. 
soldiers as soon as it became apparent that they could not win a conventional war against 
U.S. forces. U.S. soldiers became frustrated with fighting elusive foes who laid traps, 
assassinated collaborators, ambushed patrols, and melted back into the civilian 
population. U.S forces soon resorted to extreme and brutal tactics in their fight against the 
insurrectos. Torture, re-concentration of civilian populations, free-fire zones, and even 
rape and murder became commonplace toward Filipinos. By the time General John 
Coulter Bates was dispatched to the Sulu archipelago to negotiate a treaty with the sultan, 
the northern insurgency was in full effect.135  
Theodore Roosevelt and Leonard Wood were of a like mind regarding United 
States administration of the islands and the nation’s responsibility to tutor its inhabitants 
in the ways of civilization. Roosevelt and Wood discussed the situation in the 
Philippines, and the Moros in particular. The race question was of great concern to 
Roosevelt. In his text The Winning of the West, Roosevelt argued that the Anglo-Saxon 
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race alone possessed the racial characteristics necessary to create a democratic society. 
He wrote that lesser races needed the proper maturation, and Anglo-Saxon tutelage, in 
order to acquire them.136 Wood and Roosevelt both decided that the Moros were a savage 
people for whom “warfare was their religion and like a national sport” and who were 
incapable of self-rule. Wood asked to be posted in the Philippines, and Roosevelt 
responded that “nothing would be better” to tame those “tagal bandits” and “Chinese 
half-breeds,” whom he compared to Apaches. Roosevelt expressed concerns publically 
that other European powers might occupy or dominate the Philippines if the United States 
did not act quickly. In the four years that the U.S. Army had been in Mindanao and Sulu, 
the Moros had earned a reputation as fierce, exotic warriors. Men like Roosevelt and 
Wood welcomed this opportunity to be tested against savagery and barbarianism. It fit in 
with Roosevelt’s racial fantasies of conquest and emergence from battle having proved 
the racial superiority and vigor of the white man. In his worldview, the stronger races 
would inevitably dominate non-white, inferior races. For Roosevelt this was the natural 
order of things.137  
While Wood and Roosevelt were putting together the Rough Riders, McKinley 
sent General John Coulter Bates to the island of Jolo with orders to reach accommodation 
with Sultan Jamal Kiram. Dean C. Worcester, one of the architects of the eventual 
agreement, pushed for it based on his belief that the Moros and the “wild tribes” were 
not, and had never been, part of the Philippine nation envisioned by the insurrectos. 
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Despite possessing access to this assessment, the Americans behaved as if the sultan were 
the sovereign ruler of the Moros of the Sulu archipelago. 138  
 The insurrection in the north necessitated the need to avoid open, organized 
opposition in the south. Military officials were concerned that U.S. forces would be 
spread thin if the Moros rose up en masse and violently opposed occupation. Given these 
circumstances, the U.S. government was satisfied with a simple recognition of U.S. 
sovereignty by the sultan of Sulu and was willing to overlook slavery in the south. 
General Elwell Stephen Otis, the Military Governor of the Philippines from 1898 to 
1900, and other U.S. army officers worried that Moros would collaborate with the 
Filipino nationalists in their insurgency and create a southern front for an already 
beleaguered army battling a growing insurgency. U.S. officials assumed Spain occupied 
and controlled the southernmost portions of the Philippine Islands, including the Sulu 
archipelago. This turned out to be completely false. In fact, Spain grossly exaggerated the 
extent to which they exercised power and influence in the south. Bates’ instructions were 
to meet with the sultan, get him to “recognize United States sovereignty,” and insure that 
the Moros would not join the Christian Filipinos’ campaign to rid the island of United 
States occupation.139  
Sultan Kiram held political legitimacy through his purported ancestral connection 
to the Prophet Muhammad. The datus of Sulu recognized Sultan Kiram as the Khalifa, 
despite the fact that his ability to force their compliance was not at all absolute. In fact, he 
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was able to gain compliance only through diplomacy and his own powers of persuasion, a 
fact he hid from General Bates when he signed the Bates agreement. The people of the 
archipelago self-identified as the Tausug, which, when translated, meant “people of the 
current.” The Tausugs were the most independent of the Moros and had very little 
political affiliation with the Moros on Mindanao. Sulu had a fairly homogeneic 
geographical population of at least ninety percent Muslim, and the Tausug were the 
largest and most powerful of the many ethnic groups in the Sulu archipelago. They 
earned a reputation, first with the Spanish and then with the Americans, as the most 
tenacious fighters among the many Moro ethnicities.140  
The datus headed many autonomous communities that recognized the sultan’s 
lineal authority from the earliest Muslims of the archipelago, who claimed descendancy 
from the Prophet Muhammad himself. The powers of the sultan required economic 
tribute and defense of his office and person. This contrasted with the Maguindanaons of 
Mindanao, who were bound by ethnicity but lacked a central authoritative figure. 
Although there were some who held the title of sultan, there was no caliph—or God’s 
political representative on earth. The U.S. Army never signed an agreement like Bates’ 
with the Maguindanao Moros and thus began hostile operations against them as early as 
1900. It was during these hostilities that the Moros earned their reputation with the U.S. 
military as recalcitrant, fierce, even suicidal warriors.141  
On August 12, 1898, Sultana Pangyan Inchi Jamela, “the Sultan’s extremely 
powerful Mother,” invited General John Coulter Bates to dine in her quarters. During the 
negotiations over the Bates agreement, she had the sultan’s aides, Hajji Butu, Habib 
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Mura, and Datu Calbi, present a letter to General Bates signaling that she was taking 
control of the negotiations. The sultana was the second wife of former sultan Jamal ul 
Azam and mother of the current sultan, Jamal Kiram. She exercised great power and 
influence behind the scenes. She was responsible for maneuvering her son, Sultan Kiram, 
into power. General Bates recognized and respected her as an important figure he could 
use to influence the terms of the agreement.142  
 The sultan spent most of his time in Singapore, where he had extensive trade 
relationships, and lived the life of wealthy cosmopolitan elite. He had made hajj several 
times and also had contacts within the Ottoman Empire. He was well aware of the 
colonial arrangements that other Muslim elites like himself had made in Dutch territories 
and the British-controlled Malay region. Muslim rulers and political elites throughout 
Southeast Asia entered into subordinated arrangements with European powers that 
offered protection of their class, raw materials, land, and strategic access to their colonial 
masters. The sultan foresaw the eventual ouster of Spanish imperial power in the region 
and had been shopping among the imperial European powers for an imperial protector. 
The British, the target of much of his lobbying efforts, took a wait-and-see attitude to 
discover what the United States planned for the region. The sultan was unsympathetic to 
the Filipino nationalists and feared the prospect of Philippine independence. During the 
many years of hostile relations between the Spanish and the Moros, the Spanish used 
Catholic Filipinos as foot soldiers against the Moros, while the Moros raided Catholic 
Filipino areas for slaves and other resources. The sultan understood that political 
domination by the Filipino illustrados was religiously and politically untenable.143  
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From the very beginning, General Bates tried to set a particular tone for Moro-
U.S. relations in Sulu by insisting that troops respect locals and Islamic customs. Despite 
his insistence that the United States flag fly over the ship above the sultan’s banner, Bates 
demonstrated appropriate deference to the sultan, his retinue, and his family. One of the 
most contentious issues for Bates was slavery. Bates intentionally treated the topic with 
circumspection and ambiguity, precisely because he correctly perceived it to be a 
potentially intractable issue fraught with potential for conflict. Trying to resolve it could 
have killed any chance for an agreement with the sultan and his datus.144 
The Bates agreement of August 20, 1899 was the result of his efforts and became 
controversial for several reasons. First, it came to be viewed by military officials as an 
impediment to control of the population and the remaking of the “savage Moros” and 
their institutions. Second, there were competing interpretations of key passages in the 
text. The sultan claimed he had been led to believe Moros retained their sovereignty in 
their new imperial relationship with the United States. Furthermore, he certainly gave this 
impression to his datus and the Tausug masses, who after years of resistance against 
Christian rule would never have accepted American political and cultural domination. 
Third, because the Spanish had misled the Americans into believing that the Moro areas 
were subdued and under Spanish control, Americans assumed Moros were just 
exchanging one imperial power for another. The sultan had limited power among his 
followers and certainly did not have the means to enforce his political will absolutely. His 
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inability to control his datus became one of the primary complaints of Governor General 
Leonard Wood when he arrived in the south.145 
Sultan Kiram and his mother were keen to preserve the kind of limited autonomy 
they had enjoyed under the Spanish. The Tausug had signed a treaty with the Spanish on 
July 22, 1878, ending centuries of Spanish incursions and set in place an understanding 
between the two parties. The agreement was ambiguous about the autonomy of the 
Moros. There was also the open accusation by later administrators that Charles Schuck, 
the American interpreter, intentionally misled and misinterpreted the different versions of 
the agreement.146 The agreement provided monetary compensation for the sultan and his 
entourage. The agreement did not prohibit slavery and in fact promised not to interfere 
with the religion of the Moros. The agreement was intentionally ambiguous in order to 
give breathing room to the Americans as they fought in the north. Bates’s primary goal 
was to come to an understanding, so he left the more prickly items, such as slavery, for 
others to hammer out.147  
Moros were exoticized in U.S. popular culture with the 1902 release of the play 
The Sultan of Sulu, written by George Ade, a popular playwright and political satirist. 
Ade made a name for himself by gently mocking what he perceived as the conceit and 
arrogance of contemporary society. He was not an anti-expansionist, but he believed “just 
the idea of Americans trying to transform the Filipinos into Asiatic carbon copies of 
American democrats was almost too absurd for words.” Ade wrote a series of articles 
mocking the civilizing mission of the Americans, using the fictional rural Tagalog family 
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the “Kakyaks.” He visited Manila in 1900 and became intrigued by the agreement with 
Sultan Kiram. Ade found the circumstances of the agreement with the sultan, who 
practiced the “twin relics of barbarism,” slavery and polygamy, a particular source of 
irony, and it planted the seeds for the successful satire in his mind. When he returned, he 
put pen to paper and wrote The Sultan of Sulu: A Satire in Two Acts. The play opened to 
huge crowds in Chicago on March 11, 1902. It was a comedy of errors and 
miscommunications between a fictional delegation of Americans and the sultan. Ade 
mocked the conceit of benevolent assimilationists while also introducing the Moros to a 
popular American audience. Even President Roosevelt and William Howard Taft brought 
their families to see the show, which was performed before one hundred ninety-two 
standing-room-only audiences on Broadway. Ade’s successful show ran during a period 
when the atrocities on Samar and the controversy over occupation were in full effect 
throughout the nation. Even as people enjoyed the satiric nature of the show, the public 
thirsted for more information about these unfamiliar lands so far from the continental 
United States. Despite this, U.S. policymakers and other Americans had only a very 
vague picture of the Moros and initially lumped them in with the “wild tribes” as 
disparate groups of non-Christian Filipinos.148  
The Muslims of the Philippines, however, defined themselves very differently 
from how Americans saw them. Likewise, the Moros saw the Americans and their 
presence in a very different light than the Americans did themselves. Moros eventually 
viewed the Americans as yet another group of non-Muslim invaders intent on the 
destruction of their communities, their culture, and their religion. Moros expected a 
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similar autonomous arrangement they had achieved with the Spanish through hundreds of 
years of struggle. They did not anticipate the intrusive physical presence of the U.S. 
Army in the midst of their communities. Nor did they expect dictatorial colonial officials’ 
attempts to regulate the internal affairs of their communities. Armed with a rich historical 
tradition of jihad as resistance against Christian aggression, Moros resorted to jihad 
fisibillilah with great enthusiasm yet limited effectiveness.149   
The Muslims of the southern Philippines were ethnically distinct from the 
Christian Filipinos in the north. When the Spanish had arrived in the Philippines three 
hundred years earlier, they had encountered these Islamic communities throughout the 
northern portion of the islands. The Spanish labeled them “Moros” because of Spain’s 
experience with the Muslims of North Africa who had occupied the Iberian Peninsula for 
several centuries.150 Along with this moniker, Spanish also incorporated the Muslims of 
the islands into their historical narrative of the struggle between Islam and Christendom. 
David Barrows quoted a sixteenth-century Spanish priest who noted that the hostility of 
the Spanish toward the indigenous people was so intense that “those who have received 
this foul law” (i.e., Islam) persist in it, and there is “great difficulty in making them 
abandon it, for they are better treated by the preachers of Mohammad than they have been 
by the preachers of Christ.”151 The Spanish quickly subdued the non-Muslim, and 
nominally Muslim, populations and then engaged in violent campaigns of conquest in 
order to destroy Islamic political power and convert Muslims to Catholicism. The 
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Spanish contextualized aggressive expansion within a historical past of “holy war” to 
convert the “heathen” indigenous peoples to Catholicism. It took many years of warfare 
to push the Muslims southward into Mindanao and Sulu. Inhabitants of the northern 
Philippine Islands were integrated into the Spanish imperial system, and Spain then 
converted the people by force and through the destruction of their indigenous culture and 
religion. The result was the Christianization of the indigenous people in the north and the 
transformation of their society.152  
Although U.S. officials claimed that the Moros possessed only a crude 
understanding of Islam, they did in fact have a solid intellectual tradition of Islamic 
scholarship and martial tradition of jihad. They produced versions of the sharia filtered 
through the cultures and histories of the various Moro communities. A strong tradition of 
militant jihad emerged from several centuries of struggle between the Spanish and the 
Moros. The “Moro Wars,” as the Spanish called them, were a series of attempts by Spain 
to incorporate the area into the rest of the Philippines and proselytize Catholicism as they 
had done in the north.153 This knowledge and understanding of Islam fortified and 
motivated many of them to declare jihad against American soldiers. Armed resistance 
became much more common when Americans attempted to usurp Islamic political 
autonomy and especially when they attempted to force them to pay the cedula. By 
grounding resistance to U.S. occupation in Moro Islamic ideology, they resisted attempts 
by Americans to define and control them. Individual Moros, even those with only a 
rudimentary understanding of their religion, understood the primacy of Islamic 
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governance in the sharia and the proscriptions against living under the rule of non-
believers. In addition, defense of the institution of the caliphate was understood to be the 
duty of every Muslim. Four hundred years of resistance to Spanish imperialism had 
created a culture of jihad. The caliphate existed within the Islamic vision of political life 
to ensure the practice of religion, protect the survival of the “umma,” and preserve the 
ability of the individual Muslim to practice his faith.154  
One of the cultural and economic bases for Moro society in Sulu and Mindanao 
was the institution of slavery. Slavery and slave raiding had been central to Moro 
economic society throughout its long history. Moros raided coastal regions of the 
Philippines and throughout Southeast Asia for captives, who became essential sources of 
labor within the Moro economy. They were used as rowers and haulers and often brought 
needed skills such as the ability to translate into the community. There was a distinction 
within Moro society between slaves who were debt bondage and those who had been 
acquired through raiding and trade with other Moro bands. Captives were known as 
Bisaya, which in Moro dialects meant “foreigner.” Slaves in the Moro community did 
have the opportunity for upward social mobility. Through their accomplishments they, 
and their descendants, could ascend to positions of influence. Datu Piang of Mindanao, 
who became a successful and infamous collaborator with U.S. forces, was the son of a 
Chinese merchant and a slave-concubine of a powerful datu. By the 1870’s, due to 
political pressures and setbacks for most Moro communities, slave raiding had decreased, 
and most captives came from central Philippine hill peoples.155 
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Slavery became one of most frequently deployed pretexts and justifications for 
armed intervention within Moro communities and the establishment of American 
hegemony. Anti-slavery ideology played a “hegemonic role” in the consolidation of 
American imperial power in the Philippines. Americans used it to position Moros as 
savage and abusive people. Men like Dean C. Worcester intentionally ignored the 
difference between chattel slavery, which had existed in the American South, with 
multiple gradations of servitude within the many Moro communities. Like many other 
Americans with various political agendas, he collapsed every system of servitude into 
“absolute categories, independent of any social context.”156 Americans conflated slavery 
among the Moros with the institution that had existed in the southern United States and 
did not place it into the context of continuous struggle against Spanish and Filipino 
Christians, of which slavery was a prime feature for Moros.   
The anti-imperialist Democratic presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan 
made slavery an issue during the campaign by accusing the McKinley administration of 
tolerating its practice in the southern Philippines. He specifically cited the Bates 
agreement in an October 4, 1900, campaign speech. Bryan claimed the “Sulu treaty 
recognized slavery” and cheapened the sacrifices made by Union soldiers to eradicate the 
practice in the States. Seventy-one-year-old veteran abolitionist Edward Atkinson wrote 
an incendiary pamphlet condemning the agreement. Atkinson linked slavery, polygamy, 
and Islam in the southern Philippines. He declared the agreement with the sultan 
“hypocritical and unconstitutional” and called for the “undisputed terms of the treaty” to 
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be “disavowed.” Republicans responded defensively, arguing there was no such “treaty,” 
and the “agreement” with the sultan was a “temporary” measure meant to prevent 
hostilities in the south while the army was pacifying resistance in Luzon and Visayas. 
Furthermore, Congressman C. H. Grosvenor, a Republican from Ohio, stated that U.S. 
policymakers intended to eradicate the practice as soon as possible. After the 1900 
election, President McKinley openly declared his intention to do so.157  
Moros’ resistance to U.S. attempts to ban slavery were grounded in their 
conviction that it was sanctioned by Islam. Rhetorical opposition to slavery, however, 
established American cultural supremacy and provided the proof policymakers believed 
they needed to justify subjugation of the Moros. It was within this context of hundreds of 
years of jihad against Spanish imperialism, declining economic and political influence, 
and a tradition of political autonomy that Moros confronted United States occupation of 
the southern Philippines. Through the Bates agreement, Sultan Kiram expected the same 
type of autonomous relationship he had enjoyed with the Spanish. Individual Moros 
certainly never agreed to be ruled over by the Americans. When U.S. Army officials 
attempted to enforce American policies and laws, Moros reacted with violent resistance, 
just as they had always done against the Spanish.  
U.S. anthropologists, biologists, and adherents of scientific racism were both 
allies and architects of an American white supremacist empire. David P. Barrows, Dean 
Worcester, Najeeb Saleeby, and many others reinforced ideas of white supremacy by 
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using scientific inquiry, specifically cataloguing, in order to legitimize and naturalize 
racial inferiority of Moros, and indeed all Filipinos. American academics of the social 
and life sciences disseminated and legitimized an evolutionary vision of humanity 
combined with a pyramided hierarchy of races with whites firmly established at the peak. 
Academics had the prerequisite cultural and intellectual foundation in place, which 
practically dictated how the many groups of Filipinos would be placed. While scientific 
categories emerged during occupation, academic tools such as Morgan’s hierarchy and 
American anthropologist Barrows’ categorization of Native Americans enabled proper 
placement of these groups in order to create a coherent narrative, which fit with a larger 
framework of white racial superiority.158  
Barrows had extensive experience studying American indigenous peoples and 
saw the mission of civilization for the Moros as similar to what had been done with the 
former. Wood and other policymakers used Barrows’ studies to devise methods of 
control of the indigenous peoples and to devise means of moving them forward along an 
imagined teleological path to civilization. Barrows depicted Filipinos as a hodgepodge of 
disparate dependent communities that the U.S. had a moral duty to save from the 
consequences of their own barbarity.159  
Before Barrows visited the island, his assessments of the non-Christian Filipinos 
included policy recommendations similar to Washington’s policy toward Native 
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Americans. American policymakers had created reservations to contain Native American 
populations and specialized bureaus to execute policies designed for the purpose of social 
control. By the end of the nineteenth century U.S. policy towards Native Americans had 
shifted to one of assimilation, which included an aggressive “civilizing”.  Barrows visited 
these reservations and examined U.S. legislation regarding Native Americans in his effort 
to craft effective policies for the non-Christian populations. Eventually, he decided upon 
an amalgamation between the Christianized and the “wild tribes” to further the American 
civilization project. Upon his arrival, he focused on the use of American built and 
organized schools to prepare the Filipinos for self-government, while he developed a 
bureau to begin the “civilizing” of the so-called “wild tribes and Mohammadans.” He 
believed they needed separate legislation in order to administer laws and “advance their 
welfare.” Barrows, an enthusiastic supporter of U.S. occupation, also supported the 
counterinsurgency. Barrows understood it would take violence and coercion to force 
Filipinos, especially the non-Christians, to accept U.S. political control and cultural 
destruction/indoctrination. He believed most Filipinos were active insurrectos or 
supporters of the insurgents and deemed the Moros a savage, violent, barbarous 
people.160  
Barrows fortified his ideas through the creation of a popular representation of the 
Moro juramentado. He integrated these images into the process of identification and 
categorization of the Moros. Juramentado was the term given by the Spanish to a Moro 
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who attacked occupiers with the intention of preemptively killing as many of them as 
possible. The Spanish coined the phrase, and the Americans accepted it along with the 
implications it carried. Juramentados fought with no expectation of survival and believed 
that paradise awaited them after death for their act of self-sacrifice. They referred to 
themselves as Sabils, a derivative of the Quranic phrase jihad fisibillilah, which meant 
“struggle in the way of Allah.” The Spanish, then the Americans, rendered their actions 
as fanatical, irrational, and cruel and attached this characterization to their appellation 
juramentado. Barrows wrote of them and described their stealth attacks as treacherous 
and proof of their savage barbarity and “outrageous fanaticism.” Barrows linked 
juramentado activity to the level of religiosity of individual Moros instead of seeing their 
militancy as a response to U.S. encroachment upon their lands and society. Barrow 
focused on the tenacity and commitment of the juramentados and dismissed their 
motivations and grievances. In this way the juramentado became symbolic of Islamic 
fanaticism and barbarity, rather than a potent and often desperate method of resistance 
against the well-equipped American soldiers.161  
Another major academic contributor to support of American imperialism in the 
Philippines was Dean C. Worcester. As a dominant member of the Philippines 
(Schurman) Commission appointed by President McKinley in 1899, Worcester crafted 
his scholarship to justify U.S. imperialism. Worcester’s principle expertise was in 
zoology, botany, and ethnology, which he studied and taught at the University of 
Michigan. McKinley and then Roosevelt relied upon his supposed scientific expertise and 
knowledge of the Filipinos to contextualize colonial policy. Worcester served on the 
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Philippine Commission until 1901 and afterward was Secretary of the Interior for the 
Insular Government of the Philippines until 1913. Worcester exemplified “Americanism” 
in the Philippines. He believed deeply in the “universality of American values,” and his 
academic training had been under ethnologists who classified humanity according to 
various sub-species. Like Wood, Roosevelt, and Barrows, he saw all inhabitants of the 
islands as racially inferior barbarians. Like them, he enthusiastically supported military 
operations against Filipinos and called the counterinsurgency “a most humane war.” 
Worcester utilized the ideas of Lewis Henry Morgan, the well-known ethnologist and 
author of Ancient Society, and categorized the disparate ethnicities of the Philippines into 
specific stages of human development.162  
He also participated in the disenfranchisement of the Filipinos by linking his 
altruistic missions of uplift with economic investment in the natural resources of the 
islands. During his tenure at the Bureau of Science, he gave high priority to the 
discovery, acquisition, and exploitation of the natural resources of the islands. He also 
aided in the writing of a Forestry Act for the Philippines, which he presented and 
championed in front of the commission. Worcester then used former soldiers as front men 
to invest in these resources. He advocated as well for the separation of the areas with rich 
resource wealth from the Philippine nation proper. He consistently argued that the 
populations in these areas, with “wild tribes” and Moros, required the perpetual 
protection of United States government. He argued that Christian illustrados could not be 
trusted to care for these dependents properly and would in fact oppress them and thereby 
thwart the civilizing efforts of altruistic Americans like himself. He cloaked his avarice 
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and aggressive investment in the language of protection and benevolence. Worcester 
became quite wealthy investing in rubber plantations and land ownership, and he was one 
of the few men on the Philippines Commission who intended to remain on the islands as 
a permanent resident.163  
American academics defined Moros within an epistemology that rendered them 
impotent and silent. The questions asked were decided upon by those who supported the 
imperial mission, or at least fully embraced the ideology of race produced and 
disseminated by hegemonic whites. White supremacists defined who the Moros were and 
set the agenda for any discussion of their political status and their future as wards of the 
U.S. government. They also defined what scientific knowledge was relevant and who was 
entitled to assist in its production. This institutionalized edifice of white supremacy 
succeeded in part because of the dearth of scholars willing to recognize the value of the 
histories of the peoples whom they were “othering.” For most scholars of the Philippines 
in the American academy, the silence, or cursory treatment, regarding any deep 
intellectual exploration of Moros was conspicuous. These Islamic peoples became 
footnotes, for the most part, in the historical narrative being created for the Philippines. 
The Tausug, Maguindanaon, Samal, Maranaw, and myriad of Muslim ethnicities were 
lumped together as “Moros” in the lexicon of the chauvinistic Spanish.164  
Najeeb Saleeby, an army officer and scholar of Tausug and Maguindanaon 
civilization, attempted to present a sympathetic portrait of “Moro culture,” yet also used 
the language of white racial dominance when he defined, discussed, and even defended 
the Moros. Saleeby was a naturalized U.S. citizen who had immigrated from Syria. 
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Although an Arab Christian, he shared the same racial and civilizational ideologies as 
native-born American imperialists. He claimed that he could “read and write the Moro 
language with greater facility and accuracy than the Moros themselves” because of his 
“superior education in Arabic.” His assessments of Moro Islamic society located them 
within what Morgan would have referred to as the “upper stages of barbarism” in his 
hierarchy of civilizational models. Saleeby impressed Barrows with his insinuation into 
the sultan’s inner circle and access to the tarsillas of the royal family. Saleeby’s 
translations of Sulu and Maguindanaon historical and religious texts were not necessarily 
read by men like Wood, Roosevelt, and McKinley with the intention of gaining a deep 
and nuanced understanding of Moro culture and history. Yet they still relied upon the 
intellectual production of men like Worcester, Barrows, and Saleeby to understand and 
ultimately define who the Moros were.165  
These scholars received recognition from policymakers as men possessed of the 
expertise to define who the Moros were. They became recognized “experts” on the Moro 
race and the Philippines in general. The proponents of American empire required a 
veneer of expertise that provided useful intelligence and simultaneously upheld the 
hegemonic framework of white racial dominance. Americans excluded the Moros’ 
definitions of themselves, their communities, their histories, and their religion from their 
assessments of them. Though Saleeby explored the histories of the Moros, he assessed 
these histories through the lens of American cultural hegemony and white supremacy. 
Saleeby cited three flaws in Spanish administration of the Moro regions: their intolerance 
toward Islam, their failure to occupy the region physically, and their failure to use the 
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existing hierarchies of power within Moro Islamic society to indirectly rule the populace. 
He described the Moros as “tenacious in battle” while showing “obstinate passive 
resistance in peace.” He openly exhibited sympathy for their plight and admiration of 
their martial spirit and warrior culture. Like most white men of this era, he admired the 
“primitive” he found embedded in Moro Islamic society, much as Wood and Roosevelt 
admired Native American martial culture. Despite differences of opinions among them, 
these men all agreed upon the inferiority of the Moros to white American civilization.166 
In February 1901, President McKinley promoted Wood to the coveted rank of 
brigadier general after his service in Cuba. Wood’s promotion over five hundred and nine 
qualified candidates stirred resentment among older veterans, anti-imperialists, and even 
many imperialists who supported McKinley’s policies. It also made Wood a target of 
ridicule. The New York Evening Post editorialized, “No other service in the world would 
reward an army doctor with the rank of Brigadier General because of military duties 
comprising in all eight weeks in command of a volunteer regiment.”167 When Roosevelt 
declared the end of the war against Filipino nationalists in 1902, the United States Army 
had been in the southern Philippines for four years. In those four years, the army had 
attempted to establish a physical presence and map the region. The U.S. Army 
completely administered the south, unlike the north, where civilian rule was instituted 
after the insurrection ended. Several military governors attempted to quell opposition to 
United States occupation, with limited success. Roosevelt decided Wood was the kind of 
assertive, imaginative, and aggressive officer needed to administer the territories and 
bring United States policy to the region. In 1903, Roosevelt selected Wood over several 
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other candidates to become governor of the southern Philippines, henceforth known as 
the Moro Provinces.168  
Governor General Wood was also like many of his contemporaries among the 
military and foreign policy establishment in that he saw the United States as entering into 
a new role as a global empire. Wood believed that the U.S. needed to embrace that role 
and telegraph its power onto the world scene. Prior to his deployment to the Philippines, 
Wood had visited the colonial outposts of the Dutch and the British in Southeast Asia to 
gain insight into colonial rule. Wood was especially impressed with the administration of 
the Dutch; particularly their use of indigenous Christian converts as scouts and 
constabularies to police the population. Later he saw this as a distinct possibility in the 
Mindanao area, as he proposed using Christians, who had been sent to the area as 
convicts and hated the Moros, as candidates for a similar form of colonial control. He 
wrote in his diary, “I believe that there is much we can learn to advantage from these 
British Officers.” Wood clearly admired the efficiency and expertise of control he 
observed in European colonial administrations throughout Southeast Asia. Wood’s 
secretary of the Moro Provinces, Captain George Langhorne, took a similar tour in 1904 
during which he collected British colonial literature on the Malay regions. Langhorne, 
who would become an important figure in the Bud Dajo episode, later claimed: “They 
were of much use in the associations I had with the Filipinos.” American officers came to 
the Moro Provinces with a combined legacy of territorial warfare, race ideology, and 
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what they believed were many different examples of colonial administration to draw 
from.169 
Wood dove enthusiastically into his duties as the new Governor General. Much as 
he had been in his previous posts, Wood was quite happy to be once again be in the field, 
challenged by a tough assignment and facing a fierce, intractable opponent. Wood 
relished the discipline of army life and the challenges of combat and saw the Philippines 
assignment as a means of reinvigorating the army. He wrote to President Roosevelt that 
the Philippines were “the best school for troops in the army.” He cited pre-Philippines 
high desertion rates in the service and attributed them to monotony and a lack of goal-
oriented activity. To Wood, a peacetime army was “like asking a man to take a log of 
wood across the road, lay it down, pick it up and bring it back, and keep this up all day.” 
He was happy to have eight hundred to twelve hundred men in the field per day in 
Mindanao “practically all the time.” Furthermore, he recommended keeping U.S. soldiers 
in the field for five-year rotations during which they could benefit from the training 
opportunities that combat with the Moros provided.170  
In the four years that the army had been in Mindanao and Sulu, the Moros had 
earned a reputation as fierce, exotic warriors. Men like Roosevelt and Wood welcomed 
this opportunity to be tested against men whom they placed in the categories of savage or 
barbarian. It fit in with their racial fantasies of strength via conquest and emergence from 
battle having proved the racial superiority and vigor of the white man. Roosevelt believed 
that war was “normal on the border between civilization and barbarism” and that “only 
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the warlike power of a civilized people can give peace to the world.”171 The Moro 
Provinces also gave Wood, and other army officers, a readymade testing ground for the 
modern twentieth-century army they were keen to develop. Such views were the bedrock 
upon which General Wood would fashion an aggressive campaign later on in his career to 
reform the United States Army into a professional citizen army to rival the professional 
imperial armies of Europe.172  
These officers were conscious of the changing role of the United States in the 
global community of empires and yearned to be part of the great enterprise of the carving 
up and acquisition of “unused lands.” Unlike European imperialists, however, they 
adapted a particular vision of American empire that was predicated upon a sooner-rather-
than-later goal of self-governance for their “wards.” Wood and his contemporaries held 
an absolute conviction that Americanness was a universal goal that all people could reach 
given the right tutelage.173  
This conviction created a paradox for them, however, because they were also 
steeped in the ideology of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism. Wood, armed and fortified with 
this ideological agenda, plunged into his duties with determination. He believed he could 
force Moros to accept the benevolent guidance of U.S. authorities, abandon practices 
U.S. authorities found objectionable, and live under American political authority. His 
resolve was tempered by the conviction that Moros responded only to military force, 
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which formed the thrust of his policy as governor. Wood abhorred weakness and lack of 
self-discipline, traits he claimed the Moros possessed, and condemned them for it. He 
insisted in private and public that the Moros just needed a tough lesson administered, and 
compliance would immediately follow. Wood declared, “These Moros will have to be 
eventually soundly thrashed” in order to train them to behave in a politically responsible 
manner; for Wood this meant acquiescence to U.S. authority. Wood embarked upon a 
campaign of force designed to eradicate martial challenges to U.S. authority and provide 
a “show of force.” Most likely these campaigns were also designed to demonstrate his 
own military prowess and prove him worthy of the rapid ascension thorough the ranks 
that his political contacts had ensured.174    
Despite his aggressive approach to governing the Moro Provinces, Wood wanted 
to understand the Moros, if only in order to craft effective methods of control. With this 
in mind, Wood sought out a specialist. In 1904, he appointed Saleeby Agent for Moro 
Affairs. Saleeby informed Wood that the “Christian Filipinos had already been civilized 
by Spain,” and that the Moros had “not yet attained the proper degree of civilization or 
the proper stages of culture that modern institutions require.” He criticized the Spanish, 
whom he claimed neglected to share the benefits of Western civilization with the Moros 
during their imperial tenure.175 
Saleeby thought highly of Moro political institutions and wanted to preserve them 
for use as tools of colonial control. The Syrian-born expert described Islam as the 
civilizing element of their society that kept them on the peripheries of civilization, 
distinguishing them from savages of the hunter-gatherer type. He described the individual 
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Moro as “a faithful and devoted worshipper of Allah ta’ Ala” who “had laws, an 
organized government, an alphabet, and a system of government.” Saleeby also said that 
if Moro judges were to “study American laws,” this would facilitate social reform and the 
improvement of Moro society, leading to a “more thrifty and intelligent” Moro society.176  
Despite Saleeby’s attempts to introduce a measure of complexity into racial 
constructions of Moros, Wood rejected his aide’s arguments. Saleeby believed the Moro 
political position of datu was the key to controlling the Moro population and that the U.S. 
should use the office as a means of indirect political control. This apparent radical break 
with Wood and the U.S. Army’s tactics evidenced more a debate over the process of 
cultural destruction rather than any serious sensitivity to Moro customs and 
institutions.177 The paradox of the civilizing mission bedeviled these men and led to 
policies that were erratic and, in the long run, ineffective.  
General Wood merged varied interpretations of this ideology of civilization into 
an aggressive policy of forcible transformation of the Moros. Wood had emerged from 
this new class of American men—Progressives—who argued for a universalization of 
American values. While not all progressives were imperialists, most imperialists were 
progressives. The language and tactics used by officers and policymakers demonstrated 
that they shifted between interpretations, adopting the one that suited political and 
strategic goals of the moment. Wood’s approach to pacification reflected the same 
principles articulated by Barrows and Worcester and the same paternalistic racism 
articulated by Najeeby, despite the differences they had with one another. Wood used 
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these academic representations of the Moros to reinforce existing beliefs about race, 
civilization, gender, and even religion. By engaging resistant Moros with extreme 
violence while simultaneously intimidating and bribing the political elite, he eventually 
severely weakened the political and cultural autonomy of Tausug and the Maguindanaon 
Moros.178  
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Chapter Three: “Moros of a Very Bad Type”: General Pershing, General Wood, 
and the Abrogation of the Bates Agreement179 
 
Chaplain Doherty made an address to the men in the evening. The Chaplain’s 
address was a short one. He seemed to be filled with the crusading spirit and 
spoke of the troops being in service in a land of infidels where it had been 
impossible for the Word of God to be preached in times past. His words seemed to 
convey the idea that a wholesome disciplining of these people would be approved 
by him.180    
 
Wood had come to the southern Philippines with an approach to pacification that 
hinged upon zero tolerance for practices he deemed impediments to effective governance. 
His approach and his character further cemented the universal application of a “get 
tough” policy, which had already begun to evolve among army personnel. This attitude 
persisted until after the massacre at Bud Dajo had occurred and Wood had departed the 
island. Moros’ embrace of Islam added another layer of complexity to the construction of 
them as warlike savages. It created a fear that, unlike the Christian Filipinos, the Muslim 
Moros would block the progress of Americans; therefore, this justified the utter 
destruction of their culture, political autonomy, and physical presence if necessary. 
Americans adopted a similar policy in the North to deal with a bloody insurgency by 
Christian Filipinos whose westernized credentials as illustrados dictated that this 
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approach would be temporary. In the southern Philippines, Americans pursued this policy 
as a permanent modus operandi for dealing with the Muslim population. These men, who 
executed the initial phases of pacification of the Moros, left behind a record that defined 
Moros as an intrinsically belligerent and savage race. The destruction of indigenous 
Islamic culture in order to westernize the Moros became the ultimate objective of the 
U.S. Army.181  
During the period from the signing of the Bates agreement in 1898 to its 
abrogation in 1904, the U.S. Army sought to destroy the political and cultural authority of 
Islam throughout Mindanao and Sulu. Exploration and mapping of the region became 
part of the occupation effort, and it required U.S. Army personnel and other colonial 
representatives to be able to move about freely. To Moros, however, the sight of armed 
disbelievers traipsing about in Mindanao, ostensibly mapping the region in preparation 
for the disenfranchisement of the populace, provoked violent responses.  
It was provocative in the eyes of the Moros quite simply because it was not 
misinterpreted or misunderstood. Having endured several centuries of incursions by the 
Spanish, and armed with an ideological context of Islam, Moros responded with force in 
an attempt to stop this invasion of their lands. These responses consisted of direct violent 
confrontations with the Americans and imprinted an understanding of “Moro character” 
upon those soldiers responsible for the pacification of the region.182 U.S. soldiers readily 
adopted a discourse of racial inferiority and backwardness of the Moros. They resorted to 
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the existing United States methodology of race war and territorial conquest in order to 
subdue the Moro communities. In the opinion of these men, Moros became a recalcitrant 
and incorrigible race that understood only the language of force. This point of view 
existed to varying degrees among these men, from Pershing, who wanted to pacify and 
transform Moros with as little force as possible, to Leonard Wood, who would not 
tolerate the slightest reproach or challenge to U.S. authority. In fact, Wood actively 
sought out violent confrontation in order to deliver a “clear-cut lesson” that he believed 
would break the insurgent spirit of all the Moros.183 This period of growing hostilities 
between the Moros and army personnel eventually culminated in the slaughter at Bud 
Dajo.  
While the Bates agreement stood as the guiding principle of U.S. administration 
of the Sulu region, Mindanao emerged as the primary site of army operations to pacify 
resistance to U.S. authority. General Samuel S. Sumner explicitly pointed out, “In 
Mindanao we have no treaty obligations.” Sumner saw this discrepancy as an opportunity 
to aggressively pacify the inhabitants and occupy the region.184 During this period, 
military officials began to articulate a specific interpretation of the “Moros.”185 The 
experience of continental American expansion had been predicated upon a similar 
narrative of appropriating “unused” lands from a racially inferior foe. Those who made 
initial contact with the Moros of Mindanao readily transferred that narrative to this new 
foe as they embarked upon their assigned mission of pacification. While this construction 
of racial identity was influenced by centuries of race war waged against Native 
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Americans in order to acquire their land and resources, it also drew upon growing 
contempt for Filipino Islamic culture and institutions. Sumner declared his intention to 
“eradicate the customs” of Muslim society that had become “a bar to any efforts toward 
Christian Anglo-Saxon civilization.” The U.S. categorized those Moros with “an 
intelligent understanding and appreciation of U.S. methods of government” as the good 
Moros. That differential became the yardstick officials used to categorize Moros as either 
cooperative partners or recalcitrant belligerents.186   
From 1898 to 1902, the priorities of the U.S. Army were pacification of the 
insurgency in the north and reconnaissance and exploration of the south. Interactions 
between Moros and the U.S. Army from 1898 to 1900, although limited, were 
increasingly marked by contempt on the part of army personnel and mounting resentment 
on the part of the Moro population. Initially, Moros tolerated these incursions into their 
lands as U.S. officials mapped the region, cataloged its natural resources, and assessed 
the potential degrees of cooperation or resistance from the inhabitants. Some soldiers 
returning from duty in the region advocated the “extermination of the Moros as the only 
viable solution to dealing with them.”187 By late 1901,  military officials, as well as rank 
and file soldiers, believed they needed to adapt more aggressive methods to force Moro 
compliance with U.S. directives declared via the mechanisms of the Philippines 
Commission and ad hoc pronouncements of military governors. Centuries of prior 
experience subjugating Native Americans on the North American continent supported the 
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maxim that savages understand only force and that “savagery and civilization cannot 
exist side by side.”188 
The progressive intellectual movement that developed in the States was fueled by 
racist ideology. Officers like Wood and Colonel Robert Bullard placed their role and their 
duties in the southern Philippines within this ideological context, which articulated their 
desire to be architects of an improved and forward-thinking society. The common theme 
among them was the intention to engage perceived lower races from inferior civilizations 
in order to improve their lives and raise them up from barbarity. Despite their claims of 
benevolence and commitment to the betterment of these “dependent peoples,” however, 
their acculturation within the contemporary ethos of white supremacy shaped their 
actions and attitudes in a manner that became lethal to the Moros.189  
The first site of concentrated army operations against the Moros in 1902 was the 
Lake Lanao region of Mindanao. Lake Lanao had earned a reputation of being full of 
hostile Moros who would brook no political domination by either the Spanish or the new 
imperial power. The Moros of the Lake region were ethnically Maranaos. U.S. Army 
reports described them as aggressive fighters who would not easily submit to U.S. 
authority. General Sumner viewed them as being “determined to resist our presence in the 
country” and labeled them “savages” with “no idea of law and order as we understand it.” 
Captain Robert Hamilton of the 23rd Infantry, who served under Captain John J. Pershing 
at Lake Lanao, described them as a “frenzied fighting machine, far more cruel and 
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bloodthirsty then [sic] our Apache Indians.”190 Attempts by army officials to survey, 
map, or traverse the area often met violent resistance from the Maranaos. Colonel Bullard 
recounted the efforts of the U.S. Army to build a road around Lake Lanao in the spring of 
1902. He deemed the Maranaos “ignorant” and “savage,” eons away from “civilization.” 
Furthermore, he declared that “as savages the Moros stand in the way of our destiny and 
we cannot permit that,” and so Moros had to be dragged, kicking and screaming, if 
necessary into white Anglo-Saxon civilization.191  
In September of 1901, Captain Pershing was dispatched to the Lake Lanao region 
in order to pacify these incendiary communities, isolate resistant authority figures among 
the Maranaos, and put an end to any opposition. Pershing was a Missourian who had 
graduated near the top of his class at West Point. He became essential to the efforts to 
pacify the Maranaos. His intelligence and initiative, combined with a sincere desire to 
avoid the outright slaughter of the inhabitants, initially made for a relatively placid tenure 
in Mindanao. On July 1, 1901, he received his own command at Camp Vicars, Mindanao, 
and was afforded considerable autonomy and latitude in dealing with the Lake 
population. While in command at Vicars, he was meticulous in his attempts to cultivate 
contacts with Datus willing to accept a nominal U.S. presence in the Lake Lanao region 
while dealing harshly with those communities who resisted United States troops. 
Pershing believed that through “fair and just treatment” of the Moros he could eventually 
persuade them of the good intentions of Americans.192   
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Pershing thought that the Moros would tolerate U.S. occupation if they were 
treated with fairness and given the opportunity to experience life under U.S. rule. In mid-
May 1903, he believed that most Maranaos wanted the U.S. to occupy their lands and 
would grow in appreciation of the improvements that a U.S. presence and tutelage would 
bring. Pershing prided himself in having “benevolent intentions toward the Moros” and 
was convinced that armed efforts to destroy their cottas and occupy their lands were 
necessary to improve their lives in the long run. He took steps to learn the different 
ethnicities in the area and commanded his troops to refrain from disrespecting their 
customs and religion. Yet like Sumner he demanded that all datus among the Moros 
declare their “friendship” with the Americans. If they did not, Pershing would engage 
them decisively and destroy them and their communities. Like General Sumner, he also 
declared them savages, albeit simple and barbarous ones. Pershing did not believe the 
Moros were a threat as long as the United States met opposition with “brute force” and 
left intact their Islamic and cultural traditions, including slavery, which Pershing 
inaccurately likened to the vassalage of medieval Europe.193 Pershing avoided conflict 
except when the Moros stole from, attacked, or killed U.S. personnel. Pershing 
considered these serious provocations, which necessitated the engagement of the 
Maranaos in combat and with great effectiveness most of the time. Despite his efforts he 
engaged in combat, and killed, many Moros in Mindanao during his tenure.194  
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By contrast, Pershing’s commander, General Samuel Sumner, adopted a less 
conciliatory approach, which relied on violence and the threat of violence as the most 
effective modes of communication with the Moros. His manner of opening a dialogue 
with the sultan of Baclod involved sending him a letter “notifying him that he had to be a 
friend or suffer the consequences.” The sultan responded by a letter in which he 
committed to “declare war at once, as we wish to retain the religion of Muhammad.” He 
told Sumner to “cease sending us letters” and began an insurgency against U.S. forces.195 
Moro leaders who resisted U.S. occupation correctly interpreted U.S. Army actions as 
being meant to delegitimize Muslim political autonomy and eventually destroy Islamic 
culture and political power. Pershing himself in time destroyed the Baclod cottas in a 
serious of attacks. Pershing’s destructive efficiency pleased Sumner, who had believed 
that the Maranaos’ fortifications were the most “impregnable” of the Lanao cottas. 
Sumner deemed such demonstrations of strength and willingness to use violence as the 
most effective methods for subduing the Moros, as did most commanders who came after 
him. The subtext to any interactions with the Moros was that they were savages who 
would respond only to force.196  
During Pershing’s fight against the sultan of Baclod, his campaign to pacify the 
Lake Lanao Maranaos began to take on a messianic meaning for the Muslim population. 
Pershing immediately conflated this phenomenon with the Ghost Dance phenomenon of 
the Plains Indians whom he had fought in the continental United States more than a 
decade earlier.197 Pershing’s forces outnumbered the Moros by more than five to one, but 
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with only two hundred rifles the Moros still inflicted heavy losses on the Americans. 
Three to four hundred Moros were martyred, and an account quickly spread that four 
angels had appeared at the site of the battle to carry the bodies of the Mujahiduun into the 
heavens. The following day a brilliant rainbow appeared, whereupon Moro Imams 
interpreted the entire event as Allah being pleased with those Mujahiduun who had died 
for the preservation of Islam. The Moros contextualized these battles within the 
eschatological narrative of the martyrdom of the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad on 
the fields of Karbala thirteen hundred years prior. Similarly, Pershing’s own experiences 
of the pacification of Native Americans led him to fear a firestorm that needed to be 
extinguished before it spread throughout the Moro population. Sumner granted him the 
authority to act independently at Camp Vicars and arranged to sit down with datus to 
work out an agreement that would avoid a protracted religious war with the Moros.198  
Like many of the soldiers and officers Pershing made explicit comparisons 
between the Maranaos and Native Americans. These comparisons cited the U.S. imperial 
experience of the conquest of North America as a point of reference for dealing with the 
Moros. Pershing saw a parallel with Native Americans in the lack of central political 
authority among the Moros and the difficulties in pacification. Similar to how many 
officials viewed the loose confederacies of Native Americans, Pershing regarded the 
autonomous bands of Moros as an indication of their lack of political sophistication. 
Given the existence of so many autonomous communities, he discouraged the developing 
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mindsets of Taft, Roosevelt, and later Wood that all it would take would be one “clear-
cut” lesson to get them all in line. Pershing pictured the Moros as disparate communities 
with varying agendas and united only by distaste for the presence of U.S. soldiers. While 
he believed in the use of violence as an effective tool to gain the compliance and respect 
of the Moros, he placed more value on patient diplomacy and a tempered respect of Moro 
culture and authority. In time, Pershing anticipated that the Moros could be civilized and 
integrated into a national community of Filipinos, Muslim and Christian.199  
During Pershing’s tenure as commander of Camp Vicars, the media, especially 
the Chicago Tribune, mythologized him as the tamer of the Filipino frontier, likening him 
to the Indian fighters of the nineteenth century. Pershing employed frontier methods, such 
as taking local leaders hostage in retaliation for insurgent activity. After defeating the 
Moros of Baclod, he declared the area pacified and the Moros of the region ready to 
receive the occupation and assistance of the U.S. Army. Pershing’s perceived successes 
at Lake Lanao provided fodder for the construction of an image of an effective soldier, a 
patriot, and a fine specimen of white manhood in an era of anxiety over white male 
potency. Indeed, the Tribune declared the Moros “not the formidable adversaries 
American Indians were” after Pershing “administered some salutary lessons.” His violent 
suppression of Moro political and cultural autonomy became the exemplary model for 
those army officers who came after him.200Pershing’s successes helped to cement 
extreme force, combined with paternalistic engagement, as the proper formula for dealing 
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with the Moros. Army officers accepted this as conventional wisdom, despite Pershing’s 
preference for diplomacy and use of violence only as a last resort.201  
Colonel Bullard, who served under General Davis in Mindanao during Pershing’s 
early campaigns, was a prime example of an officer who emphasized Pershing’s martial 
successes over his propensity for diplomacy. Like many officers assigned to Mindanao 
and Sulu, Bullard had served in the counter-insurgencies in the Philippines and against 
Native Americans in North America. He was also an active and enthusiastic participant in 
the campaign to subdue the Maranaos. Bullard was born and raised in Alabama, deeply 
grounded in white supremacist philosophy and the culture of racism that permeated post-
reconstruction Southern life. His primary military experiences had been commanding 
African American troops during the Spanish-American War. Afterward, he compiled a 
report titled “The Negro Volunteer: Some Characteristics.” This report reflected his racial 
philosophy, which he tried to apply to the Moros. Bullard claimed that while African 
American troops had “the lightest hearts and best humor,” they lacked the attention span 
needed to be able to hold grudges or remain angry. African American soldiers, in his 
estimation, lacked the capacity to manage their financial affairs properly; they were 
spendthrifts, needing the supervision of white officers if they were to attain any kind of 
financial stability, and prone to violence and theft toward one another. Bullard insisted 
that African American soldiers needed a firm hand since they had no notion of honor, and 
that the experience of slavery and plantation life not only made them well suited for the 
army, but made Southern white elites like Bullard most suited to command them. The 
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prescribed paternalistic management of African American troops presaged what he would 
later prescribe for the Moros.202   
Bullard became an enthusiastic supporter of Wood’s get-tough approach in the 
beginning. He interpreted it as a vindication of his prescribed method for dealing with the 
Moros. General Wood appointed him governor of the Lake Lanao region in 1903. In the 
southern Philippines, Bullard believed building roads and infrastructure important for 
pacification and the good of the Moros. Bullard declared them a people for whom 
“thievery and aggression” were prime characteristics and considered them arrogant, 
amoral, and completely bereft of any understanding of the “public good.” Bullard further 
stated they possessed a “hornet like temper” and an “incoherence” of communities with a 
plethora of datus, indicative of a chaotic decentralization. For him, nothing less would do 
than producing a blank slate upon which to reconstruct Moros as a civilized people.203  
In addition to his racial judgments, Bullard condemned the Moros’ cultural 
practices and social institutions. He especially despised the practice of slavery within 
Moro society and believed Americans had a responsibility, as a morally and racially 
superior people, to force its abolition in the Philippines. In keeping with his deep belief in 
the racial superiority of whites, he saw abolition as a relatively simple task for white men 
to accomplish, given the backward state of the Moros and their apparent racial inferiority. 
Bullard felt that the racial superiority of the whites was so apparent to the Moros that, if 
given the directive to abolish the institution by U.S. authorities, they would comply. He 
claimed that he personally had witnessed “the word of white military authority 
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extinguishing the right of a Datu to his slave.” In other words, if only U.S. authorities 
would decree an end to slavery, it would cease to exist in the Philippine Islands. Bullard 
believed strongly that the racial superiority of whites was absolutely obvious to so-called 
lower races like the Moros.204 
The common theme among men like Bullard was the firm belief that what was 
good for U.S. interests was likewise good for the Moros. This paternalist and 
universalistic thinking reflected the Progressive rationale of these men, despite their 
destructive and often contemptible behavior toward the Moros. This particular 
understanding and framing of the expansion project in philosophical terms also 
permeated the discourse and thinking of colonial administrators, including military 
personnel tasked with carrying out the expansion project in the southern Philippines.  
Despite assurances that the sultan of Sulu felt he had received via the Bates 
agreement, the political autonomy of Moros in the archipelago stood in jeopardy from the 
moment U.S. Army officers arrived to administer the region. Even before the insurgency 
in the northern portions of the island had ceased, army personnel and policymakers 
explored ways of reinterpreting the Bates agreement in order to rule unfettered. The 
attempts to reinterpret Bates echoed the American agenda to embark upon a civilizing 
mission of the Moros of the region.  
The 1903 Annual Department of War Report helped shape the justification for a 
reinterpretation of the agreement by colonial officials. The reports described military 
pacification of the Muslim population with references to a supposedly intrinsic savage 
character. In the Lake Lanao district of Mindanao, the “wild Moros” were described as 
almost pacified with the exception of a few whose “predatory habits” remained a concern 
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to military officials. The “predatory habits” included subsistence farming, supplemented 
by slave trading and piracy. These characterizations of Moros suggested a community 
unable to govern itself properly, responsive only to brutal force, and in need of the 
tutelage of the United States. These reports pronounced Moros’ fate with one sentence: 
“The Moro does not understand popular government and does not desire it, and he is not 
likely to until he is changed by education and the introduction of civilized life into his 
neighborhood.” This was advice that Wood and other officers took to heart. The overall 
message declared that Moros could not be autonomous because they lacked the level of 
political sophistication needed for self-government.205  
The U.S. government’s evolving position came to resemble that of Spanish 
colonial officials who had also attempted to construct an effective mode of colonial 
administration. Reverend Father Pio Pi, Superior of the Jesuit Order and subject of 
Imperial Spain, completed a manuscript on the Moros that was included in the 1903 
Department of War Annual Report. Pi described the Moros as “haughty, independent, 
dominating, and treacherous” and as “most obstinate in passive aggression.” He 
characterized them as an “obstacle” to the establishment of civilization because of these 
intrinsic racial characteristics. Father Pi advocated for the removal of the Moros so that 
civilization could advance. He also advocated the immigration of more Christian 
Filipinos to the region to ethnically cleanse the territory because he claimed they were 
more intelligent and “more docile” than the Moros. He advised that Moros be 
concentrated in small areas if they were to “exist at all.” The tone of his report suggested 
that a campaign of either extreme containment or extermination would be the only 
possible strategy for dealing with the Moros. Pi’s letter circulated among those 
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individuals responsible for implementing U.S. rule in the region. American colonial 
officials even adopted the term “Moros” as an official ethnic designation for Muslim 
Filipinos. At the time, the Moros identified with whatever specific ethnic collective they 
came out of. American officials were profoundly influenced by the Spanish colonial 
discourse, which had placed Moros outside of the realm of civilization. It was no 
coincidence that Wood’s actions and written opinions of the Moros reflected these 
extreme sentiments as well.206  
On August 6, 1903, Wood took command as governor general of the southern 
Philippines in a rather hostile domestic political environment in which charges of 
favoritism dogged his public image.207 This charged political atmosphere influenced 
Wood’s desire to prove his worth as a combat officer. He harbored an enthusiasm for 
confrontation with the Moros in the hope of providing a “clear cut lesson to subdue them 
once and for all.” Criticism from the domestic front put pressure on Wood to prove his 
mettle on the battlefield, so that he consistently sought out conflict with the Moros.208 
Wood wanted to continue the heroic campaigns of Pershing as depicted in the domestic 
media. Wood, however, differed from Pershing in his disdain for the sensitivities or the 
culture of the Moros. Instead, he flagrantly advertised his contempt for their religion and 
culture.209  
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By the time Wood was appointed military governor of the region, many army 
officers were ripe for confrontation with the Moros. When he arrived in Mindanao he 
judged the previous administration to have been ineffective and resolved to shake things 
up. Particularly annoyed by what he perceived as coddling of the Moros. Moros’ open 
embrace of slavery, polygamy, and concubinage, along with their supposed arrogant 
individualism, all reinforced Wood’s belief that they were a savage and immoral people. 
Wood charged the previous officer of Sulu, Colonel George W. Wallace, as “weak, 
lacking decision of character, and unaware of what was going on around him.” Wallace’s 
orientation toward “reformation” rather than a hard-line stance against Moro recalcitrance 
offended Wood’s sense of mission.210 A successful military campaign in this region could 
justify his rapid ascent through the ranks and subsequent appointment as governor of the 
Moro Provinces over so many other senior officers.  
Determined to have his men “move about freely whenever we please, and be 
ready for trouble if necessary,” Wood engaged in provocations in order to demonstrate 
the U.S. primacy in the Moro Provinces. Moros reacted to these incursions with violent 
resistance. Nonetheless, Wood ultimately blamed Moro resistance on the “weakness” of 
Colonel Wallace’s administration, which he believed had encouraged the false hope in 
the Moro population that U.S. forces could be expelled from Sulu.211 Wood continued 
Pershing’s efforts to “tame” the Lake Lanao region with the enthusiastic support of 
officers like Bullard, who declared that as a result of Wood’s 1904 campaign “Moros for 
the first time understand that the United States stands for authority, order, and 
government.” Despite his grudging recognition of Pershing’s “successes,” Wood 
                                                 
210
 War Department Annual Reports, 1904, Report of Headquarters, Department of Mindanao, July 1, 1904. 
211
 Diary of Leonard Wood, 22-23 August 1903, 18 November 1903, Papers of Leonard Wood.  
 125 
continued to criticize any “coddling” of the Moros or any minimal recognition of Moro 
culture, institutions, or political autonomy. Wood sent the message that the Americans 
were there and intended to stay—perhaps even to bring in settlers and make unused lands 
flourish with Anglo-Saxon Christian productivity.212 
Wood and other policymakers in the United States saw “pioneering” as part of 
this new phase of American expansion. In 1902, General George W. Davis and Senator 
John Tyler Morgan, a segregationist democrat from Alabama, urged for a settling of the 
Philippines, including Mindanao, with “surplus” African Americans in order to address 
the “negro problem” in the United States as well as transform the tropical terrain of the 
Philippines into commodity-producing properties. Despite his conclusions that generally 
“blacks are lazy, thriftless, and unreliable,” Davis believed that African Americans 
brought a measure of order to an otherwise disordered and wild country. Although this 
and other schemes for settlements never brought the flood of settlers these proponents 
desired, General Wood nonetheless concurred with such settlement notions and proposed 
bringing in Christian Filipinos, Japanese, and Europeans to develop the land in Mindanao 
and create a Western-style economic base and system of land ownership. Wood 
envisaged such settlement activity as a vanguard that would “bring civilization to the 
region,” much as was done in North America.213  
While proposed colonies of non-Moros seemed a potential remedy for Mindanao, 
in Sulu American officials identified claimed traditional Moro leadership as the greatest 
impediment to the American civilizing project among the Moros. Incensed by the 
misplaced confidence of U.S. officials in the sultan’s ability to control the Tausug Moros, 
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Wood immediately joined a chorus of disapproval of the sultan. According to Wood, 
recognition of the sultan’s political legitimacy severely impeded U.S. goals. Wood 
objected to autonomy in any form and eventually dismissed the Bates agreement 
regardless of political consequences. The War Department’s annual report of 1903 
concurred with Wood when it described the sultan as “a gambler and intriguer with not a 
spark of courage or patriotic and paternal interest in his people.” Governor Hugh Scott, of 
the Sulu province, referred to him as an “ignorant, but cunning, unprincipled savage.”214  
Even before Wood met the sultan, he referred to him as “degenerate, dishonest, 
tricky, dissipated, and absolutely devoid of principle.” He further described him as 
licentious, conniving, self-serving, and unwilling to carry out U.S. directives. Wood 
wrote to President Roosevelt that the sultan was “a tricky little Oriental with half a dozen 
wives and no children, a state of affairs I am sure you would disapprove of.” The sultan’s 
sexual profligacy appeared to Wood to be a sign of racial and moral degeneracy. Wood 
knew that Roosevelt agreed with his judgment about the Sultan. Many early twentieth-
century Progressives held the view that manliness included physical strength and 
hardiness as well as sexual restraint. Sexual licentiousness was believed to be immoral 
and led to “race suicide.” These Progressives believed that indulgence in excessive sexual 
activity weakened and effeminized men, which ultimately threatened the survival of the 
white race. Wood emphasized the sexual degeneracy among the leadership as proof of 
biological decline and racial mortality. Therefore, with Moros deemed unable to govern 
properly and devoid of any political legitimacy, colonial officials used this logic to 
destroy their political autonomy. Wood implemented harsh measures combined with acts 
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of benevolence and kindness in order to define Moros as a race in need of paternalistic 
guidance. 215 
On October 30, 1903, General Wood strongly recommended an abrogation of the 
Bates agreement. Wood described the Bates agreement as “foolish in every way, although 
doubtless well intended,” and claimed it was an “impediment to good government.” He 
insisted “force seems to be the only method of reaching” the Moros and of convincing 
them to abide U.S. authority.216 Like many of his contemporaries, Wood believed that to 
give Moros political autonomy amounted to a “conciliatory” approach, which would be 
seen as cowardly and weak and encourage rebellion. Wood stated in his diary, “We are 
going to have trouble with these people unless we teach them we propose to move about 
freely whenever we please.” He then set off on a cross-region journey through Sulu to 
provoke an armed response so that he could demonstrate the power and resolve of 
colonial authority.217 
In August 1903, Wood visited Datu Panglima Hassan, a powerful leader in the 
Sulu archipelago, second only to the sultan. Wood hoped to intimidate Panglima Hassan 
and the Tausug Moros into cooperating with U.S. authorities. Wood and his army arrived 
in Hassan’s territory and attempted to impress his authority while he noisily arrested 
suspected horse thieves in plain view of the entire community. He then demanded that 
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Hassan order his men to stage a demonstration of their fighting abilities. Afterward, 
Wood fired his cannon and mountain guns into the hills to one-up the Moros. 
Unimpressed, one of the datus challenged Wood to a competition between their best men. 
Wood’s refusal seemed cowardly to the Moros and fortified their belief that the 
Americans hid behind numbers and superior weaponry. Wood’s arrogance, naked 
contempt, and miscalculation of his actions toward the Moros deepened feelings of 
hostility and mistrust by a population already perturbed by U.S. occupation. Panglima 
Hassan responded by organizing rebellious Tausug Moros as a force to be reckoned with. 
The final straw for Hassan was Wood’s decision to abolish slavery in the Moro 
Provinces.218  
The attempt to abolish slavery and terminate the Agama, the Islamic code of laws 
used by the datus, in favor of a “Western system of jurisprudence” written and dictated 
by colonial authorities incensed Hassan still further. Prior to Wood’s arrival, various 
colonial authorities had either ignored or debated the issue of slavery in connection with 
territorial expansion. Anti-imperialists against the acquisition of the Philippines used the 
issue of slavery to their advantage when they embarrassed Republicans with the 
hypocrisy of their behavior, given their championing of the anti-slavery cause during the 
Civil War.219   
Wood objected to slavery on principle, saw no social value to the Moro version of 
it, and was committed to taking robust actions against those who continued the practice 
after its official abolition in 1903. One of the hallmarks of U.S. operations ordered by 
Wood was the hunt for slaves and their “liberation” from Moros, be they datus or 
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commoners. Wood believed these efforts were integral to eradicating “evil practices” and 
“bringing order” to the region, and he vigorously pursued them. Wood would not abide 
slavery in the Moro Provinces or anywhere in the Philippines and in fact regarded slavery 
as further proof of the barbarous nature of Moro society, as did many among his staff and 
supporters in Washington. Hassan rallied others to resist this directive. Moros interpreted 
Wood’s attempts to destroy slavery as an attack on Islam, as the practice remained a 
cornerstone of the political and cultural society of Moros as sanctioned within the Moros’ 
version of the Sharia. In an attempt to preserve Islamic authority and resist subjugation 
by non-Muslims, Hassan waged a war to preserve his political legitimacy and the sanctity 
of Islamic law. Wood and others reinforced the “barbarous” nature of Moro society when 
they strenuously objected to the practice of slavery in the Philippines.220   
Wood’s determination to collect the cedula, the head tax the Spanish had required 
only of Christian Filipinos, seemed even more provocative than his anti-slavery 
campaign. Moro commoners, as well as many datus, saw it as form of jizya, the head tax 
Muslim political authorities traditionally collected from conquered non-Muslim subjects 
in lieu of the poor tax, which was required by Sharia of all Muslims. The collection of the 
jizya represented a social arrangement that provided a certain measure of freedom of 
religion and coexistence for non-Muslims. Collection of the cedula set off alarm bells 
based on the cultural institutions of Islamic polity, which suggested that the United States 
had conquered the Moros. The decree against slavery, demand of the cedula, and general 
contempt displayed by army officials toward Moros signified a process of subjugation of 
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Muslim people. For centuries, Filipino Muslims had successfully kept such domination at 
bay despite the decline of their political and economic conditions in Southeast Asia.221  
The Tausug Moros consistently grew suspicious of U.S. influence in their region, 
so when the sultan acquiesced to U.S. demands for a paltry sum, he destroyed his 
legitimacy among many Moros. In addition, the collaboration of datus who conspired 
with U.S. forces to kill and subjugate other Moros, especially commoners, further 
inflamed the masses and wrecked the credibility of traditional political leadership.222 The 
consequences of this loss of confidence in the leadership contributed to a state of 
confusion among Moros, who expected their leadership to organize resistance against the 
encroachment of disbelievers. Astounded by the extent to which the leadership had 
acquiesced to U.S. demands upon the people, the Moros eventually took matters into their 
hands, establishing an autonomous community on Bud Dajo. The grass-roots resistance 
developed within the precepts of the Sharia based on the principle that Moros cannot 
submit to non-Muslims.223  
During the transitory period from Wood’s arrival to the abrogation of the Bates 
agreement, Moros, especially the Tausug, viewed Wood as a brutal and cowardly man 
determined to humiliate and defeat them. Wood believed he had successfully and 
forcefully demonstrated the power and resolve of the U.S. government to the savage 
Moros. He thought that this aggressive display would force Moros, like Native 
Americans before them, to recognize their own cultural inferiority.224 
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In August of 1903, Wood appointed Colonel Hugh L. Scott governor of the Sulu 
archipelago. In Wood’s judgment, Scott’s participation in the pacification of Native 
American communities qualified him as a key figure in the campaign against Muslim 
Filipinos. Scott had served in South Dakota, arriving there just days after the Little Big 
Horn Battle. Scott witnessed the “Ghost Dance” phenomenon at Fort Sill, which caused 
so much unrest among the Native Americans. Scott and other officers introduced similar 
patterns of paternalistic control from the U.S. western plains into the southern 
Philippines. Despite their shared military experience in North America, Scott often 
disagreed with Wood’s approach toward Moros. During his tours in the western United 
States, Scott eventually developed a respect for the abilities and the humanity of Native 
Americans. Scott had employed native scouts and attempted to master many Native 
American dialects. In his tenure as governor of Sulu, he tried to avoid direct and 
sustained conflict with the Moros. Scott believed unnecessary conflict produced only a 
growing insurgency.225 On November 11, 1903 Wood, ordered Scott to pursue and 
eliminate Panglima Hassan in what was later referred to as the 2nd Sulu Expedition. 226  
Wood wanted to get rid of Hassan as a symbol of resistance among common 
Tausug Moros. He described his campaign through Sulu from November 1903 to 1904 as 
“a pleasant march into Sulu.” Instead, the ferocity and destructive consequences of the 
campaign represented an orgy of violence. The result of Wood’s march produced many 
of the homeless and disaffected Tausug who later congregated on Bud Dajo in defiance 
of U.S. authority. Even Colonel Bullard, never shy to kill Moros, confessed to a “liberal 
use of ammunition before entering any structure.” As a result, many “women and 
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children” died. After the 2nd Sulu Expedition, Bullard, disturbed by the extent of death 
and destruction, made a resolution in his diary to “pay more attention to the care of my 
soul,” a clear indication of his discomfort with the carnage he had wreaked upon the 
Moros of Sulu.227 
Not all datus and Moro political leaders resisted U.S. efforts to occupy the Moro 
Provinces. Sultan Jamal Kiram enthusiastically collaborated with U.S. Army and 
provided personnel for hunting down Panglima Hassan. The sultan tried to make the best 
of his precarious political situation. He remained under pressure from colonial officials to 
maintain a semblance of order among people over whom he had no real control; at the 
same time, he faced hostility from Moros who had taken up arms against the U.S. 
occupation and declared collaborators to be unbelievers. His slaves escaped to datus who 
took a stand against the U.S. in the name of Islam and the defense of the Moros. The 
sultan ultimately decided to eagerly embrace U.S. authority in order to preserve some 
semblance of his title, authority, and wealth. On March 3, 1904, Panglima Hassan 
charged a squad of rifle-bearing U.S. soldiers with his parang raised and died in a hail of 
gunfire. Heroic ballads immortalized Panglima Hassan as a testament to the strength and 
courage of the Moros.228  
Wood refused to entertain the notion that he had made a mistake. He remained 
committed to the theory that the death of Panglima Hassan provided the “clear-cut 
lesson” he sought. Wood’s stubbornness compounded his cultural orientation toward a 
Progressive political and social agenda for the United States Army as well as for the 
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people of the Philippines.229 A disciple of Emory Upton, a military reformer who had 
gathered an intellectual following among young officers during the late nineteenth 
century, Wood looked to European imperial armies, especially the Prussian tradition, for 
models of reform and reorganization. These models fit in with the early twentieth-century 
Progressive atmosphere and embraced the managerial reforms of that movement.230 
These ideas reinforced the conviction that the Moros needed to be reconstructed 
in a manner consistent with American notions of civilization. Wood’s statements 
regarding the construction and execution of policy in the Moro Provinces reflected this 
American ideology. As Wood stated, “We would much rather have them govern Sulu 
than not, but that they must govern it properly”231 This declaration illustrated the 
underpinning ideology of U.S. imperialism: societies that wish to govern themselves 
must do so in a fashion compatible with “American” values. The insistence upon an 
American manner of governance combined with a missionary impulse to remake Moro 
society even if it required the application of force to get Moros to accept the tutelage and 
“order” envisioned by army officials.232  
Although U.S. military officials and imperialists appeared to view all Filipinos as 
an inferior “other” within the power structure, complexities developed around the issue of 
religion. These officers viewed Christian Filipinos as superior to the “wild tribes” and the 
Moros because they apparently had internalized values about civilization via their 
relationship with Spanish colonial governments over several hundred years. In the eyes of 
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policymakers, this experience made them more susceptible to a transformative U.S. 
paternalism. Moros, however, lacked the capacity for even the most rudimentary political 
participation, since they had not benefited from the civilizing influence of Western 
Christendom. Democratic ideals such as self-determination disappeared from the 
landscape as American officials attempted to inculcate their new wards with an obedience 
to white supremacy. Wood’s actions reflected these policy recommendations and 
resolved to reduce opposition to colonial rule. At no time did Wood consider the 
possibility of indigenous autonomy for the Moros.233  
In this context, Wood described his particular goals for the southern Philippines to 
Taft in December 1903. Wood explained that the sultan, as principle signer of the Bates 
agreement, did not have the will or the ability to make his subjects follow it, and so the 
document “stood in the way of good government in that it recognizes the authority of a 
class of men who we have found to be corrupt, licentious, and cruel.” This specific 
reference to the sultan and blanket condemnation of all the datus provided evidence that 
Moros lacked the capacity to govern themselves. He presented this letter in a meeting 
with William Howard Taft in Manila in the form of a formal list of recommendations for 
the abrogation of the Bates agreement.234  
At the beginning of 1904, Wood unilaterally abrogated the Bates agreement and 
took direct political control of the region. Despite his meager experience with the Moros, 
the general stated that “force seems to be the only method of reaching” the Moros and 
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convincing them to abide U.S. authority.235 Wood believed that allowing the Moros any 
political autonomy or recognition of the legitimacy of their cultural or religious practices 
amounted to “conciliatory” behavior that encouraged rebellion because it would be 
interpreted by Moros as cowardice and weakness. He furthermore informed the sultan of 
his decision to abrogate the treaty, vowing to “do away with slavery and lawlessness.”236  
Even though Wood and other officers disliked the sultan, they often used him to 
control the Tausug people. Upon abrogation, Wood suspended the sultan’s payments 
despite his cooperation in the hunting down and killing of Panglima Hassan. Sultan 
Kiram protested the loss of his salary, in particular citing his cooperation in fighting his 
own subject on behalf of the U.S. Army.237  
When the sultan eventually had his stipend restored and officials reinstated his 
powerless title, he ingratiatingly called America “a Mother with milk” because of the 
richness of the nation and President Theodore Roosevelt the “father to the Moro 
people.”238 The sultan and other Moro elites supported suppression of the Tausug 
resistance and enriched themselves through collaboration with U.S. occupiers. Despite 
the sultan’s acquiescence, resistance to U.S. occupation intensified as growing bands of 
Moros ignored the traditional hierarchy of their political leadership. 
After the defeat of Hassan, Wood turned his attention back to Mindanao and 
declared that “the prompt crushing of Hassan’s rebellion has left . . . [a] deep impression 
on the people,” with “Datu Ali the only group openly hostile in all of the Moro 
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Provinces.”239 In March 1904, Wood again ordered operations against Datu Ali, a 
popular, leader who faced challenges from his ambitious father-in-law, Datu Piang. 
Moros who supported Ali and participated in the insurrection against U.S. troops were 
especially rankled by Wood’s campaign to eradicate slavery. Because slavery was 
sanctioned within the Moros’ Sharia and was an important component of their politics 
and culture, they interpreted Wood’s attempts as trying to destroy their way of life and 
attack Islam itself.240 Like Pershing, Wood sought out datus who cooperated with the 
U.S. imperial project and acted as imperial proxies at the behest of U.S. authorities. This 
cooptation of traditional leaders continued to be a feature of his administration, and the 
administrations of others after him, despite his condemnatory remarks regarding the 
Moros’ leadership abilities.  
Datu Piang, not born of royal lineage, had usurped the power of others power to 
attain his status and authority. The son of a Chinese trader and a concubine of the 
politically powerful Datu Utu, he ingratiated himself with Utu through a mix of loyalty 
and treachery. Ultimately, he displaced Utu and rose to a position of power among the 
Maguindanaons.241 Intent on solidifying his legitimacy, Piang married his daughter to 
Ali, knowing his offspring would have a familial link to political legitimacy. U.S. forces 
favored him over other potential elites because of his pliancy and enthusiasm for U.S. 
occupation. Piang embraced the occupation because it increased his personal power.242 
Piang’s son-in-law, Datu Ali, interpreted U.S. Army actions as precursors to the 
destruction of Muslim political, spiritual, and cultural autonomy. Datu Ali avoided 
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conflict until U.S. forces openly supported Piang against him in their efforts to “limit 
further extension of the growing influence of Datu Ali.” It was at this point that Datu Ali 
declared that the “U.S. forces must be opposed or they would force the Moros to convert 
to Christianity.”243  
As General Wood prepared to engage the Maguindanaon Moros, he understood 
his role to be that of a benevolent disciplinarian. Wood thought that he had taken on a 
spiritual quest to mete out punishment to the recalcitrant and unruly Moros. Wood 
commented enthusiastically on a sermon given by Chaplain Doherty that linked the 
religious duty articulated by the chaplain to the “wholesale disciplining” that he intended 
to bring upon “these people.” Wood also praised efforts by Bishop Charles H. Brent to 
disseminate translations of the Bible to the Moros in the Mindanao region during the 
campaign to kill Datu Ali. Wood saw himself in the role of missionary as well as soldier. 
244
 Wood had an opportunity to negotiate surrender with Ali, but instead followed the 
advice of one of his junior officers, Captain George Langhorne: “From our own 
experience with Indians and the English and Dutch in their various colonies it would 
seem better to get entirely rid of a disturbing element like Ali. Every concession to an 
Asiatic is a mistake. It is only when they beg for mercy that they should get, not more 
than they beg for, if anything less.”245  
Unlike Datu Ali, Datu Piang always took advantage of colonial arrangements to 
gain specific political and economic benefits. Piang cooperated with the Americans much 
like he had with the Spanish. Extremely pragmatic and politically shrewd, he knew which 
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way the political winds blew. He worked his relationship with the Spanish to preserve his 
political power and autonomy while he profited from a codependent relationship. By the 
time the U.S. forces came to Mindanao, he was the richest and most powerful datu in the 
region.246 Datu Piang allied with the Americans and hand-delivered his rebellious son-in-
law so that they could execute him. This act ended the longest sustained rebellion against 
their rule from 1903 to 1905. Eventually, Datu Ali was killed at his home in October of 
1905 with the collusion and assistance of his father-in-law Datu Piang. In return, Piang 
received extensive land holdings and U.S. labor contracts for which he provided Moro 
labor and pocketed the money for himself. Wood believed this arrangement marked the 
end of Muslim opposition in the Cotabato Valley. It also convinced him of the rightness 
of his approach.247 
Many elites openly collaborated and dismissed the interests of common Moros for 
their own enrichment. Piang, one of the more successful collaborators, also 
enthusiastically embraced U.S. cultural and institutional values. He made sure that his 
children received Western educations and went on to become one of the prominent 
political figures in Philippine national politics. The sultan, too, followed this pattern, 
much to the dismay of datus like Panglima Hassan. This open collaboration and 
abandonment of the people caused great disillusionment among many Moros. This 
disillusionment became key to the establishment of the community on Bud Dajo, which 
would come together mostly outside of the traditional structures of Muslim polity. 
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Leaders emerged from the vacuum created by the collaborating elite who had abandoned 
jihad and pushed aside the common people in their rush for the spoils of occupation.248  
In May 1905, General Wood pursued the survivors of Panglima Hassan’s band, 
many of whom had taken refuge on Bud Dajo. Colonel Scott, ambivalent about Wood’s 
enthusiastic desire to provoke violent responses from the people of Sulu, ultimately 
blamed the entire Dajo affair on the previous years of campaigning against the Moro 
community. Scott disliked the sultan, yet endorsed the destruction of Hassan’s cotta, 
which he called “an object lesson” for the Moro population. The violent campaign 
undertaken by Wood set the stage for the massacre at Bud Dajo. Many of the survivors of 
this campaign coalesced around Datu Pala and others who inhabited and defended Bud 
Dajo. At a grass-roots level they resisted the United States’ sweeping dismissal of their 
community as backward, incapable, and savage. These Moros sought refuge at Bud Dajo 
for two reasons: first, for fear of U.S. forces, and second, to live and sustain themselves 
independent from colonial rule. Wood’s march through Sulu the previous year had 
rendered most of the inhabitants of Bud Dajo homeless.249 The destruction of their 
homes, loss of loved ones, and U.S. demand for payment of the cedula hardened their 
resolve to resist U.S. hegemony. 
The operations in the Lake Lanao region of Mindanao set the pattern for future 
relations between the U.S. Army and Filipino Muslims. It reinforced the prevalent 
attitudes among army personnel that Moros were vicious savages incapable of civilized 
behavior and responsive only to extreme force. Army officials disregarded the Bates 
agreement as an impediment to their goals, which dictated a radical transformation of 
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Moro society. Pershing’s “successful” pacification of the Lake Lanao Maranaos provided 
a model of conquest and reinforced the belief that, like the Native Americans, these 
“savages” responded only to force. Colonel Robert Bullard reflected on his service in the 
Philippines and wrote, “The west is being grafted upon the east; American government 
and ways are passing to oriental savages.” He asserted that most Moros desired the 
guidance and tutelage of the United States colonial administration, even if they 
occasionally had to be reminded of their racial inferiority by means of martial conquest. 
Bullard made a stark comparison between Moros and “simple plantation negroes” when 
he boasted of his ability to understand Moros from his experience on the plantations with 
recently emancipated African American agricultural laborers.250  
Wood and his men continued to face opposition from the Moros. He declared that 
these “hostilities that can only result in their destruction.” While most Moros remained 
labeled as backward savages, datus who collaborated and understood the nature of the 
relationship between capital, labor, and property ownership were construed as intelligent 
and forward-thinking “friendly Moros.” Many U.S. officials believed these Moros would 
help them enforce the civilizing mission. The hostilities, which characterized the 
interaction between the army and Mindanao Moros during Wood’s tenure, had their roots 
in four previous years of military operations against Moros under Captain Pershing. U.S. 
Army officials, determined to map the region and catalogue its natural resources, forced 
Moro acquiescence to U.S. authority.  
These ideological justifications provided the political and economic rationales 
necessary to abrogate the Bates agreement. Additionally, these rationales suggested a 
need to embark upon a cultural crusade of sorts to remake the Moros. The argument was 
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also made that other European powers could take control of the islands if the U.S. did not 
take aggressive measures to control the population. The economic rationale was similar 
to that which drove most expansion during this period: the need for markets for 
manufactured goods from the States and the possibility of acquiring raw materials to fuel 
U.S. economic growth.251 Wood’s reports spoke of the potential in the Moro Provinces 
for the growing of hemp and the success of the “Moro exchange,” which he linked to his 
efforts at creating order in the area. Wood also encouraged emigration to the area in order 
to build up an economic base of yeoman farmers who owned land and contributed to the 
principle of free-market capitalism in a global economy.252 Furthermore, abrogation was 
consistent with the relationship with Native Americans and the tradition of breaking 
treaties whenever it suited the policy needs of the United States. Together, these ideas 
provided the underlying rationale and justifications for abrogation of the Bates 
agreement.  
Since Moros practiced “savage” behavior, U.S. officials easily justified the 
abrogation of the Bates agreement. Army officials leaned on economic motivations for 
the dissolution of Bates, but their deep distaste for Moro culture made the rationalizations 
appear logical and coherent. The Americans relied on the time-honored tradition of 
dispossessing the indigenous people of the North American continent. The campaigns of 
                                                 
251
 American businessmen wanted to enter into the “China market,” which they believed would provide an 
antidote to the depressions of the late nineteenth century. The Philippines would have provided a location 
for coal stations to fuel this Pacific commerce.  Also, Mindanao was believed to contain untapped natural 
resources and possible land for Anglo-American settlement. Neither ever really materialized during U.S. 
administration of the islands.   
252
 Hagedorn, Leonard Wood, Vol. 2, 49, 50. The Moro Exchange was an open air market set-up by Wood 
when he arrived in the Southern Philippines. Its purpose was to regulate trade between Moro farmers and 
those who came to purchase their goods. It was located in Zamboanga, Mindanao. ; Patricio Abinales, 
Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State (Quezon City: 
Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), 53. The Southern Philippines had been part of “an indigenous 
trading network” attached to the Southeast Asian community, especially the Malay states. After European 
and American colonialism, these networks were dismantled, and in fact U.S. authorities would arrest and 
prosecute Muslims who attempted to engage in trade outside of the parameters of the colonial orbit. 
 142 
Lake Lanao, the killing of Panglima Hassan, and the death of Datu Ali did not put an end 
to Muslim opposition as Wood had predicted. Individual Moros engaged in violence 
against occupiers and collaborators via the use of Juramenados and bands of Moros who 
resolved to rob, pillage, and harass U.S. forces and collaborators. The followers of 
prominent Datus who made political accommodations to the U.S. eventually banded 
together, broke from collaborating datus, and created the settlement on Bud Dajo. 
Colonel Scott described their collective alliance as created for the purpose of “preying in 
common upon the inhabitants of the island, and resisting the authority of the 
government,” even as he worried openly that many of the inhabitants would join them in 
rebellion against U.S. authority. Even after the climatic events on Bud Dajo in March of 
1906, Moros attacked a hospital ward in Parang Mindanao, which resulted in the death of 
one soldier and the wounding of several others.253   
The decision by Wood to abrogate the Bates Agreement must be understood 
within the context of the contemporary constructs of race, civilization, and economic 
imperative. Scientific racism dictated the construction of Moros as well as decisions 
about policy. A teleological construct of human civilization influenced the manner in 
which policymakers viewed the inability of Moros to govern themselves. U.S. cultural 
understandings of the proper manner of governance and economic policy influenced the 
decision to flood Mindanao with settlers. Wood’s vision for the civilizing of the Moros 
and the proper allocation and use of the natural resources of the region followed the 
history of dispossession of other indigenous populations. These policies caused Moros to 
                                                 
253
 Wood to the Executive Secretary, Philippines Commission, 16 April 1906, Papers of Hugh Scott; Report 
of Colonel Duncan, 19th Infantry, RG 395, NARA 
 143 
resist by violent means. The abrogation of the Bates agreement supported the long-held 
tradition of creating policies—and then breaking them—for the benefit of U.S. interests.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 144 
Chapter Four: “Strive with Your Lives in the Cause of Allah:” The Defenders at 
Bud Dajo 254 
 
“…a bright light came down to that mountain. Seeing this light those wounded arose. 
One “Budjang,” an unmarried woman said: “oh, I long for, Sarang Bantuk, like our faith 
to be married here on earth. I will wait for you there in “Tarang Hulku.”255 Though fell 
down already, her fiancé replied: “I likewise grieve and long for Sarang Tangki, if for 
instance our fate to be married on this earth would not take place I will just wait for you 
at the bridge sirat ul mustaqiim.”256 After the promise was made between lovers, the 
wounded men all fell dead. The numbers of Americans and Tausugs who were killed in 
battle, were like sticks wherein if combined together were enough to make a broom. This 
is the end of the battle of Bud Dajo between the Tausugs and the Americans.”257   
 
On the morning of March 6, 1906 a marriage ceremony took place on the Bud 
Dajo summit in the midst of an American artillery barrage. A young Tausug couple, just 
old enough to marry, stood before witnesses and an Imam to verbally acknowledge the 
Islamic written contract of marriage. Their marriage contract, or nikkah, differed from 
most in that it included a sworn oath to die together that very day defending the summit. 
They both promised to “fight in the way of Allah” and leave the earth together as 
                                                 
254
 Abdullah Yusuf Ali, trans., The Holy Qur’an Text, Translation & Commentary (Brentwood, MD: 
Amana Corp., 1983), 9:41. This is one of the verses of the Quran, which exhorts the believers to struggle in 
the way of Allah or “jihad fisibillilah.” This can be either a marital or a spiritual struggle.  
255
 Budjang is Tausug for an unmarried girl. Here it is being used to describe a bride. Sarang Bantuk refers 
to the “good figure of the body.” Tarang Hulku means “the hereafter.”  
256
 Sarang Tangkil means “one who cares a lot.” The bridge refers to Islamic beliefs about the afterlife in 
which all must cross a bridge over the hellfire to reach paradise. Sometimes it is called sirat ul mustaqiim, 
which means “the straight path.” This comes from the first chapter of the Quran, Al Fatiha, also known as 
the “seven oft-repeated verses.”  
257
 Oliveros, “Islam in the Moro-American War,” 11, 162. 
 145 
martyrs; as-shaheed. Knowing death was imminent the couple pledged to wait for one 
another at the “bridge to the hereafter” and cross the siratul-mustaqiim, the straight path, 
together. All this took place amidst the last minute preparations for war with the entire 
community anticipating imminent death at the hands of the U. S. Army. This couple, as 
with everyone on the summit, committed themselves to parang-sabil, the Tausug word 
for jihad. They pledged neither to live under the domination of non-Muslims nor to 
endure punishment in the next life for shrinking away from the obligation of jihad 
fisibillilah because of fear of death.258  
This community of Tausug Moros had lived previously in various disparate 
Tausug communities under the immediate authority of Datus who upheld the political 
legitimacy of the Sultan. They came together on Dajo because of changing political 
circumstances that resulted from the American occupation and a shifting social 
environment. Landless Tausug families and their sympathizers, created a community on 
the summit where they formulated grass roots resistance. Traditional political leadership 
within the Tausug community did not direct this resistance. It emerged from the 
experience of displacement and to fill a power vacuum left by Datus who had 
accommodated with the Americans. It was a leadership that emerged from the experience 
of resistance.259  
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Although Americans criticized polygyny, concubinage, and Moro family life, 
these practices created strong familial ties and systematically grounded Moro 
communities through bonds of kinship and alliances. In the instance of this ceremony on 
the summit the couple knew they would not have children or consummate the marriage. 
Their only expectation was death. They believed they would die fighting against those 
who would stifle and destroy the very basis of what they believed to be Islamic ummah. 
Within the theology of Islam there is no higher goal, nor greater reward, for the believing 
Muslim. This Tausug couple understood this and like others did not hesitate to sacrifice 
themselves fisibillilah, for the sake of Allah.260  
To the Americans, whose goal was to gain the acquiescence of the Tausug, this 
behavior appeared barbarous and irrational. The significance of the act of marriage 
during an artillery barrage would have been completely lost upon the attackers. The 
gender ideology of White masculinity would have interpreted the idea of a man accepting 
his wife’s presence on the battlefield as an emasculating and absurd notion. In the 
American definition of white male masculinity “women were expected to inspire men in 
war,” not fight alongside them.261 The willingness of the Tausug to allow women to fight 
alongside of men added another layer of complexity to the attitudes of the American 
attackers against their Tausug protagonists. American military personnel either 
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intentionally misinterpreted and/or did not care how Moros understood gender roles. The 
“virile expansionism” advocated by President Roosevelt and embraced by American 
white men was a strictly male project in, which they validated their manhood through 
combat against savage male foes. The presence of these female warriors threatened to 
ruin that quest for manhood sought by white men. It also validated American ideas about 
gender and civilization. The lack of clear and binary gender roles reinforced the argument 
they were barbarians. The media and U.S. foreign policymakers depicted the event in a 
manner that satisfied their political agendas. The U.S. Army declared that these cowardly 
barbarians hid behind weak and vulnerable women and children rather than fight as 
“men” or surrender in order to save the lives of those they should protect.262 
Unbeknownst to the Americans, the Islamic tradition, which dated back to 
establishment of the first Muslim community in 7th century Medina, established a 
precedent for women to engage in armed struggle in order to thwart attacks upon the 
Muslim ummah. In 625 C.E. at the Battle of Uhud outside Medina a woman named 
Nasibah bint Ka’b al-Maziniyyah fought alongside the Prophet and saved his life when 
she fended off with her own sword the flurry of sword strikes meant to slay him. During 
the “Battle of the Trench” Saffiya, the Prophet Muhammad’s Aunt, fought back attackers 
who had breached the Muslims’ defensive perimeter at Medina. Saffiya and her female 
companions dispatched a cavalryman, beheaded him, and tossed the head over the barrier 
leading the attackers to believe there were male soldiers on the other side. Afterward the 
enemy cavalry abandoned their attempts to breach the defenses. After Prophet 
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Muhammad’s death his youngest wife, Aisha Bint Abu Bakr, led an army onto the 
battlefield in an attempt to install a Khalif of her choosing after Prophet Muhammad’s 
death. The Prophet Muhammad’s daughter Fatima exercised a great deal of political clout 
in her lifetime and challenged the elder male leadership of the Muslim ummah. She 
refused to recognize the elected successor to the Prophet after his death. She insisted that 
her husband Ali was the legitimate heir. Her vocal opposition was so intense that it 
formed the intellectual and legal basis of the Shia Imamate.263 These accounts are retold 
in the various hagiographies of the Prophet and the collections of his oral 
pronouncements, hadith. They are also part of an oral tradition of transmitting knowledge 
via extolling the virtues of the Prophet and his companions as the templates for the 
character of all Moros. Unlike U.S. characterizations of Tausug women as oppressed and 
subjugated to Tausug male dominance women held status and power, albeit restricted by 
patriarchal norms, within Tausug warrior culture.264 
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The circulation of Orientalist conceptions of Islamic culture in the late nineteenth 
century created ready narratives about gender, which were universalized to explain all 
Islamic societies across time and space. Art, literature, and other modes of intellectual 
and cultural production, positioned Moros as the “other” against a normalized image of 
white supremacist maleness. This cultural production, coined “Orientalism” by Edward 
Said, relegated Muslim women to the shadows of Islamic society. Women were framed 
as objects of sexual desire subjected to the violent perversions of savage men. Despite 
this white supremacist project to relegate Muslim women to the margins of power in 
Islamic societies the presence of female Tausug warriors on the field of battle challenged 
this ideology.265  
Most 19th century Americans agreed that the presence of women and children on 
the battlefield was uncivilized and barbaric. In fact any position of power held by women 
threatened white male masculinity. Army and media personnel reported “women dressing 
as men,” Tausug Moros “using women and children as shields,” and “women behaving as 
men” as deviant, unnatural behaviors in order to discredit them as equals. Corporal James 
R. Miller reported that he personally witnessed an adult female shoot Lt. Gordon Johnson 
in the head as U.S. soldiers painstakingly fought their way to the top of the summit. The 
disclosure of such testimony in the Duncan report attempted to vindicate the actions of 
General Wood.266 In a time of great anxiety among white American men about their own 
masculinity and the potential undermining of it by perceived encroachment and 
aggressiveness of women in the states, the image of fierce female Tausug Mujahidina 
killing Americans as they attempted to breach the Dajo defense was quite unnerving. In 
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addition anti-imperialists used these reports to “enlist” Tausug women in the fight against 
extra-continental expansion, which they felt threatened the racial integrity of the nation.   
Rather than acknowledge the reality of competent female Tausug warriors, Americans 
universally chose to cast the women warriors in the role of victims or savages.267  
On the evening of March 5, Tausug women and men prepared for the American 
assault with the knowledge, and acceptance, that death was imminent. What Americans 
had referred to as “rumors” of an attack became a reality for the Bud Dajo Tausug in the 
early part of March 1906. The feeling among them was that the Americans were 
determined to change them and force them from their way of life. In their eyes this was 
tantamount to forced conversion from Islam. Many of them had experienced firsthand the 
onslaught of American military might in the preceding year with Wood’s expedition and 
knew that this would be their last stand. They were fully prepared to face death. Despite 
the impressive fortifications of Dajo and their fierce determination to resist, they adopted 
a collective attitude of jihad fisibillilah and martyrdom. They vowed to sacrifice 
themselves, and their families, as sabils rather than become apostates, which they 
believed would be their fate if they agreed to political domination by non-Muslims. They 
dressed in their finest apparel, as if they were going to pray in the weekly congregational 
prayer or a holiday celebration. They performed their obligatory prayers and the 
superogatory prayers and awaited the American assault all the while shouting out Allah 
Akbar, chanting the wird of their tariqa, and taunting their attackers.268  
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The atmosphere amongst the Tausug, while grim and determined, was also 
festive. In the Sufi tradition they donned their religious amulets and chanted wirds, or 
prescribed verses and prayers from the Quran or passed down by Awliya, or Saints that 
had originally brought Islam to the Islands.269 They also relied upon Quranic injunction to 
fortify their resolve to oppose the American occupation. Verses throughout the Quran 
justified the use of force and the sacrifice of one’s life in defense of the lands, lives, 
property, and political authority of Islam and the Muslims. The interpretations of those 
verses, along with sayings of the Prophet, were the heart of the production of Sharia 
among the Moros. The Tausug, like the Maguindanaons, had codified them into text and 
disseminated those ideals throughout the Tausug community via oral and written 
traditions along with social conditioning.270 According to this understanding of the 
injunctions humiliation in the life and the afterlife was the punishment for loss of Islamic 
sovereignty.271  
The Tausug prepared to die, and solemnly accepted the imminent destruction of 
their families, with the intention to avoid providential punishment from Allah. This 
sacrifice also guaranteed for the believer great reward in the next life. Despite the 
statements by officials and others that the defenders considered their position impervious 
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to the firepower of the Americans, the actions of the defenders indicated this was not the 
case.  
Historians have hitherto obscured the importance of the behavior of the Tausug on 
the mount those Tausug who were encouraging the U.S. Army to attack them. Those who 
claimed the Bud Dajo Tausug believed their community was impregnable had a clear 
agenda wanting the destruction of that community. The Bud Dajo Tausug claims of 
invulnerability were not foolish or savage conceit. They were a reflection instead of the 
jihadi commitment to die bravely for the sake of Allah. A lack of examination and 
understanding of the religion, history, and culture of the Bud Dajo Tausug lent to an 
interpretation of their actions as one-dimensional, irrational, and savage.272  
General Wood assaulted Bud Dajo in yet another attempt to demonstrate the 
primacy of U.S. rule in the Moro provinces and in the hope that he would end violent 
opposition to the occupation. The Bud Dajo community posed an ideological dilemma for 
Wood and his officers who were convinced of the cultural and racial inferiority of the 
Moros. Not only did the Bud Dajo Tausug challenge U.S. authority and their ideas about 
cultural superiority, but they also provided a potential alternative to other Tausug living 
under U.S. authority. They offered a material alternative for the subjugation of the people 
and cultural genocide of their community. Wood feared that Tausug resistance, or ideas 
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about resistance, would spread throughout the Moro provinces if he did not act decisively 
to erase this example the Bud Dajo community provided.273  
In the run up to the assault Army officers continued to build upon a growing 
portrait of the Moro refusals to accept United States rule as evidence of their intransigent 
savagery that stymied attempts by the U.S. to improve their lot. While the army records 
describe the Tausug Bud Dajo community as not representative of the wider Moro 
community, over one thousand of the Tausug had congregated on Bud Dajo at the 
rebellion’s high point. During the assault intelligence reports indicated that Tausug who 
had not taken to the summit also planned to fight American forces in support of their 
Muslim brethren.274  
The actions of the Bud Dajo Moros reinforced U.S. depictions of their community 
as backward, incapable savages. The reasons they sought refuge at Bud Dajo were 
twofold. One was out of fear of the U.S. forces, and the second was to plant crops and 
cultivate them in peace beyond the authority of colonial rule. Despite claims by U.S. 
officials that the Tausug Moros lacked a clear understanding of the civilizational concepts 
of Islam, they in fact acted upon deep religious convictions grounded in the Sharia they 
understood for centuries. 
In addition, the Tausug understood and attempted to uphold the political 
legitimacy of khalifa. The Sultan, as representative titular head of the Tausug Muslim 
community was in effect their Khalif, or Amir al-Mu’mimeen. This position was crucial 
to the establishment of Islamic polity and the faithful were required by Sharia to 
recognize the legitimacy of the Khalifate, whoever it may be, and defend its existence 
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from attack. The political concept of the Khalifate, as most Moros understood it during 
this period, was so crucial that the absence of an existing Khalif could theoretically place 
in doubt the status of the community as adherent Muslims. The Moros, Tausug and 
Maguindanaon, had a long history of jihad against the encroachment of Spanish 
imperialism and forced conversion. They grounded their resistance within the cultural 
and historical interpretation of the Sharia, which reflected concepts pervasive throughout 
the Islamic world. The destruction of their homes, loss of loved ones through U.S. army 
operations, and finally the demand to pay the cedula had hardened their resolve to resist 
foreign hegemony.275  
Approximately three thousand Tausugs were killed by General Wood’s 
expeditions between January 1903 and March 1906. In May 1905, Wood pursued 
survivors of Panglima Hassan’s band when many of them took refuge on Bud Dajo. 
Relatives and followers of Datu Pala, another leader killed by U.S. forces, joined the 
inhabitants of Dajo. According to U.S. Army reports, Datu Pala had “run amuck,” and 
killed twenty-six people, including several American soldiers and civilian personnel. As 
Datu Pala saw it, however, he had attacked U.S. troops in an act of jihad hoping to kill as 
many of them as possible and inspire others to follow his example. The actions of Pala 
succeeded in sparking a general uprising against U.S. personnel, which required General 
Wood to return to Jolo from Mindanao with the 17th Infantry and put down the rebellion. 
Eventually Wood hunted down and killed Pala, whose death and the ensuing destruction 
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of the communities that rallied behind his cause created a large population of disaffected 
and homeless Tausug. Opportunistic Datus who collaborated with U.S. authorities 
confiscated lands of those who had been in the path of Wood’s campaigns. They also 
forced those Moros they could get their hands on into various states of indenture, despite 
U.S. Army claims that they were working to abolish slavery in Sulu.276  
Bud Dajo first came to the attention of Colonel Hugh Scott, Governor General of 
Sulu, in early 1905, when Tausug cleared ground on top of the summit and occupied the 
area. When challenged by Scott and U.S. authorities Tausug explained they settled on 
Bud Dajo out of fear of American aggression and merely desired to live in peace where 
they could plant and harvest their crops. They even surrendered ten rifles to Colonel Scott 
who in turn allowed them to gather crops they had planted at the foot of the summit. 
Early in 1905 when General Wood returned to Zamboanga, a rumor circulated among 
Tausug Moros that Wood intended to attack the summit and dislodge the inhabitants. In 
response, additional Tausug Moros began to gather upon the summit in order to support 
their relatives and kinsmen.277  
Wood, his staff, and some of the Tausug elites worried about the symbol of 
defiance this refuge represented. Captain James Reeves offered a worst-case analysis to 
Wood:  
“the chiefs and all the people said that these people are on Bud Dajo for no good reason; 
that they were up there in opposition to and in defiance of the American government; that 
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they were going to fight, that the sooner we fought them the better, because they believed 
a delay would cause more people to join the people on the hill.”278  
Reeves further characterized the Tausug on the summit as a rebellious force 
committed to the organization of the Tausug Moros against U.S. occupation. He reported, 
“these people made the boast that they were patriots and in a way liberator of the Moro 
people.” Despite his condescending language Reeves was accurate in his depiction of this 
community, which had been established precisely to provide an alternative to U.S. 
subjugation and evolved into a space for armed struggle against U.S. imperialism. U.S. 
officials eagerly characterized the Dajo people as a small group unrepresentative of the 
majority of Tausug despite ample evidence that suggested otherwise. Their own 
intelligence reports suggested Tausug ranks were growing daily. As time passed and 
more Tausug Moros settled on the summit, a palpable fear engulfed all parties involved. 
Due to rumors, as well as Wood’s aggressive posture toward the people of Sulu, the 
Tausug on Bud Dajo feared the army planned to wipe out Tausug not only on the summit 
but throughout Sulu. The Sultan himself feared that the Tausug Moros on the hill would 
foment rebellion and further demonstrate his worthlessness to U.S. authorities as a 
figurehead capable of influencing the population. The U.S. army worried that the Dajo 
Tausug provided an unhealthy example of defiance that might spread among the 
population and develop into a full-blown insurgency.279 
Much like General Wood, Colonel Scott worried that the U.S. “was on trial before 
the whole archipelago” in the struggle to achieve military and political supremacy over 
the Muslim population. Bud Dajo stood outside of imperial control. As such it concerned 
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military officers worried about the propagandistic effect it could have on other 
disgruntled Moros forced to live under the rule of Americans. Colonel Scott wrote to 
Wood that, “the greatest danger” was not so much the raids or depredations but “the 
attitude of the entire Moro people” that suggested the Moros on Bud Dajo were 
impervious to U.S. authority. It made the U.S. Army look helpless against this symbolic 
fortress of their armed resistance.280  
Despite his concerns, however, Colonel Scott differed from Wood in his approach 
toward Tausug Moros. He preferred to avoid open conflict and opposed attempts by 
Wood to force Moros to pay the cedula and completely eradicate slavery.281 Scott 
initially sought compromise with Bud Dajo Tausugs. The Tausug agreed they would not 
harbor fugitives and would refrain from molesting inhabitants at the foot of the summit. 
Once the community on the summit became a safe haven for Tausug unhappy with the 
accommodations their leaders had made with the Americans, it began to attract others on 
the fringe of Tausug society. They also resumed harboring fugitives wanted by U. S. 
authorities. Some of these Tausug who moved to the summit were not content to just live 
autonomously, but began to raid the properties of those Moros deemed collaborators with 
U.S. Authorities. Tausug increased raids on “friendly Moros” below when they were told 
that an attack was imminent by U.S. forces in the late fall of 1905. In early February a 
group of Tausug raided a property owned by the interpreter and American Agent August 
Schuck and also burned down a shooting range belonging to the U.S. Army. This episode 
was the final provocation for more aggressive action toward the Bud Dajo community.282  
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On February 17, 1906, Captain Reeves issued warrants of arrest for theft by 
inhabitants on the summit. Reeves reported to Colonel Scott that the inhabitants of the 
summit were, “in open defiance of the American authority” and urged immediate action 
to root them out and remove Dajo as a symbol of defiance. Reeves further asserted that 
they had, “violated all their promises” to refrain from aggression and theft, “and had 
placed themselves in a deliberate false attitude before the Moro people.” As U.S. army 
officers prepared to assault the position they had the support and encouragement from the 
Sultan and certain Datus who claimed that this was “the last of opposition to American 
authority,” and that when they were removed, “American authority will be accepted 
without any more opposition.” In the eyes of these officers on the ground Bud Dajo was 
to be the last gasp of indigenous resistance to U.S. control of the region. Some Tausug 
elites were complicit in creating this perception in order to preserve their own status with 
colonial authorities and convince them that they still held influence within their 
communities.283  
Superficial efforts were made to persuade the Tausug to come down by sending 
Datus up to negotiate with them. Governor Scott sent Datu Acku to tell the people to 
come off the hill where they did not have access to “the same facilities” as others “down 
below” and “plant coconuts and hemp” for market. Acku, who went among them with a 
dog he had accepted as a gift from the Americans, was jeered, called an “American,” and 
was unable to convince the inhabitants to abandon the summit. He returned and informed 
U.S. authorities that they had, “gone up there to die, and that they would fight.” Adam 
negotiated with Captain Reeves, to bring the Bud Dajo Tausugs down if General Wood 
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agreed no harm would come to them if they surrendered. Army officers sanctioned these 
talks while they stalled for time to get troops in place, and hoped that Adam would 
provide intelligence and betray his fellow Tausug for an adequate sum of money. Instead, 
when Adam learned that U.S. troops landed on Sulu Island he stated the Americans were 
“going to cut off my head anyhow” and thus returned to the summit to fight to the death. 
General Wood made the decision to bring troops over fresh from his campaign through 
Sulu for the assault. Wood remained eager to deliver the punishing blow that he imagined 
would teach the Moros a lesson and further augment his military record.284  
By March 4, 1906, General Wood made final preparations to attack the summit 
under the tactical command of Colonel Joseph Duncan in charge of the assault force. 
Duncan’s plan involved using three columns of infantry assaulting the summit via three 
trails that led up the summit: the West trail, the East trail, and the South trail. On that day 
a reconnaissance team attempted to establish a system of communications and locate the 
trail, or trails, which would link all three together. The mission was completely 
unsuccessful, as the three outfits became lost in the maze of trails and jungle. Despite this 
failure Duncan determined to begin the assault the next day.285 The West trail column one 
consisted of Cavalry Troop F, G, elements of the 4th Cavalry, and one company of the 6th 
Infantry. Colonel Duncan assigned West trail to Captain Tyree Rivers. On the South trail 
the attack force was comprised of elements of the 6th Infantry and White’s Moro 
Constabulary, which totaled two hundred and forty men, including twenty officers. Major 
Omar Bundy commanded them. It was the most difficult and exposed of the three trails. 
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The East trail personnel consisted of company G of the 6th Infantry, and companies B and 
D of the 19th Infantry. They amounted to a total force of one hundred and seventy four 
men including seven officers. 
The attack was to be a three-pronged assault supported by a flying column, a sort 
of rapid deployment force, to serve as support troops and fill in any gaps in the line. In 
total close to one thousand Americans and their allies would attack the summit, fully 
equipped with .30 caliber Krag rifles, .45 caliber Springfield rifles, 12 gauge shotguns, 
and Colt forty-five revolvers. In addition to four mountain guns, the U.S. Army and the 
Navy introduced three Colt Automatic Machine guns into combat. About seven hundred 
to one thousand Tausug Moros faced this impressive array of professional soldiers 
wielding advanced weaponry. They were armed with a total of one hundred to one 
hundred and fifty rifles, about half as many pistols, and six to eight lantacas. Wood and 
his subordinates expected a quick skirmish that would end in a day or two. The Tausug 
proved to be a much more difficult foe than any of them envisioned.286    
The Moro Constabulary became central to the successful U.S. assault on the 
summit and their performance in the operation became legend. The constabulary 
consisted of indigenous troops led by American officers. They included Moros, as well as 
Christians who were from Mindanao or Visayans. John Roberts White earned a 
reputation for the constabulary as a light, well-equipped, effective counterinsurgent force, 
which would take the fight to the enemy. He recorded several military successes in 
Mindanao despite the skepticism, and sometimes outright hostility, of regular army 
troops and senior officers. The Constabulary was established as a law enforcement unit to 
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police the inhabitants of the island. John White joined in the hope of being able to take 
the fight to the enemy and also to command indigenous soldiers. One early setback 
occurred when the Moros who signed up for the unit took their rifles and equipment and 
deserted. For regular army skeptics such behavior reinforced their ideas of the Moros as 
treacherous savages and justified their dismissals of the constabulary as a police force 
unsuited for combat in the field. White was determined to remove these doubts and get 
the unit into action in order to demonstrate their loyalty, combat prowess, and courage. 
White’s antidote for the desertion problem was to take his Lieutenant, Leonard Furlong, 
and wait in the tall grasses along the perimeter of the constabulary camp with shotguns to 
blast any other constabulary troops who wanted to desert.287 The original vision of the 
constabulary agreed with President Roosevelt in ending the insurrection by fiat, declaring 
any further insurgent behavior as brigandage. While officially a police force they were in 
fact a light infantry force that engaged in heavy combat throughout their career in the 
Islands. Men like John Roberts argued that the best way to combat unrest among the 
Moros was to use such indigenous forces. Roosevelt by declaring the war over in the 
midst of combat forced the Philippines constabulary, in concert with regular Army, to 
deal with continued hostilities.288  
John Roberts White, the commander of the Moro Constabulary, had been born 
and raised in England. When the Spanish-American War broke out he joined the U.S. 
Army in 1898 in the hope of combat and adventure. The ideological baggage he carried 
comprised of a Kiplingesque vision of benevolent uplift energized by confrontation with 
the savage other. White believed he lived during an age of white civilization actively 
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acknowledging “an obligation that Kipling called the White Man’s Burden,” and he was 
eager to be a participant this global mission. He had been adventuresome and idealistic 
since his youth.289 White called “American altruism” the “marvel of a hardboiled world” 
and believed America carried out that mission of uplift of lower races, which he believed 
essential since he had fought in Greece against the Ottomans.  In fact, White would 
characterize his service in the constabulary as “a chance for a Kipling” to find adventure 
among colorful exotic people while embarked upon a mission of racial and civilizational 
uplift. His decision to enlist with the constabulary when he left the regular army reflected 
his commitment to this task he imagined the Americans were undertaking.290  
While Bud Dajo’s steep volcanic crater was not considered impregnable by the 
defenders, many of the constabulary members, and some of the Tausug at the base of the 
summit, believed it would be extremely difficult to dislodge the inhabitants. Colonel 
Duncan used White and his Moro constabularies on the 6th to make their way up the steep 
incline of the South trail to clear trenches manned by Tausug defenders, which had 
slowed the advance and threatened to stymie U.S. efforts. By use of lethal concentrated 
rifle fire and fierce hand-to-hand combat the constabularies made steady progress against 
the Tausug, who were armed mostly with spear, kris, and parang. In fact the greatest 
impediment next to the fierce Tausug resistance was the U.S. army who trained “friendly 
fire” on the constabulary twice, mistaking them for the Dajo defenders. Despite these 
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setbacks, by the middle of the day on March 5th, White’s men made remarkable progress. 
They made it more than halfway up the summit and destroyed fortifications along the 
way. Throughout they were forced to crawl under rifle fire, spears, large rocks, the 
withering fire of the lantacas, and any other debris the Tausug could hurl at them. 
Colonel Duncan called in support from the Colt machine guns, which rapidly became a 
dominant and deadly weapon in the battle.291  
On the morning of 6 March just after 10:00 am, General Wood finally arrived on 
the scene of the battle he had initiated. Captains Frank McCoy, George Langhorne, and 
soon to be Governor Tasker Bliss accompanied Wood. Unhappy with the inability of 
Duncan’s unit to achieve the objective Wood immediately sought to micromanage the 
assault. He ordered Captain Lawton to aggressively assault the summit up the East Trail. 
In addition he sent Captain Langhorne ahead with two more Colt Automatic machine 
guns manned by naval personnel from the USS Pampanga. These guns proved extremely 
lethal against the defenders and turn the tide of battle back to the Americans in a dramatic 
and decisive manner.292  
March 6th ended without U.S. forces having achieved their objective. The Tausug 
had pinned down the constabularies. Intelligence was coming in, which indicated the 
Tausug on the lowlands were planning to attack American forces in support of their 
brethren on the summit. During the ascent up the summit Adam and a cohort of warriors 
stopped the American advance by releasing a prepared trap of logs, which rolled down on 
the Americans.293 In light of this information, and the difficulties facing the troops on the 
South Trail, Duncan decided, with Wood’s acquiescence, to slow the advance. The 
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Constabulary demonstrated competence and the machine gun established itself as an 
effective tool in the ensuing fighting. Because of their impressive performance on March 
6th, . Colonel Duncan called upon the constabulary on March 7th to be the vanguard of the 
attack on the South trail. Once again at first light they painstakingly made their way up 
the trail. Once again they performed impressively moving aggressively up the summit 
and taking the fight to the Tausug. Colonel White ended the day severely wounded, 
having been shot through his left knee. The constabulary ended the expedition with a 
casualty rate of over twenty five percent. White’s wound was severe enough to cause him 
to leave the constabulary and later seek a post with a penal colony in the Philippines.294  
As the Americans made steady progress up the summit on the seventh the Tausug 
defenders lay in wait, dressed in their finest clothes and prepared to die. They shouted 
maksabil and Allahu Akbar like missiles aimed at the hearts of their attackers. They 
launched human wave attacks with bolos, parangs, and spears and hurled large rocks 
against the Americans. As they waited to die they chanted the wird of imminent death: 
wa hezbanallahi wa nehma wakeel, and the testimony of faith: la illaha illahlah.295 
Women, some wearing the same garb as their male warrior comrades, armed themselves 
and continued to defend the dwindling position on the summit. Other women took to the 
small building, which served as the community Masjid, with their children and old people 
awaiting their death deep in prayer and dhikrullah. Given the experiences of the previous 
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year with the American forces they had no wish to be taken as captives and sent back to 
the collaborating Datus as slaves. The Tausug defenders repeatedly charged the American 
line with cries of Allahu Akbar. Each charge, while lethal to the Americans, was repulsed 
by their superior firepower. The newly wed Tausug couple fought side by side all the 
while shouting out poetry of love to one another in anticipation of an afterlife, in which 
they would pass the tests of faith before entering paradise together.296  
By deploying the machine guns on the flanks of the lined up infantry, and 
directing accurate and persistent rifle fire into the trenches, cottas, and buildings, the 
Americans quickly dispatched the defenders and their families. U.S. officers described 
the Moros as “fanatic and feigning death” in order to kill as many Americans as possible. 
Wood claimed that toward the end of the battle the Tausug Moros intentionally exposed 
themselves to withering U.S. army fire in order to be killed rather than taken prisoner. In 
his immediate reaction to the resistance by the Tausug on Dajo Wood wrote, “I was 
greatly amazed at the number of men opposed to us. There were many more than two 
hundred, which confirms the information that Moros were going to the top to assist those 
there in their defense.”297 Toward the end of the battle Captain Langhorne, who had 
urged Wood to exterminate the inhabitants of Dajo, was sent in with a detachment to burn 
the remaining structures to the ground. This incinerated survivors and corpses. Seaman 
Joseph Fritz volunteered to climb into a tree overlooking the Tausug position in order to 
shoot any wounded crawling about on the ground. On March 7th Adam died charging the 
American line with a large bolo in one hand and a “baby” under his arm, dying in a lethal 
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volley of rifle fire. The community Masjid was riddled with .30 machine gun fire and 
then burned to the ground with hundreds of people inside. 298  
Once the shooting ceased, General Wood gave the order to incinerate all the 
bodies in place and withdraw immediately, which resulted in an inaccurate count of 
bodies and weapons. This command irritated Colonel Duncan and created lasting 
uncertainty as to the actual body count. Numerous reports by the attackers claimed that 
the Tausug used women and children as “shields, claiming this cowardly tactic accounted 
for the great loss of life among them. The Colt Automatic Machine guns destroying the 
Masjid inflicted many deaths of non-combatant women, old people, and children. In 
addition women willingly participated in the fight against the Americans because jihad 
would have been obligatory upon the women as well as the men in a situation where the 
survival of the entire community was at stake.299 Instead of acknowledging the agency of 
the Tausug women as capable and willing to sacrifice their lives en masse, Americans 
attributed their deaths to the cowardice and barbarism of the “Moro race.” They also 
claimed Tausug displayed the “well-known treachery of the uncivilized Mohammedan” 
feigning death or wounds and then attacking medics attempting to administer aid to 
them.300 U.S. Army and constabulary forces lost a total of twenty-one killed and seventy-
three wounded. Approximately twenty-six Tausug prisoners were taken prisoner, and it is 
estimated that anywhere from fifty to one hundred Tausug Moros escaped down a fourth 
                                                 
298
 Report of Colonel Duncan, RG 94, NARA; White, Bullets and Bolos, Papers of John R. White; Fulton, 
Moroland, 291, 293.  
299
 Fulton, Moroland, 294. 
300
 “Letter from the Secretary of War to the President of the United States, Included in the Duncan Report 
on the Battle of Bud Dajo,” Papers of John R. White. Secretary Taft echoed Wood’s report that women 
dressed in “trousers” and behaved as men during the battle.  
 167 
trail left unguarded. The estimates of dead Moros ranged from seven hundred to as high 
as one thousand.301  
Female defenders at Bud Dajo unwittingly challenged U.S. gender ideology as 
they fought and died alongside the men. Even though Tausug women killed American 
soldiers Wood was forced to defend his decision to attack women and children. U.S. 
gender and race ideology worked two ways. It allowed U.S. to view the Tausug as 
barbaric, but also the American military as unmanly for killing women and children.  
After being informed of the victory at Bud Dajo President Roosevelt 
congratulated Wood on “a brilliant feat of arms” in which it was, the “duty of civilized 
men to put down savagery and barbarism,” and if the United States was “too weak” to do 
it some “stronger and manlier power” would step up to the task.302 Even though the army 
took control of its objective and considered the massacre at Bud Dajo a successful 
operation. Secretary of War William Howard Taft questioned the “wanton slaughter,” 
deaths of women and children, and subsequently forced Wood to defend the attack on 
Bud Dajo.303  
U.S. news organizations portrayed the episode as either a senseless slaughter of 
innocents or just deserts meted out to savages. Despite the dueling headlines, all the 
coverage denied any agency to the women involved in the battle. Some charged that U.S. 
soldiers had killed “defenseless” women and children. The relationship with the 
Philippines since 1898 had been problematic in the eyes of the public and disturbing to a 
nation that believed it was participating in a mission to uplift a backward people. The 
incident at Samar just three years prior had already created fears that this relationship 
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with these “new wards” was corrupting white male youth by “turning American soldiers 
into savages.” This most recent incident at Dajo seemed further evidence to anti-
imperialists that the experiment with extra-continental expansion had proved a failure. 
Much like the perpetrators of the Bud Dajo massacre, however, they also denied any 
agency on the part of the women and youth who had died there. Rather they assumed the 
slain had been helpless victims cowering in fear as the soldiers slaughtered them without 
resistance.304  
The domestic press coverage reinforced the idea of women and children as 
victims, either of U.S. aggression, or of Moro cowardice and irresponsibility. This 
publicity fed the debate on Capitol Hill in which recriminations were hurled by both 
imperialists and ant-imperialists. The New York Times stated that “women and children 
were killed as well as fighting men” and compared it to the massacre at Samar, stating, 
“what hell roaring Jake ordered, but did not dare to do. Wood has exceeded.” Mississippi 
Democratic House Representative John Sharp Williams’s satiric poem “The Charge of 
the Wood Brigade” was read on the floor of the Senate and reprinted by the New York 
Times, which ridiculed and shamed the actions of Wood as brutal, cowardly, excessive, 
and unnecessary. The article denied the accurate reports of women fighting and scoffed at 
claims that the Tausug used the children as shields.305 The Dallas Morning News claimed 
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the Moros “sacrificed their offspring” by throwing onto American bayonets, used them as 
shields when they charged, and placed women dressed as men in the front ranks and that 
the U.S. troops could not be blamed for the carnage.306 Even Colonel Scott, who had 
opposed the assault, backed up the actions of the Army by telling a reporter that it was 
“the proper chastisement for a band of outlaws” who defied U.S. authority as well as that 
of their “chiefs.” Scott furthermore downplayed the role that Islam or “religion” played in 
the affair by falsely claiming that the U.S. did not interfere with the free practice of Islam 
among the Moros.307 
The press coverage of Dajo used the presence of women and children in battle as 
a locus of contention over U.S. foreign policy and the proper place of women in society. 
The newspapers placed women in the same category as children and infantilized them. 
This cultural assumption solidified a portrait of women as incapable of making coherent, 
rational decisions on their own. Furthermore, the insistence upon imagining women 
either as “shields” or as defenseless victims lent validity to domestic ideas about gender, 
which relegated women to the realm of the household and incapable of exercising 
independent judgment, especially in the realm of politics and warfare – men’s last 
exclusive refuge. If the insecurities created by the depressions of the late 19th century 
eroded middle class white men’s sense of potency and the 1898 wars re-established their 
virility as warriors, the women of Bud Dajo threatened to intrude into a realm men felt 
was theirs alone. In fighting fiercely alongside their men, the women of Bud Dajo 
challenged the gains made by men like Roosevelt, Wood, and the cultural production that 
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had re-established white male supremacy by means of territorial expansion and 
warfare.308  
In the U.S. legislature condemnation of the affair generally split along party lines. 
Anti- imperialists had enough support to generate calls of inquiry into the massacre. 
Although much of the criticism of the carnage stemmed from partisan opportunism, there 
was a genuine dislike of the extra-continental empire building. Opposition to empire was 
strongest among Southern Democrats adamant against including non-whites in the 
national community. For them Bud Dajo presented an opportunity to embarrass a 
Republican administration that was intent on extra-continental expansionism, which they 
believed threatened the racial integrity of the nation. Senator Charles A. Culbertson, a 
Democrat from Texas, asked for a Senate resolution “directing the secretary of war to 
send to the senate full copies” of all communications between the U.S. Army in the Moro 
Provinces and Washington officials related to the Bud Dajo affair. The issue, which 
animated his response, was whether or not women and children were killed at Bud Dajo. 
Representative John Sharp Williams denounced the raid in the House and called into 
question the claims that Moros used women and children as shields. Sharp Williams was 
specifically referring to the death of non-combatants as well as the initial reported 
imbalance of 18 U.S. dead to over 800 Moros killed with no prisoners taken. 
Congressman Grosvenor claimed that the Dajo people were an “utterly lawless, 
treacherous, bloodthirsty gang, never amenable to law or civilization” and suggested that 
House members who criticized the operation were staining the honor of the U.S. Army.309 
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Clergy and social reformers split in a similar way. It was less vitriolic, however, 
and characterized by a paternalistic general belief that the United States had a moral 
obligation to the Filipinos. Social reformer and well-known cleric Dr. Charles H. 
Pankhurst condemned the operation on Dajo, specifically criticizing Theodore 
Roosevelt’s congratulatory telegram to Wood following the massacre. That telegram was 
leaked to the New York Times despite a censor ordered by General Wood. It was featured 
with a pointedly sarcastic headline “Women and Children Killed in Moro Battle, 
President Wires Congratulations to Troops.” Pankhurst was critical of the manner in 
which the United States was dealing with these “pagan” people whom he described as 
having been mistreated by a Christian nation and therefore likely to turn away from 
Christianity. Describing the “mowing down of savages and semi-savages” by the U.S. 
Army, Pankhurst argued that colonial officials had abandoned a true missionary duty to 
gently assimilate and Christianize the peoples of the Philippines. He added that they were 
more concerned with the economic benefits of empire, such as the “passage of the 
Philippine tariff bill.”310  
For Pankhurst the emphasis on the favorable trading arrangements rather than the 
souls of the Filipinos reflected misplaced priorities of capitalists intent on integrating the 
islands into the economic orbit of the U.S. General Otis O. Howard, co-founder of 
Howard University, head of the Freedman’s Bureau during Reconstruction, and a veteran 
of frontier warfare against Native Americans, defended the Bud Dajo action and the 
retention of the Philippines as a colony. Howard retired from the army in 1891 and was 
not an active participant in the administration of the newly acquired territories after the 
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Spanish-American War. Yet, he supported the imperialist cause and encouraged the 
evangelization of the newest wards of American empire. General Howard encouraged the 
copious use of missionary tracts and missionaries to remake Filipinos as compliant pupils 
of American values. Howard stated: “we cannot do so rash a thing” as granting Filipinos 
independence, “until we have accomplished…what providence has intended us to do, 
namely, Christianize them.” Such sentiments were consistent with Howard’s career as a 
passionately Christian army officer. Throughout his military career he grounded the 
performance of his duties within paternalistic ideology of uplift. As head of the 
Freeman’s Bureau Howard ignored Congressional mandate to distribute plantation land 
to emancipated landless African Americans, believing they were not prepared for land 
ownership. He did, however, harness the power of the state and private philanthropy, to 
evangelize the African Americans with the gospel of Christ and the cultural superiority of 
white America.311 Although Howard and Pankhurst used different language to define the 
nature of U.S. conduct in the region, both were firmly committed to the missionary vision 
of extra-continental expansion, which took responsibility for “savage” peoples who came 
into the nation’s imperial orbit. They believed it was the U.S. responsibility to engage in 
uplift and evangelize these populations.312  
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Wood vigorously disavowed that he had intended to kill women and children. He 
stressed that the people on Bud Dajo had been given every opportunity to let the women 
and children off the mountain. He did this despite the fact that in a private 
correspondence with Roosevelt he made no apologies for the deaths of the women and 
children on the summit claiming that “work of this kind,” though “disagreeable” was 
“unavoidable.” to achieve the greater policy goals of the United States.313 In a telegram to 
Taft, Wood claimed “Moro women wore trousers and were dressed and armed much like 
the men and charged with them.” He also claimed that the men used children as human 
shields as they charged U.S. troops. The Datus and the Sultan backed up these claims 
during this meeting. Wood staunchly defended the operation in official documents 
claiming that “no man, woman, or child were wantonly killed in the fight. We have 
begged Moros again and again to fight as men and keep women and children out of it.” 
However, he did allow “some women or children were killed or wounded by preliminary 
shelling at distance.” Wood pressed the Datus as to whether or not he thinks there will be 
peace now after Bud Dajo. Sultan assured him that “all the bad people were killed” at 
Bud Dajo and that there would be no more opposition to U.S. authority.314  
Wood gathered together many of the Tausug elites in order to encourage them to 
accept the U.S. vision of uplift and improvement and follow their agenda. He encouraged 
them to tell their people to farm rather than confront the U.S. occupation. He advised 
them to “have big crops of babies, hemp, rice, and coconuts, and no more fighting.”315 
Encouraging farming was Wood’s way of civilizing a community he imagined to be just 
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a step above hunter-gatherers. Introducing trade within the imperial orbit of the U.S. 
represented a further step toward his civilizing goal. After all, farmers are more civilized 
than hunters and people who engage in trade are less likely to engage in war, or so Wood 
believed much like his peers who were designing Philippines policy. In later 
correspondences between Wood and his staff, and in the Philippines Commission reports, 
officers emphasized the progress made and the great expanses of Muslim land being 
placed under cultivation, especially the land of the Panglima Hassan, whom Wood’s 
troops had killed in 1904. They appeared to have made a connection between this burst of 
agricultural activity and the fact that the people appeared to be “so pliable and plastic” 
and the rash of resistance, which had characterized their relations with the people, had 
ceased.316 Despite the martial opposition of Moros and harsh responses by military 
authorities, administration of America’s first imperial encounter with Moros would be 
characterized by efforts to civilize the inhabitants and remake them as compliant 
participants in the imperial state. Wood also encouraged the large scale harvesting of 
hemp and cocoanuts. He even desired white settlers to come to the Mindanao region a 
place he called “white man’s country,” by insisting that only the introduction of white 
settlers with “modern agricultural methods” would make the region profitable. For Wood 
bringing Moros into contact with the global markets would be their salvation, as he 
believed that trade partners and trading activity made for a peaceable society.317 
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In addition to providing a justification for Bud Dajo to a stateside audience, Wood 
solicited official approval from the Muslim ruling elites. The gathering of the Datus and 
the Sultan took place on the American warship Sabah. Wood solicited their approval for 
the operation in the presence an interpreter and a clerk recording the dialogue. They 
unanimously expressed satisfaction with the outcome. In fact some of them urged Wood 
to act more expeditiously in the future to suppress the slightest sign of defiance or 
rebellion and to allow them greater latitude to deal harshly with those deemed 
disobedient. Hajji Butu, the Sultan’s second in command and enthusiastic collaborator, 
was quite satisfied with the outcome stating “even if the man talks in his sleep about 
fighting, to hit him on the head right away.” Datu Indinan was concerned that the U.S. 
authorities were interfering by modifying judgments of chiefs for punishments thus 
usurping their authority. He told Wood that, “the Moros are very ignorant, very stupid, 
and very bad people, and what they delight in is to have a chief tried for punishing them. 
If a chief punishes any of his men, they like him to be tried for doing so.”318 Wood after 
sitting with these elites wrote in his journal that “the Sultan and native headmen” 
expressed “satisfaction over extermination of outlaws.” Wood believed that he had the 
support of the ruling elite when he commanded action that upheld U.S. authority in the 
area.319  
The Tausug elites were very concerned with losing control of the masses and 
jeopardizing their capacity as proxies for U.S. colonial authority. Both groups, American 
officials and Tausug collaborators, found common cause in suppressing the behavior of 
the Dajo people, as well as any group that refused to respect the colonial arrangement set 
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up by U.S. authorities and accepted by Moro elites. Datu Indinan, another enthusiastic 
supporter of the Bud Dajo operation, asserted that “the people on Dajo were bad people 
because they would not follow anybody” and therefore should have been exterminated 
much sooner. As Panglima Haiyudin stated, “a bad class of people was up there, and it 
was necessary to fight them, otherwise it would have been like a disease.” Clearly they 
all thought that if Bud Dajo had been left alone, it would have glowed as a beacon for 
others who opposed U.S. authority. The ruling elites function in the colonial arrangement 
was to provide a cover of legitimacy to U.S. rule in exchange for material wealth and 
social status. They reacted with fear and exasperation when grass roots resistance to the 
U.S. occupation continued to break out, despite their own politically calculated decisions 
not to resist. Wood had been very exorcized about the example set by the people on Dajo, 
and the Tausug elites were no less concerned.320 
President Roosevelt’s staunch defense of Wood’s actions as both unavoidable and 
necessary enabled him to accept the promotion to Commander of the Philippine Division 
at the end of the month. Wood came out of the episode without official blemishes upon 
his record and honor. In light of all the negative reaction to the operation Taft cabled 
Wood with his concerns and by mid-March had called Colonel Hugh Scott, who was on 
leave in the states, to answer his inquiries as to the extreme nature of the operation. Wood 
complied by providing the requested documents, supplemented with letters of defense 
from General Henry Clay Ide, one of the members of the Taft Commission, and a 
transcript of his meeting with the Datus upon the Sabah.321 On March 28, 1906, he 
handed the governorship over to General Tasker Bliss and made preparations to return to 
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Manila as Commander of the Philippine Division, his career and reputation intact, yet 
somewhat tainted by the incident at Bud Dajo. His name would forever be linked with 
this massacre. 322  
The Tausug Moros died on Bud Dajo believing a great reward awaited them for 
engaging in the most selfless and praiseworthy act in the Islamic tradition. The Tausug 
Moros believe that when a mujahid dies one may see him, or her, right before the time of 
the evening prayer riding a white horse on their way to paradise. On the last day of the 
siege Adam was among the last of the Tausug left alive as the Americans had completed 
a semi-encirclement of the community and slowly shredded the remaining warriors and 
their families to pieces with withering gunfire and artillery. As one cotta after another 
was destroyed, and one trench after another cleared by American firepower the bodies 
piled up until they choked trails and filled the trenches three and four deep. In the midst 
of all these broken and ripped bodies, with the smoke of artillery and machine fire 
stinging the eyes of attackers and defenders alike, Adam scooped up a small child, tucked 
it in the crook of his arm, raised his kris above his head and made one last charge at the 
American rifles arrayed before him. Shouting out “Allahu Akbar” he was riddled by the 
American Krags and died in a mangled pile along with the child. American soldiers who 
witnessed the act included it in the Duncan report, along with testimony of “women 
dressed as men and fighting like men” as further proof of the savagery of the Moro, and 
justification for their slaughter and cultural genocide. The young married couple who 
pledged to die did so declaring their love for one another and regrets they would not 
experience the consummation of their union. They died together, according to the 
silsilah, promising to wait for each other in the hereafter. Another warrior, Imam Illih, 
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called out to his wife as he died: “Oh my dear, come near me for I am already wounded. 
Help me: my soul is still within me. My horse is already here smelling me, yet I cannot 
yet ride him for my soul is still within me.” 323  
The Moros of Bud Dajo took up arms, established an autonomous community, 
and eventually fought to the death within the religious and cultural context of Islam. They 
dressed in their finest apparel and donned the mantle of the parang sabil with an 
acceptance of mortal death with the expectation of paradise for themselves and their 
families. The women, young men, and young girls took up arms alongside the adult male 
warriors in the desire to protect their loved ones, their community, and obey what they 
believed to be the commands of Allah. The young woman who killed Lt. Gordon Johnson 
served as fodder for a narrative, which vindicated the actions of the U.S. Army in killing 
“defenseless” women.324 What Americans witnessed and interpreted as Moro indifference 
for the life and the use of “women and children as shields” was in fact a reflection of the 
deeply held religious convictions of the Moros that they were obeying the commands of 
Allah and would receive a reward for their actions.325  
Americans at Bud Dajo imposed gender and racial norms they were developing in 
the States onto the Moros and judged them well outside the community of civilized races. 
The marriage at Bud Dajo symbolized a dedication of Tausug men and women to one of 
the most basic principles of Islam: fighting against oppression. The actions of the 
Mujahidina on Dajo were grounded in the Islamic tradition and the historical context of 
Maguindanaon and Tausug armed struggle. For the American men trying to subdue them 
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the appearance of these women on the battlefield challenged narratives of manliness they 
were desperately trying to disseminate both at home and abroad. Women in the states 
challenged male hegemony by trying to vote, pushing prohibition, and bringing income 
into the household. Because they acted aggressively to gain political and social power 
they threatened gender roles dictated and upheld by a white supremacist patriarchy. By 
doing so they also earned the label of meddlesome emasculating harpies. Tausug women, 
by standing their ground with their male brethren and fighting to the death on Bud Dajo, 
were cast as savages acting in a manner unnatural and contrary to gender norms of 
civilized people. Americans re-interpreted the actions of these women by casting them as 
helpless victims of their cowardly men and a savage culture. The unfortunate 
consequence was their death by American guns. Unlike American versions of the battle 
Tausug folklore and historical memory of the event cast these women as the best of what 
femininity had to offer: pious, lethal, women warriors dying fisibillilah in a confrontation 
with the forces of disbelief.326  
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Conclusion 
 The operation on Bud Dajo was carried out by a generation of men who lived 
during a dramatically transformational period of United States history. The greatest 
illustration of that transformation was the extra-continental expansion of the United 
States and its entry onto the global imperial scene. Concurrent with extra-continental 
expansion were the renegotiations of white masculinity. The renegotiation of gender roles 
in this period was heavily dependent upon specific boundaries of white femininity also. 
The place of women was articulated in popular culture, the academy, and many other 
venues. As such, non-white women were placed outside of this binary of white man and 
white woman and placed into a third, genderless category of savage or barbarian, as were 
many white women who attempted to challenge contemporary roles set out for them. This 
was not just a top-down construction; it was a renegotiation of gender and race involving 
all classes of white men, specifically resulting from perceived threats, one of them being 
the immigration of “hordes” of working-class immigrants whose whiteness was 
questionable.327   
Intellectual and cultural production of the nineteenth century, in tandem with 
white supremacist race ideology, was employed to construct a particular “Moro race,” 
which suited the methods of control exerted by military officials in the Moro Provinces.  
Explicit judgments about Moros’ readiness for self-rule were measured by various 
factors, most having to do with their willingness to recognize United States political and 
cultural authority, as well as Anglo-Saxon racial supremacy. Moros who opposed 
                                                 
327
 Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home 
and Abroad, 1876-1917 (New York: Hill & Wang, 2000), 180-81, 190, 218; Evan Thomas, The War 
Lovers: Roosevelt, Lodge, Hearst, and the Rush to Empire, 1898 (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 
2010), 144-45; Gail Bederman, Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the 
United States, 1800-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 5,7, 11.   
 181 
colonial control and authority were characterized as irrational bandits and undisciplined 
childish savages, incapable of participation in civil society. Colonial authorities decided 
that the Moros were eons away from civilization. The institution of slavery, perceived 
sexual licentiousness, improper use of the land, and a lack of central authority were cited 
as justifications for a violent paternalistic policy of control, which brooked no challenge 
to U.S. authority. The U.S. army designed a colonial policy that placed the Moros in the 
category of “hostile minority culture.”328    
The legacy of violence left by the United States during its occupation of the 
Southern Philippines goes well beyond the massacre at Bud Dajo in 1906. This was just 
one of many instances of extreme measures being taken in order to attempt to pacify the 
Muslim population and force compliance with U.S. directives.329 The massacre at Bud 
Dajo is a prism through which to examine how race and gender were formed in such a 
way as to reify U.S. hierarchies of race, maintain racial and gendered boundaries, and 
advance political and economic agendas for expansion.  
Massacres and other racial atrocities have functioned throughout United States 
history as moments of definition. They continue to in our contemporary times: the siege 
of Fallujah and accompanying killings of scores of Iraqi civilians in “free fire zones,” the 
gang rape of Abeer Qasim Hamza and killing of her entire family, the mass murder of 
twenty-four civilians by Marine Sergeant Frank Wuterich and his fellow marines, and 
most recently the mass murder of seventeen civilians, including nine children, by Staff 
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Sergeant Robert Bales in Afghanistan. In all of these contemporary examples of cross-
gender violence and infanticide the rhetoric of discernment continues to focus upon what 
the war is doing to “our young men.” The brutal gang rape and mass murder in 
Mahmudiyyah resulted in one life sentence and sentences with eligibility for parole in 
less then ten years. Sergeant Wuterich will serve no time, and already Staff Sergeant 
Bales is being prepped for a vigorous defense that he suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder. Murder, rape, and other types of cross-gender violence defined, and continue to 
define, which bodies matter and who is a savage or a barbarian.330  
The Moros who resisted the United States Army and the traditional leadership 
were animated by their particular understanding of the principles of Islam and recognized 
that traditional leadership was no longer standing by those principles. Moreover, contrary 
to popular notions of Islamic society even today, Tausug women exercised a great deal of 
political and cultural authority within their societies, to the extent that women were active 
warriors in the struggle against United States occupation. The destruction of many of 
their homes and the deaths of kinsmen at the hands of the U.S. army convinced them that 
the datus and the sultan were unwilling or unable to protect them. The demand for 
payment of the cedula to U.S. forces demonstrated to them that they were becoming a 
conquered people, much like the dhimmi status and jizya payment levied upon non-
Muslims under the dominion of Muslims. To further exacerbate the relationship, the 
insistence by Wood that cultural, social, and economic arrangement associated with Islam 
be dismantled convinced many, like Datu Ali, that the United States was intent on 
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destroying the religion itself. Given that, the Muslims of Sulu of course resorted to jihad 
to defend their religion, their culture, their way of life, and their political autonomy.331  
This band of Moros attempted to establish autonomy, wanted to avoid living under the 
dominion of non-believers, which was understood to be a prohibited act in Islam, and 
attempted to recapture political control of their society by jihad fisibillillah. They acted 
within their understanding of the Islamic faith. Abandoned by their political elite, 
unprotected from the violence and depredations of the U.S., they banded together in this 
grass-roots effort to resist the destruction of their society and way of life. They dressed in 
their finest apparel and, with less than three hundred rifles among them, prepared to face 
death with the hope of paradise. 
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Appendix 
Archival Materials 
The Library of Congress holds the papers of the major figures involved in the 
pacification campaigns against the Moros as well as the dissemination of the ideological 
justification for those efforts. General Leonard Wood’s papers contain army reports 
regarding the massacre at Bud Dajo, his personal diary, and correspondences that provide 
insight into his own motivations and ideological orientation. In tandem with his 
aggressive attitude toward Moros, he held deep convictions about the place of races 
within a hierarchy of civilization. A thorough examination of these papers will illustrate 
the mentality of the “armed progressives” who were the primary protagonists during the 
pacification of the Moros in the southern Philippines.  
The papers of General John Pershing hold his personal diary, correspondences, 
after-action reports, and his impressions of the Moros. Pershing was also quite aggressive 
in his counters to martial opposition by the Moros. Unlike Wood, however, he relied on 
his knowledge and understanding of Islam and Muslim culture in the hope that he could 
manipulate them into accommodation of the gradual encroachment upon their lands, 
sovereignty, and society. Pershing’s administration became a model for colonial officials 
charged with administrating the south.332  
 Colonel Robert Bullard’s papers offer insight into the colonial mentality and the 
Progressive orientation of officers involved in these campaigns. He was a Southern 
officer whose primary experience had been commanding African American soldiers. 
Bullard considered his childhood exposure to “plantation Negroes” as a relevant 
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experience he could implement during the pacification of Moros. Like Wood and 
Pershing, he imagined his role as crucial to the larger benevolent mission of the United 
States. Bullard’s cultural conditioning influenced his seemingly clear and decisive 
judgments about the racial character of Moros and the methods needed to control and 
improve their communities.   
 Reverend Charles Brent was deeply involved in efforts to bring “Christian 
civilization” to the Filipinos, including the Muslim population. Brent’s papers at the 
Library of Congress will provide further insight into the civilizing mission that American 
officials embarked upon in the southern Philippines. The Bancroft Library at the 
University of California, Berkeley, contains the papers of David Prescott Barrows. 
Barrows was the man primarily responsible for exporting an American style of academic 
institutions to the Philippines. Most of the American men involved in this effort 
understood Islam as the antithesis to human civilization and believed that Anglo-Saxon 
Christian civilization represented the apex of human development.  
 The U.S. Army Heritage Institute at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, holds the papers of 
many other figures involved in the pacification operations. The papers of General John 
Coulter Bates offer insight into the thinking behind the decision to sign a treaty with the 
sultan of Sulu regarding the status of existing political institutions after the Treaty of 
Paris. George W. Davis and John P. Finley, both officers who served during the early 
period of U.S. occupation, also have papers and collections of photographs at this facility. 
  
 The National Archives in Washington, D.C., contain the Philippines Commission 
Reports as well as the records of army overseas operations in the time period examined in 
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this project. These records contain Colonel Joseph Duncan’s reports on the Battle of Bud 
Dajo, which were ordered and compiled by the Senate in light of the controversies 
surrounding the killings. Taken as a whole, they provide a coherent record in order to 
organize a chronology of events and provide details, which support my argument that 
savagery and Islam were conflated and understood within a racial context by U.S. 
officials. The unifying worldview of these men was the contrast between civilization and 
savagery, which they understood and articulated within a race ideology, which permeated 
all cultural, social, and philosophical discourses of this era. 
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